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At PhD defenses, guests will, almost invariably, when given the printed PhD, first turn 
to the preface and read the acknowledgements in it. You have probably done the 
same. Perhaps this is even the only part of the PhD you will read. That would be 
completely fine with me: this book would not have existed without the help of all the 
people I am about to thank profusely in this rather lengthy preface. The preface is, in 
part, so long because I also (i) explain the cover, (ii) thank the people who got me 
interested in desert and justice, and only then (iii) move on to the actual 
acknowledgements.  
I must confess that I had a hard time finishing the preface, the very last bit of 
the PhD I still had to write. I not only run the risk of forgetting to thank people whom 
I really should have thanked, but every word I write brings me closer to a moment I 
dread: the moment of sending this PhD off to the printer, and never being able to 
change its contents anymore. The moment of really finishing my PhD, and saying 
goodbye to life as a PhD student. But here we are.  
 
1. Explaining the Cover: Correcting the Dutch Flag 
Let me start by explaining the cover of this book. When I decided, in March 2019, to 
speed up the finishing of my PhD to be able to apply for academic jobs starting Fall 
2019, I also began thinking about what should be on the cover. My mother is a painter. 
I love her work—so I thought it would be terrific if she would be willing to make a 
painting for the cover. I asked her 
and was delighted when she 
agreed to do it. So far so good, but 
what would I ask her to paint?  
I was still mulling this over 
when I visited my friends 
Franziska and Yuya in Cologne in 
May, and went with them to 
Museum Ludwig. The museum 
had on display one work by KP 




Brehmer (1938-1997), a lesser-known exponent of the ‘capitalist realism’ movement. 
The work is titled: ‘Korrektur der Nationalfarben’ (1970). When I saw it, I immediately 
knew I would ask my mother to make a painting inspired by this work. 
Korrektur der Nationalfarben consists of a German flag that looks strange: The 
bands are not of equal size (see figure 1). Instead, the gold band is very broad, the 
black band quite narrow, and the red band very narrow, barely visible. The ‘Korrektur’ 
that Brehmer made to the German flag was to change the width of the bands to reflect 
the share of wealth held by three groups in Germany: Grosskapital (roughly, the upper 
class—the gold band), Mittelstand (roughly, the middle class—the black band), and 
‘Restlichen Haushalte’ (the other households—the red band). The resulting flag is a 
striking depiction of wealth inequality in Germany at the end of the 1960s.  
The Dutch flag on the cover of this PhD was drawn with a ‘Korrektur’ similar to 
the one made by Bremer. The width of each band reflects the share of wealth held by 
three groups in the Netherlands in 2017: the richest 33,3% (the red band, covering 
about 90% of all wealth), the middle 33,3% (the white band, covering about 9%), and 
the poorest 33,3% (the blue band, covering about 1%). The result is, I think, certainly 
as remarkable as Brehmer’s flag.  
It takes a while to even see that the painting represents the Dutch flag: The 
distribution of wealth in the Netherlands is rather unequal. In fact, the Netherlands 
has the second largest wealth inequality of all OECD countries (OECD 2018). The 
question I hope this PhD will contribute to answering—or, at the very least, 
understanding better—is: What would the Dutch flag look like if everyone received 
the wealth they deserved? This gets me to the very first big thank you of this preface: 
to my mother, for painting the cover of my PhD.  
 
2. Moving into political philosophy  
Now, with the cover of this PhD explained, I will move back in time a bit, to the 
moment I came to the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics (EIPE), in 
September 2013, to do a master’s in Philosophy and Economics, and with the 
intention to continue with a PhD afterwards. My plan was to focus on methodology of 




the macroeconomic models I had worked with when writing my thesis in economics 
at the Stockholm School of Economics, the year before coming to EIPE.  
Ingrid Robeyns’ Ethics and Economics course, which I took during the first 
semester of the MA, made my doubt this planned focus on methodology a bit already. 
I noticed I really enjoyed reading and discussing about issues of (distributive) justice. 
It was a conversation with Marcel Boumans on possible thesis topics, in May 2014, 
that got me to decide to abandon the plan of writing about economic methodology 
altogether. He simply asked: What topic do you feel most passionate about? The 
answer, for me, was very clear: justice, of course! 
Justice it was, and has been since. But I still had to settle on a specific topic for 
my MA thesis. I thought it would be interesting to write about justice and taxation, 
given my background in economics. With that in mind, I started to look for a supervisor 
who could help me narrow down this still rather vague idea and ended up talking 
about it with Maureen Sie during the Erasmus Philosophy Faculty’s year-end drinks in 
June 2014. We met a few days after the drinks and, over the summer, Maureen sent 
me an article on economic desert by T.M. Scanlon in a special issue of Philosophical 
Explorations that she edited with Derk Pereboom. My interest in desert began through 
that article.  
I really found my MA thesis topic when I talked to Susan Mendus about desert 
during a PhD course of the Dutch Research School for Philosophy later that summer. 
She told me that there was this remarkable asymmetry of desert in John Rawls’s A 
Theory of Justice. He provides a very influential argument against desert as a principle 
of justice, but, at the same time argues that desert should be a central principle of 
retributive justice. Susan told me that a small discussion had emerged in the 
philosophical literature on the question whether this asymmetry of desert in Rawls’s 
work was defensible—and pointed me to a paper by her York colleague Matt 
Matravers on the issue. I read that paper, was intrigued, and then went on to read all 
the papers that had been written about the asymmetry of desert. I now had an MA 
thesis topic, and Maureen was, to my delight, willing to supervise me on it.  
Maureen turned out to be an excellent MA thesis supervisor. She is very good 
in getting me to think about whether the research I am doing matters. ‘How would 




during supervision meetings. And, ‘How would the broader philosophical discussion 
about desert and distributive justice benefit from your research?’.  These questions 
were a great counterbalance to my tendency to, from time to time, make too fine-
grained distinctions (to this day, I think that a correct answer to the question what I 
do for a living is: drawing distinctions) and, more generally, get slightly hung-up on 
details. Maureen would always get me to see the bigger picture again. Given how 
much I enjoyed working on my MA thesis under Maureen’s supervision, I was 
delighted that she was willing to continue to supervise me when I was offered a PhD 
position at EIPE, starting December 2015.   
   
3. Acknowledgements 
Now, on to the actual acknowledgements. First and foremost, I am grateful to the 
supervisors of my PhD: Maureen Sie, Serena Olsaretti, and Bart Engelen. 
 Maureen turned out not only to be a wonderful MA thesis supervisor, but also 
a great PhD supervisor. It was always refreshing to get Maureen’s (who has worked 
extensively on moral responsibility) take on how political philosophers use the notion 
of responsibility in their theories. I learned a great deal from her detailed comments 
on my work, and always enjoyed our supervision meetings, in particular when they 
took the shape of long walks through the forest on the Tilburg University campus. 
There are two things that, I think, stand out in Maureen’s comments on my work. First, 
she is wonderful at structuring arguments—often aided by drawings she would make 
on her iPad. Second, she is very creative. I would often get new ideas during 
supervision meetings because of questions Maureen would ask. 
 Not only did Maureen really help me to become a better researcher, she also 
gave me a lot of opportunity to develop as a teacher, presenter, and organizer. Thanks 
to Maureen’s help, I got the chance to teach lectures at Tilburg University, where PhD 
students are usually not allowed to do so. She also invited me to join her in presenting 
at the Avond voor Wetenschap en Maatschappij in the Hague, which was a great 
experience in talking about my research for an audience of non-philosophers. And 
Maureen convinced the practical philosophy chamber of the Dutch Research School 
for Philosophy that I would be capable of organizing a summer school for PhD 




 Whilst I was working on my MA thesis, I came across Serena Olsaretti’s Liberty, 
Desert, and the Market (2004). I really admired the book, and have read the chapters 
on desert many times. I often find myself thinking that I have come up with a new 
claim about desert, to then go back to Serena’s book and find out that I had simply 
read it there. I never dared to dream that Serena would one day supervise my PhD. 
But I am delighted that she did. Serena is very generous with her time. She provided 
me with detailed comments on my papers and took hours to go through these 
comments during supervision meetings, of which we had many more than I thought 
could reasonably be expected. She taught me to become more precise in my writing, 
sometimes even rewriting whole paragraphs to show me how I could improve. I am 
very impressed with Serena’s knowledge of the literature on desert, egalitarianism, 
and wellbeing. It happened more than once that she would remember details 
(footnotes, even) from a paper that she read fifteen years ago that I would no longer 
remember—having read the same paper a few months back. I consider myself very 
lucky to have been supervised by Serena. 
 When I moved to Tilburg University, Bart Engelen became the third supervisor 
of my PhD. Writing my PhD would not have been as much fun if I wouldn’t have had 
Bart as a supervisor. His dry sense of humor, combined with his love for tables in 
philosophy papers, always made our supervision meetings very enjoyable. Bart is very 
good in thinking about how to strengthen arguments, especially through examples. I 
found Bart especially encouraging when I would receive referee reports. My usual 
response to such reports, certainly when they recommend rejection, is to try to 
fundamentally rethink the paper I submitted. Bart would often manage to show me 
that it was possible to accommodate the comments whilst keeping (a significant) part 
of the submitted paper.  
I spent the first fourteen months of my PhD at EIPE. EIPE is a wonderful place 
to study and work. Conrad Heilmann, Constanze Binder, Jack Vromen, and, a bit later 
on, Christopher Clarke really manage to build a sense of community by organizing 
reading groups, PhD lunches, and dinners after research seminars. I am very grateful 
for everything they, and the other excellent teachers at EIPE, have taught me. I much 
enjoyed hanging out with my PhD colleagues Caglar Osman Dede, Daphne Truijens, 




Koliofotis, and Willem. I also worked, during my time as PhD student at EIPE, for the 
Faculty’s director of education Bart Leeuwenburgh one day a week. Being an assistant 
to Bart also got me to work closely with the support staff of the faculty—especially 
with Evaline Bender, Lena Schots, Marloes Westerveld, and Ticia Herold. I really 
enjoyed working with them and have good memories from when Bart, Lena, Ticia, and 
Paul Schuurman came to visit me during my research stay in Barcelona.  
When I was in Barcelona, during the fall of 2016, Maureen got offered a full 
professorship at Tilburg University, and negotiated that I could move to that university 
with her. Although I was sad to leave my wonderful colleagues at Erasmus University, 
I was also delighted with the new position, as it gave me nearly double the research 
time I had in Rotterdam. When I started in Tilburg, the department had recently made 
many new hires. It was a wonderful experience to work in an environment with so 
many young philosophers, many of whom would go on to become friends. Thanks so 
much Alfred Archer, Amanda Cawston, Bart Engelen, Ben Mattheson, Caroline 
Harnacke, Catherine Robb, Dries Deweer, Felipe Romero Toro, Jan Sprenger, Georgie 
Mills, Max van der Heijden, Matteo Colombo, Maureen Sie, Monica Meijsing, Naftali 
Weinberger, Natascha Rietdijk, Nathan Wildman, Noah van Dongen, Roos Slegers, 
Sander Verhaegh, Sanem Yazicioglu, Tim Klaassen, and Yvette Drissen. I really enjoyed 
our lunches, tea breaks, drinks, and dinners. 
Over the course of my PhD so many people commented on my papers that I 
decided that it would be best to thank them with a footnote in each of the different 
chapters of this PhD. Nevertheless, there are a few people, besides my supervisors, 
whom I’d like to thank in particular. Willem, who comments on (almost) everything I 
write before it can do any harm, and has taught me a great deal about philosophy, 
work/life balance, and, perhaps most importantly, taking a more stoic approach to life 
as an academic (though my stoicism still falters at times). Teun Dekker, with whom I 
have met up with in Maastricht a number of times in Maastricht to discuss paper drafts 
and who agrees with me that political philosophers should talk more about desert 
than they currently do (whenever I find myself thanking him for his comments on my 
work, Teun will invariably say: “It’s for the cause.”). And Julien Kloeg, with whom I talk 




fundamental questions, in particular about depoliticization, the intrinsic importance 
of equality, neutrality, and perfectionism.  
I have spent four months at Pompeu Fabra University. The experience of being 
supervised by Serena Olsaretti during my time there was so wonderful that, towards 
the end of my stay, I asked her—I think, with an excellent sense for timing on my part, 
whilst standing in the elevator together—whether she wanted to become my second 
supervisor. I still remember that she responded, “I am chuffed you ask me, let’s talk 
about it more soon”. I did not know what ‘chuffed’ meant, but was happy to discover 
the meaning of the verb in a dictionary shortly afterwards. Thanks to Anca, Andrée-
Anne and Mauro, Isa, Pedro, and Riccardo for making my stay in Barcelona so 
enjoyable. And to all the friends and family from the Netherlands who came over to 
visit.  
I have also spent four months at Yale University, under the supervision of 
Shelly Kagan. During these months, I learned a great deal from him—not just through 
our weekly supervision meetings, but also because I got the opportunity to study his 
work in detail. Kagan’s drive to state accessibly and precisely what is at stake is 
admirable and inspiring. He was much more available during and after the research 
visit than could reasonably have been expected. As others who have been similarly 
lucky to be supervised by Kagan have put it: he went beyond the call of duty, although 
he himself would deny that such a category exists. Thanks also to Carme, Dries, James, 
Jeltsche, Laura, and Min for making my time in New Haven not only academically but 
also socially worthwhile.  
My research visits, and the travels during my PhD more generally, were made 
possible, in part, through the support of external funding bodies. I am grateful to the 
Prins Bernhard Cultuur Fonds and the Institute for Humane Studies for their financial 
support.  
I have learned a great deal from my time as editor of the Erasmus Journal for 
Philosophy and Economics. I thank Caglar, Willem, and Philippe for giving me the 
opportunity to serve on the board, and to Akshath Jittendranath, Caglar, Erwin, 
Lennart Ackermans, Marina Uzunova, Philippe, Vaios, and Willem for being great 
colleagues on the journal. Special thanks to Willem, for teaching me to be an editor, 




lead editor of EJPE, the journal was, at some point, struggling to find new editors 
because of a temporary drop in the number of PhD students at EIPE (now there are, 
fortunately, many again). I was very happy that the Faculty of Philosophy of Erasmus 
University Rotterdam provided us with student-assistant support for the formatting, 
which saved the editors a great deal of time.   
During the pre-final year of my PhD, I became on the editors of Bij Nader Inzien 
(BNI). I think it is really important that philosophers try to communicate their research 
to a wider audience. BNI provides me with an excellent opportunity to facilitate fellow 
philosophers in the Netherlands and Belgium in doing so. Thanks, especially, to Fleur 
Jongepier for inviting me to join the editorial board, and for teaching me a great deal 
about writing accessibly for a broader audience. Thanks also to Dick Timmer, Eveline 
Groot, Lianne Tijhaar, Linde van Schuppen, Matthé Scholten, Natascha, and Willem 
for relaunching the blog together with me during the fall of 2019.  
I am also grateful to those who offered me professional opportunities during 
my PhD. I thank Erwin Dekker and Arjo Klamer, for giving me the opportunity to teach 
lectures and tutorial as part of the Introduction to Economics of Arts and Cultures 
course at the Erasmus School for History, Communication and Culture; to, again, Arjo, 
for asking me to teach lectures on alternative approaches to economics to students at 
the University of Applied Philosophy; and to Bert van de Ven and Wim Dubbink, for 
making an exception by allowing me to teach lectures when I was a PhD student in 
Tilburg.  
Over the course of my PhD, I have co-authored quite a few pieces with other 
philosophers. I want to thank two co-authors in particular.  
The first is Tom Mulligan, whom I met at a conference in Aix-en-Provence 
shortly after I started my PhD. I found it very generous of him that he wanted to co-
author with me, given that I was just starting as a PhD and he was about to embark on 
his second postdoc. I have learned a great deal from Tom about desert and merit, but 
also about academic writing, editing, and publishing more generally. Thanks so much 
Tom! I hope to continue the chain of helpfulness (a term I am borrowing from the 
acknowledgements to Willem’s thesis) that you initiated—and look forward to 




The second co-author I want to thank specifically is Willem. He is, by far, the 
person I co-author with the most. We are, if I am not mistaken, currently engaged in 
our seventh joined writing project. I hope we will hit the double digits soon. Willem is, 
in some ways, my philosophical twin: I think we almost always agree about 
philosophical questions. Perhaps I should have waited until the tenth joined writing 
project, but I decided to give our collaboration a name: the Rotterdam Axiology 
Platform (RAP). RAP is there to help answer—or, at least, help thinking about—all your 
questions on the nature of desert, wellbeing, and, as of late, the moral status of 
animals.    
I am very fortunate to have a lovely family and group of friends on whom I 
could always count for chats over coffee and tea, dinners, bouldering, playing squash, 
long walks in the forest and on the beach, concerts, museum visits, and holidays. 
Mama and Papa, Lotte, Jeanine and Dominique, Rozemarijn and Bas, Willem and Nina, 
Emma and John, Lydia, Julien, Manuel and Barbara, Yourai and Floor, Philippe and 
Genevieve, Christiaan and Suna, Franziska and Yuya, Jasper, Marloes, Petra and 
Martin, Roel, Martine and Herm-Jan: thank you very much.  
Writing a PhD can be hard at times. I have gone through various PhD crises, 
wondering about whether doing a PhD would be the best way for me to contributing 
(in whatever small way I am capable of) to making the world a better place, whether 
I was good enough to have a career in academia, whether I was working hard enough, 
and so on. During some of these moments of doubt, I needed a shoulder to cry on—
and I knew I could always count on Rozemarijn and Willem to provide one. Their 
support means more to me than I can convey in words. Perhaps the best way to 
describe it, is that I am tearing up a little bit even when I am writing this.  
My PhD is dedicated to the parents of my mother, whom we have referred to 
as ‘MoPo’ for as long as I can remember. MoPo lived only five houses away from my 
parents’ house, and I have spent a great deal of my time as a child at their place: 
helping out in the garden, playing on Po’s organ, reading books from their library, 
playing games, and, occasionally, investing in stocks and options with Po. MoPo were 
like a second set of parents to me. Their dedication, empathy for people in need, 










Three chapters of this PhD are co-authored. I co-authored chapter 4 with Thomas 
Mulligan (Georgetown University), chapter 5 with Willem van der Deijl (Tilburg 
University), and chapter 6 with Dick Timmer (Utrecht University). In the case of all 
three co-authored chapters, my co-author and I were equal contributors. The process, 
in each case, has been to first develop an argumentative structure together through a 
number of (Skype) meetings, then divide the writing of a first version of these sections 
amongst the co-authors, and subsequently to rewrite each other’s sections. In all 
cases, the result is a genuinely co-authored text in which I can no longer tell which 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Nearly 2 400 years ago, Aristotle wrote that “all people agree that what is just in 
distribution must be in accord with some sense of desert” (Nicomachean Ethics: 
1131a). Since then, many philosophers—including Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1697), 
John Stuart Mill (1998), and Henry Sidgwick (1981)—have written approvingly about 
desert as a principle of distributive justice.  
 During the 1960s, however, desert got out of favor. So much so, in fact, that, 
in 1971, John Kleinig observed that “the notion of desert seems by and large to have 
been consigned to the philosophical scrap heap” (1971, 71). Perhaps Kleinig was 
influenced by John Rawls’s brief, but very influential arguments against desert as a 
distributive principle in his A Theory of Justice (1971, secs. 17 and 48). Since Rawls 
proposed his desert-less theory of distributive justice, many philosophers have gone 
on to advocate other desert-less theories, such as prioritarianism (Parfit 1997), 
relational egalitarianism (Anderson 1999), and sufficientarianism (Frankfurt 1987). 
 Although it is true that desert has only played a minor role in discussions of 
distributive justice since the 1970s, it has, contrary to Kleinig’s assessment, never 
really been consigned to the scrap heap of distributive ideals. In fact, if anything, there 
appears to be somewhat of a resurgence of interest in desert in discussions of 
distributive justice in recent years. 1  Some philosophers have proposed monistic 
desert-based theories of distributive justice (Feldman 2016; Mulligan 2018a); others 
have advocated pluralistic theories in which desert plays a role alongside other 
principles, such as need (Miller 2001; Schmidtz 2006; Sheffrin 2013; Temkin 2017).   
 I believe that the resurgence of interest in desert as a principle of distributive 
justice is warranted. Ongoing philosophical reflection on the notion of desert has 
made clear, as Shelly Kagan (2012, 3) rightly observes, that the notion of desert is 
“surprisingly complex”, that there many different conceptualizations of it, and that 
not all conceptualizations of desert are vulnerable to the same objections. Generalized 
skepticism about desert as a principle of distributive justice, it seems to me, can and 
should be resisted. This PhD is a collection of five chapters that all aim to contribute 
 
1 In the introduction to an edited volume on desert and justice, Serena Olsaretti notes that: “This 
volume is testimony to a growing interest in desert” (2003b, 1).   
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to finding an answer to the question: What role can desert plausibly play within 
egalitarian theories of distributive justice?  
 The structure of this introduction is as follows. In section 2, I start with two 
cases that, I think, demonstrate the intuitive appeal of desert as a distributive 
principle, using the idea that desert requires moral balance. Then, in section 3, I 
explain in greater detail what the notion of desert is by presenting three received 
wisdoms about desert claims that have emerged in the literature on desert. In section 
4, I examine three reasons why many philosophers are critical about desert as a 
principle of distributive justice (the distinctiveness objection, the harshness objection, 
and the responsibility objection) and explain how the chapters in this PhD contribute 
to showing that the latter two of these objections do not prove to be fatal. In section 
5, I give a brief summary of each of the chapters in the PhD.  
 
1. Desert in a factory and a burning house  
1.1. Case 1: An accident in a factory 
There has been an accident in a factory. Two workers, Amira and Boris, have been 
hurt. You can only help one of them, for instance because you only have a single dose 
of painkillers. Whom should you help? Absent any additional information, a coin flip 
would be as good as any decision procedure here: Amira and Boris seem to be equally 
deserving of being helped.  
 But now suppose we receive additional information: Boris caused the accident. 
And not just that, he did so on purpose. Who should be helped first now, given this 
additional information? It seems that a coin flip no longer offers the best decision 
procedure. Amira should be helped first, because Boris purposefully caused the 
accident. Boris is no longer as deserving of being helped as Amira is: fault forfeits first.2  
 The concept of desert seems, as Shelly Kagan has argued, to do a good job at 
explaining our intuitions about the factory accident case. It shows at work an idea that 
is central to many accounts of desert: the idea of moral balance. By causing the 
 
2 This is a principle first elaborated by Joel Feinberg (1970). Kagan (2012, 23–24) uses the factory 
accident case to start his inquiry into desert, the longest book ever written on the topic. I could have 
chosen a different example, but decided to use this one as a tribute to Kagan’s work on desert, from 
which I learned a great deal.   
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accident, Boris puts a moral scale out of balance. By not helping him first, a step is 
taken towards restoring the balance. But all this raises a host of new questions: How 
do we know when a moral scale is out of balance? What are appropriate ways to 
restore balance? To decide these things, we need to become more precise on what it 
means to deserve something.  
 Claims that someone (or something 3 ) deserves something are commonly 
thought to be a three-place relation, uniting a subject (desert subject), the response, 
treatment or good the subject is said to deserve (desert object), and the ground, or 
grounds, on which this object is said to be deserved (desert basis or bases).4  An 
example would be the claim that Boris (the desert subject) deserves not to be helped 
first (the desert object), because he purposefully caused the accident in the factory 
(the desert basis). By causing the accident, Boris has put a moral scale out of balance—
and this lack of balance can be restored, or at least restored in part, by not helping 
him first.  
 Desert claims arise in many different contexts and take many different forms. 
We have seen an example of a plausible negative desert claim:5 Someone deserves 
not to be helped first. But we also often make positive desert claims: claims to the fact 
that someone deserves something.  
1.2. Case 2: Saving someone from a burning house.  
Tracy lives in a neighborhood with many timber-framed houses. One morning, she 
wakes up to the cries of her neighbor, Shirley. Shirley’s house is on fire and she cannot 
escape. Tracy calls the fire brigade and waits, but when Shirley’s cries stop, Tracy 
decides to try to save Shirley herself. Tracy gets a ladder, climbs into Shirley’s house 
 
3 Some philosophers argue that inanimate objects can deserve things. An example would be the claim 
that the Grand Canyon deserves protection. I am not aware of any sustained discussion of the topic of 
inanimate objects and desert, but McLeod does mention it briefly (2002). 
4 Olsaretti, for instance, writes that one of “few basic points of agreement amongst desert theorists” is 
that “desert is a three-place relation between a person, the grounds on which is said to be deserving 
(the desert basis), and the treatment or good which she is said to deserve (the deserved good)” (2003b, 
4). Owen McLeod says that “[t]he contemporary literature is agreed that desert … is a three-place 
relation: it binds three sorts of things: (a) a subject, (b) a thing deserved by the subject, and (c) a basis 
in virtue of which the subject deserves it” (1998, 61–62). Feldman (2016, 36) and Feldman and Skow 
(2016) cite the same passages to illustrate the support for this received wisdom.  
5 This use of the term ‘negative desert claim’ is distinct from Robert Goodin’s (1985). He has argued 
that desert claims are almost always negative in the sense that they merely give moral warrant for 
repairing states of affairs that are undeserved—but do not provide positive reasons for doing so.   
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through a window, finds Shirley lying unconscious on the floor, and carries her out of 
the house. Shirley survives. Unfortunately, the rescue leaves Tracy injured from burns 
and smoke inhalation. Tracy requires expensive treatment at the hospital, which 
means that her resource holdings decrease. Her welfare has also dropped 
considerably as a result of her injuries.  
It seems that Tracy deserves to be well-off because of the heroic act she 
carried out. It seems that she deserves to have her medical treatment reimbursed; 
perhaps she even deserves to get a medal and some money. Here the thought of moral 
balance is relevant again: If Tracy’s heroism would not be met with reimbursement 
and reward, the moral scale would be out of balance.  
 The philosophical literature on desert consists, to a large extent, of an inquiry 
into two questions that the factory accident and burning house examples raise:  
 
(1) What are appropriate desert subjects, desert objects, and desert bases? 
(2) What amount of the desert object fits with a certain amount of the desert 
basis or bases?   
  
 Sticking with the moral balance idea, one could imagine a scale with on one 
side the desert object, and, on the other side, the desert basis. Question (1) asks what 
lies on the scales: what things should we look at to evaluate whether moral balance 
has been achieved? Question (2) asks when these ingredients are in the right 
proportion to each other to warrant the claim that moral balance has been restored.  
 It seems intuitively plausible that Amira deserves to be helped first and that 
Tracy deserves to be reimbursed and rewarded. Nonetheless, many philosophers are 
critical about desert as a principle of distributive justice. Why is there so much 
philosophical resistance to a notion that, to many people, appears to be so intuitively 
connected to fairness and justice? To get a better grip on this question, it is helpful to 
consider in a bit more detail what the notion of desert is.  
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2. Three received wisdoms  
There are three received wisdoms about desert claims that many desert theorists 
subscribe to. Discussing these wisdoms will help in getting a better sense of what 
desert claims are and what my PhD project contributes to the literature on desert and 
distributive justice.  
 Besides agreeing that desert claims are three-place relations, many desert 
theorists adopt a principle that restricts what desert claims can be about:  
 
Received wisdom 1 (aboutness principle): The only permissible desert bases are 
acts and attributes of the desert object (cf. Feinberg 1970, 72; Olsaretti 2003b, 
4; Sadurski 1985, 117). 
 
The aboutness principle makes desert into an individualistic notion: You can only 
deserve on the basis of your own actions and the things that you suffer. You cannot 
deserve on the basis of someone else’s actions and the things someone else suffers—
nor can you deserve on the basis of states of the world that do not affect you 
personally. To see this, consider the following desert claim:  
 
(1) J.K. Rowling deserves to be wealthy, because George R. R. Martin wrote 
the immensely popular Game of Thrones books.  
 
This desert claim violates the aboutness principle, because the fact that George R. R. 
Martin wrote the Game of Thrones books is neither an act nor an attribute of 
Rowling’s. This seems uncontroversial, but there are other questions concerning the 
aboutness principle that are less straightforward. 
In particular, there is a discussion amongst desert theorists about whether the 
aboutness principle is enough. Can any act or attribute of people really be a basis for 
desert? People do, it seems, simply get lucky sometimes with the acts and attributes 
they have. To see this, consider the following desert claim:  
 
(2) Derek deserves to win the beauty contest on the basis of his good looks. 
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Good looks are, at least some degree, a matter of good luck. Some desertist theorists 
take a very permissive view on desert and luck—a “laissez faire view”, as Olsaretti 
(2006, 411) has called it—according to which people can deserve on the basis of their 
acts and attributes, regardless of how lucky they are to have them. On this view, even 
if good looks would entirely be a matter of good luck, people could still deserve to win 
beauty contests on the basis of them.   
The ‘laissez faire’ view about desert and luck seems appropriate for what are 
called ‘institutional’ desert claims, such as (1). On these claims, people should get a 
certain object in line with the rules or aims of institutions—regardless of how lucky 
they were in complying with them. But as Olsaretti (2006, 441–44) has argued, the 
‘laissez faire’ view of desert is implausible for the type of desert that can function as a 
principle of distributive justice: Why would others owe someone a desert object if a 
person was simply lucky enough to have it?  For that more fundamental type of desert, 
a less permissive view on desert and luck seems to be required.     
A second, related, received wisdom about desert claims is that, if desert is to 
function as a principle of justice, people should at least have some control over the 
acts or attributes on the basis of which they deserve. These acts and attributes should 
not just be matters of luck: It would be unfair if some people received more of the 
currency of justice than others simply because they were lucky. To capture this 
thought, many desert theorists adopt a responsibility requirement on desert claims:6  
 
Received wisdom 2 (responsibility requirement): When S deserves O on basis 
B, then S is responsible for B (cf. Feldman 1995, 64; McLeod 1998, 63).   
 
Philosophers who endorse a responsibility requirement on desert claims need to take 
a position on when luck undercuts desert claims, and when it does not. To do so, it is 
helpful to distinguish between two different types of luck: performance luck and 
 
6 In the literature on desert, the responsibility requirement is usually presented as a third received 
wisdom. One might also conceive of it, however, as a refinement of the aboutness principle, restricting 
the set of permissible desert bases to things the desert subject has control over. I take this second 
approach in chapter 2 (“Defending Asymmetries of Desert”) and in chapter 4 of this thesis (“Why Not 
Be a Desertist? An Argument for Desert and Against Luck Egalitarianism”). I do not think much hinges 
on which approach one takes.  
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background luck (Olsaretti 2006, 440). Performance luck is luck that disrupts 
performances, such as the death of a major competitor. Background luck is luck that 
affects the conditions under which a performance is made, such as having well-
educated parents, a good school, a stable family life, and a high IQ.  
 Amongst those desert theorists who endorse a responsibility requirement on 
desert claims, there are two main views on when luck undercuts desert: the 
conventional view (Olsaretti 2006, 438–41) and the fair opportunity view (Olsaretti 
2006, 444–48). According to the conventional view (endorsed by, among others, 
Miller 2001; Schmidtz 2006), only performance luck undercuts desert. On the fair 
opportunity view (endorsed by, among others, Dekker 2010; Olsaretti 2006; Temkin 
2017), background luck can also, sometimes, undercut desert claims. To get a better 
sense of the differences between the laissez faire view, the conventional view, and 
the fair opportunity view, it is helpful to consider two further examples of desert 
claims.  
 Imagine a small town where two bakers, Mell and Sue, have each run sole-
trader baking stores for twenty years. They are the only bakers in town and have 
roughly an equal share of the total market in baked goods. Then, one day, Sue 
suddenly dies of a heart attack. As a result, Mell’s income doubles. Does Mell deserve 
to have her income double? Is the following desert claim justified? 
 
(3) Mell deserves to have her income double as a result of her sales doubling 
following Sue’s death.  
  
Those who uphold the laissez fair view, would say that claim (3) is perfectly justified. 
The death of a major competitor is performance luck that does not undercut Mell’s 
desert of income. Matters are different on the conventional and the fair opportunity 
views. On those views, the sudden death of a major competitor is a type of luck that 
does undercut Mell’s desert of the additional income she receives.  
 To see the difference between the conventional view and the fair opportunity 
views on desert and luck, consider the following desert claim:  
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(4) J.K. Rowling deserves to be wealthy because she wrote the very popular 
Harry Potter book series.  
 
Now, suppose that J.K. Rowling was only able to start the series because her parents 
are wealthy and funded her throughout the writing of the first book of the series. 
Rowling had good background luck. If claim (4) would be evaluated from the 
perspective of the conventional view, then it seems that the fact that Rowling’s 
parents enabled her to write the book changes nothing about Rowling’s desert of 
wealth. Having wealthy parents, after all, is not performance luck.   
 However, on the fair opportunity view, the fact that Rowling’s parents enabled 
her, through their wealth, to start the Harry Potter book series would, at least to some 
degree, undercut her desert of wealth on the basis of writing these books. Not 
everyone is lucky enough to have parents who can fund during a period in which they 
work on a book manuscript.  
 The issue of desert and luck is an important one. I will return to it in chapters 
2, 4, and 6 of the thesis. To give just a brief preview: In chapter 2, I point out that it is 
possible to elaborate desert-based views of distributive justice on which all people 
deserve to have a certain baseline level of well-being, simply in virtue of being 
persons. Because such desert claims are based on a characteristic that people have no 
control over (namely, being a person), imposing a responsibility requirement on them 
is unnecessary. In that same chapter, I also argue that imposing a responsibility 
requirement on desert makes desert-based distributive theories vulnerable to the 
charge that they require people to make shameful revelations, for instance about their 
capacity to work, or their intelligence (drawing on Wolff 1998). In chapter 4 (in 
particular, section 3.2.), Thomas Mulligan and I point out that one of the main 
differences between desertism and luck egalitarianism is that desertism is commonly 
thought to be more permissive of luck influencing distributive outcomes. And, finally, 
in chapter 6, Dick Timmer and I argue that all desert theorists who adopt the 
conventional view about luck and desert should endorse policies that cap the amount 
of income people can earn.  
There is a third, and final, received wisdom about desert claims that is worth 
mentioning here. This wisdom is about the relationship between desert and time:  




 Received wisdom 3 (backward-lookingness): If at t, S deserves O in virtue of the 
fact that S did or has a certain attribute (B) at t’, then t’ cannot be later than t 
(B. Barry 1965, 111; Feinberg 1970, 48; Kleinig 1971, 73; Miller 2001, 93; 
Sadurski 1985, 117; Rachels 1997, 100). 
 
Many philosophers have argued that desert is backward-looking. They argue that the 
desert subject can only deserve on the basis of acts or attributes that lie in the past, 
or at most in the present. The following desert claim would, for instance, not be 
permissible:  
 
(5) Luke (S) deserves to be punished (O) now (t) because he will commit a 
murder (B) a few months from now (t’).  
 
There are three main reasons why desert theorists insist that desert is backward-
looking: one practical and two more fundamental.  
 The first, more practical objection (the epistemological objection) is that we 
can make mistakes when we predict the future: there are epistemological 
uncertainties about whether Luke will really commit the murder we expect him to 
commit—he might, at the very last moment, decide against committing it and 
therefore cannot be deserving of punishment before he carries out the murder.  
The second reason (the desert paradox), is that if we punish Luke before he 
commits the murder we expect him to commit, we may change the future: It could 
prevent him from committing the crime (for instance, because he would be 
incarcerated), but it could also make him more likely to commit it (‘if they are going 
to treat me like a criminal, I’ll act like one’).  
The third reason (the freedom paradox) is that if we really know for sure now 
that Luke will commit the murder, then Luke may not be free not to commit it. If Luke 
does not have the freedom to do otherwise than commit the murder, then he may 
not deserve punishment for committing it. I will discuss and challenge the received 
wisdom that desert is always backward-looking in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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3. Resisting generalized desert skepticism  
Philosophical inquiry into the notion of desert during the past five decades has made 
it clear that there are three main reasons why many philosophers critical of desert as 
a principle of justice. First, a number of philosophers have come to doubt that desert 
ever has independent moral force—it appears that the concept is often used as a mere 
rubberstamp on claims generated by institutions and moral principles other than 
desert (the distinctiveness objection). Second, desert is often associated with the 
thought that people can deserve to suffer (the harshness objection).7 Third, a number 
of philosophers worry that people cannot be held responsible in a way that is required 
to deserve the currency of justice (the responsibility objection). I’ll discuss each 
objection in turn here. 
 
3.1. The distinctiveness objection8 
The verb ‘to deserve’ is used quite often. In fact, it is difficult to spend a full day 
without saying, thinking, or writing the verb ‘to deserve’ at least once. People are, as 
Shelly Kagan has put it “friends of desert” (2012, 3). The verb ‘to deserve’, however, 
is often used as a rubberstamp on other claims. Often, when we say that someone 
deserves something, we mean that it would be good if someone were to get it, for 
reasons unrelated to desert—such as the demands of institutions, or the demands of 
other moral principles, such as need.  
Philosophers who are critical of desert as a principle of distributive justice 
worry that desert is never more than a rubberstamp. It does not have independent 
moral force. It cannot, to put it more precisely, justify that people are owed a certain 
treatment by others. To get a grip on these discussions and see the objection more 
clearly, it is helpful to distinguish between institutional, preinstitutional, and 
prejusticial desert claims, a distinction that will recur in many of the chapters that 
make up this PhD thesis.  
 
7 Note that the ‘harshness objection’ is better known as an objection to luck egalitarianism, pressed by, 
among others, Elizabeth Anderson (1999). I will use the term ‘harshness objection’ in this latter way in 
chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
8 The seminal contributions on which this section builds include: Feinberg (1970, 71–73), McLeod (1998; 
2002), Miller (2003, 25), and Olsaretti (2003b; 2004, chap. 1).  
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Institutional desert claims. Institutional desert claims hold that someone 
should get something according to the rules or aims of an institution. An example of 
such a desert claim would be: 9  
 
(6) Amy deserves an A+ because she wrote an excellent essay. 
 
 When we say that Amy should get a certain grade, what we really mean is that 
she should get this grade according to the institution of grading. If the institution of 
grading would not be there, Amy would not be owed a grade. There is no fact of the 
matter about what grade she deserves absent that institution.  
 Desert claims generated by institutions may be better described as claims of 
entitlement: When we say that someone deserves something on the basis of the rules 
or aims of institutions, we really mean to say that someone is entitled to getting that 
thing according to these rules or aims. Amy has written an excellent essay, and, as 
judged by the criteria that have been drawn up, those who write excellent essays are 
entitled to get an A+.10 
Now, if desert would always be fully reducible to the rules and/or aims of 
institutions, then it cannot be used to design institutions. There would be no fact of 
the matter about what people deserve, absent institutions. Institutions, hence, would 
have to be designed using principles other than desert.11  
 Preinstitutional desert claims. Preinstitutional desert claims are not fully 
reducible to the aims or rules of institutions. Even preinstitutional desert claims, 
however, may sometimes be rubberstamp claims—but then on claims generated by 
other moral principles. To see this, consider the following claim:  
 
 
9 This way of introducing the large variety of desert claims people make is inspired by the way Sher 
(1989, chap. 1) sets up his inquiry into desert.  
10 Although I am only concerned with preinstitutional desert claims in this thesis, it seems to me that it 
could, sometimes, be valuable to analyze the outcomes of institutions through the lens of institutional 
desert. I am, broadly speaking, sympathetic to Lisa Herzog’s (2017; 2018) proposal to partially evaluate 
the justice of market outcomes from the perspective of institutional desert.   
11 Note that aim-based and rule-based institutional desert claims can and do come apart. It is possible, 
for instance, that the rules of an institution are actually incompatible with its aims. For further 
discussion of the two types of desert claims, see Olsaretti (2003b). 
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(7) Tracy deserves to get assistance, because giving it to her would benefit the 
worst off. 
 
The claim that giving Tracy assistance would benefit the worst off is not wholly 
reducible to institutions. But while it is conceivable that a claim such as (7) could be 
used to design institutions, this is not really a desert claim either. What we say here is 
that Tracy should get assistance, because some other moral principle—for example 
Rawls’s difference principle—stipulates that she should. Here, desert is, again, no 
more than a rubberstamp, but this time on claims generated by moral principles other 
than desert.  
 Prejusticial desert claims. Prejusticial desert claims, finally, are not fully 
reducible to moral principles other than desert (Scheffler 2003a, 69). An example of a 
desert claim that many philosophers take not to be fully reducible to other moral 
principles is (Miller 2001; Mulligan 2018a; Hsieh 2000): 
 
(8) Steve Jobs deserved to be wealthy because he made such a large 
productive contribution to the world economy 
 
 A great deal of the recent literature on desert is concerned with settling when 
desert claims are preinstitutional and when they are prejusticial. In other words, a 
great deal of the recent literature is concerned with the question when desert is a 
rubberstamp and when it is not. To get a sense of these discussions, consider a claim 
that is familiar from the previous section:  
 
(9) Boris deserves not to be helped first, because he purposefully caused the 
accident in the factory. 
 
Some critics of Kagan’s use of the factory accident example have argued that the fault 
forfeits first principle need not really be captured by the notion of desert (Lippert-
Rasmussen 2016; Tadros 2017). Instead, it is much better captured by some other 
moral principle that is more plausible all-around. Tadros has suggested principles of a 
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more deontological cast than desert, such as ‘having the duty to compensate others 
you harm’ (2017, 396).  
This brings us to the distinctiveness worry: Does desert ever pick out 
something that cannot be reduced to the claims generated by institutions or other 
moral principles? Does desert have independent moral force?  
 Many desert theorists agree that at least one type of desert does in fact have 
independent moral force: moral desert. Moral desert claims hold that people deserve 
to get something (usually wellbeing, or its cognates) on the basis of morally 
appraisable characteristics, such as the virtuousness of their actions and/or character 
(see, for instance, Arneson 2007; Kristjánsson 2005; Kagan 2012; Temkin 2017). A 
standard example of a moral desert claim is the following:  
 
(10) Luke deserves to be well-off on the basis of his virtuousness.  
 
A number of desert theorists claim that people cannot just deserve on the basis of the 
moral nature of their actions or character, but also on other bases—such as their 
productive contributions (Miller 2001; Mulligan 2018a), the effort they exert (Sadurski 
1985; Wolff 2003), the suffering they go through  (Feldman 1995; McLeod 1996), or 
even their needs (Feldman 2016).  
 Although the topic of when, if ever, desert has independent moral force is an 
important one, I will not discuss it at much length in this PhD. The reason for this is 
that I think that it is too early for generalized desert skepticism. It is becoming 
increasingly clear, in philosophical discussions about desert, that it is a surprisingly 
complex notion. Given that attempts to uncover what the notion of desert is are still 
ongoing, I do not think it is warranted to dismiss the concept on the grounds of the 
distinctiveness worry alone. 
 
3.2. The harshness objection 
A second, common worry about desert is that it is a harsh notion. Many philosophers 
seem to think that a commitment to desert comes with a commitment to 
retributivism: the thought that people can deserve to suffer for the bad choices that 
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they make. As Kagan points out, however, one could very well be a “moderate” about 
desert—thinking that people can never deserve to suffer (2012, 26). 
 To see the distinction between moderatism and retributivism about desert 
more clearly, it is helpful to think of the factory accident case again. A retributivist 
might say that Boris, because he caused the accident, deserves not to be helped even 
if medicine would be available for him as well. A moderate, on the other hand, would 
say that in cases medicine is not scarce, both Amira and Boris deserve to be helped. 
Nobody deserves to suffer.  
 There are various ways in which one could argue for desert moderatism. I think 
it is worth examining one such argument here, because it will re-occur in various 
chapters of the thesis. To see the argument, suppose that we adopt an account of 
moral desert, according to which persons deserve well-being in proportion to their 
virtuousness. The moderate could, as Kagan (2012, chap. 4.1.; 2019, chap. 4.1.) has 
argued, stipulate that there is a minimum level of well-being that any person deserves, 
simply in virtue of being a person. If that is true and the minimal level of well-being is 
sufficiently high, then no amount of vice could make a person deserve to suffer.  
 In my thesis, I make three contributions to the discussion on whether desert is 
too harsh. Firstly, in chapter 2 (‘Defending Asymmetries of Desert’), I examine a 
potential challenge to moderatism about desert: the challenge that if one defends 
desert as a principle of distributive justice, then one must defend desert as a principle 
of retributive justice as well. I argue that this challenge can be resisted. It is possible 
to consistently hold that desert should play a central role in distributive justice, and 
no role in retributive justice.  
Secondly, in chapter 4 (‘Why Not Be A Desertist? Three Arguments for Desert 
and Against Luck Egalitarianism’, co-authored with Tom Mulligan), we examine a set 
of cases in which desert actually appears to be less harsh than its closest competitor 
in the distributive justice literature: luck egalitarianism. These are cases in which 
people voluntarily choose to make a social contribution—such as saving someone 
from a burning building (as in the burning house case) or caring for a sick or elderly 
family member. The luck egalitarian would hold that people are not owed rewards for 
costly, socially valuable contributions, because they made them voluntarily. The 
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desertist, on the other hand, argue that she would. This, I contend, is an important 
difference between desertism and luck egalitarianism.  
Thirdly, in chapter 5 (‘Can Desert Solve the Principle of Stakes? A Reply to 
Olsaretti’, co-authored with Willem van der Deijl), we examine a second set of cases 
in which desert actually appears to be less harsh than luck egalitarianism: cases in 
which people suffer from very bad option luck. One example would be Marc 
Fleurbaey’s (1995) famous case of the motorcyclist Bert, who voluntarily decides to 
drive his motorcycle recklessly, whilst not wearing a helmet. Unfortunately, Bert ends 
up in a terrible accident and is in urgent need of expensive medical care. Luck 
egalitarianism has been criticized for holding that there is, in principle, no limit to the 
bad consequences that Bert can suffer as a result of his recklessness. Moral desert, on 
the other hand, would constrain these consequences in proportion to an act or 
characteristics of Bert’s such as his virtuousness. These three points, I think, show that 
desertism may actually be less harsh than is commonly thought.  
 
3.3. The responsibility objection  
A third common worry about desert is that people cannot be held responsible in a way 
that is required to deserve. One version of this worry is often attributed to Rawls. He 
famously argued, in A Theory of Justice, that:  
 
“[I]t is incorrect that individuals with greater natural endowments and the superior 
character that has made their development possible have a right to a co-operative 
scheme that enables them to obtain even further benefits in ways that do not 
contribute to the advantages of others. We do not deserve our place in the distribution 
of native endowments, any more than we deserve our initial starting place in society. 
That we deserve the superior character that enables us to make the effort to cultivate 
our abilities is also problematic; for such character depends in good part upon 
fortunate family and social circumstances in early life for which we can claim no 
credit.” (1999, 89) 
 
Robert Nozick (1974, 224) and Tim Scanlon (1986, 149), among others, take 
Rawls to be argueing here that people can never be responsible for their actions, 
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because these are ultimately the result of factors outside their control such as genes 
and upbringing. In terms of the debate on free will, these interpreters of Rawls take 
him to subscribe to an incompatibilist position,12 which has it that “no differences 
between persons can be the basis for different desert claims because all differences 
between people are themselves undeserved” (Matravers 2011a, 142). If this is correct, 
then it follows that no one can deserve the objects of distributive justice, because 
deserving requires a type of free will that human beings simply do not have.   
In response to the responsibility worry, I argue, in chapters 2 and 3, that the 
relationship between desert, justice, and responsibility may be more complex than is 
commonly thought. Received wisdom 2 may need to be revised: Whether a 
responsibility requirement is necessary, it seems, depends crucially on the choice of 
desert basis and the choice of desert object. To see this, consider the following desert 
claim (taken from Feldman 1995), which I will discuss at some length in chapter 3:  
 
(11) The child deserves a trip to Disneyland because she suffers from a 
genetic terminal illness.  
 
This is an example of a compensatory desert claim, a claim in which the desert 
object is some kind of compensation. The child deserves compensation for her current 
and future suffering. Now, it is not the case that the child would only deserve a trip to 
Disneyland if she would be responsible for being terminally ill. In fact, she is especially 
deserving of a trip to Disneyland precisely because the illness is a terrible case of bad 
luck. It seems then, that not all compensatory desert claims need to be subject to a 
responsibility requirement.   
Here is a second example (familiar from the harshness objection section) of a 
desert claim for which a responsibility requirement is not necessary, which I will 
discuss at some length in chapter 2:  
 
 
12  It should be mentioned here that Rawls (2001) states that his theory is political rather than 
philosophical and explicitly denies the relevance of the metaphysical problem of free will for his theory. 
I simply present interpretations of Rawls’ work here (and do not necessarily endorse them).  
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(12) Luke deserves to have a baseline level of well-being, simply in virtue of 
being a person.  
 
According to this claim, Luke deserves well-being on the basis of a 
characteristic he has no control over whatever: the fact that he is a person. It appears 
that again, a responsibility requirement is not necessary.13 I think that these two 
examples show that the relationship between desert, justice, and responsibility may 
be more complex than is commonly thought.  
 
4. Looking ahead 
This thesis contains five substantive chapters. Although these chapters were written 
as self-standing papers, they all contribute to answering the central question of this 
thesis: What role can desert plausibly play within egalitarian theories of distributive 
justice?  
Chapters 2 and 3 are conceptual, asking what desert is. In these chapters, I end 
up challenging received wisdoms 2 (the responsibility requirement) and 3 (backward-
lookingness). In chapter 2, I examine the question whether it is defensible to uphold 
asymmetries of desert: Is it defensible to hold that desert should play a very different 
role in distributive justice than it does in retributive justice? I argue that it is. There is 
no reason to expect desert to play the same role in distributive and retributive justice. 
 In chapter 3, I ask when, if ever, desert is forward-looking. Many philosophers 
have claimed that desert is always backward-looking. Fred Feldman (1995) was the 
first to challenge this received wisdom. Building on his challenge, I argue that the 
desert of chances, compensation, rewards, and praise can sometimes be forward-
looking. I also argue that, all else equal, it is better that people get the desert object 
closer to the obtainment of the future facts that determine the desert basis.  
 In chapters 4 and 5, I move along to the relation between desertism and luck 
egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians invoke desert, and it is not always clear when 
the two views differ. In chapter 4 (co-authored with Tom Mulligan), we ask what the 
 
13  Facts about responsibility may still matter indirectly though. Desert claim 11 may be precisely 




differences are between desertism and luck egalitarianism. We argue that desert and 
luck egalitarianism come apart in three important contexts: First, compared to 
desertism, luck egalitarianism is sometimes more stingy: It fails to justly compensate 
people for their socially valuable contributions—when those contributions arose from 
option luck. Second, luck egalitarianism is sometimes more restrictive than desertism: 
It fails to justly compensate people who make a social contribution when that 
contribution arose from brute luck. Third, luck egalitarianism is more limited in scope: 
It cannot diagnose economic injustice arising independently of comparative levels of 
justice.  
 In chapter 5 (co-authored with Willem van der Deijl), we inquire into one way 
in which desert could supplement luck egalitarianism: as a principle that fleshes out 
the consequences of people’s option luck. We argue that desertism can help luck 
egalitarians avoid harshness by constraining what can count as the negative outcomes 
of people’s voluntary choices.  
 Chapter 6 (co-authored with Dick Timmer) takes a more applied perspective. 
In that chapter, we argue that desertism—along with Rawlsian egalitarianism and 
utilitarianism—supports not just a limit on the negative consequences people can 
bear (as in chapter 5), but also a limit on the positive consequences people can bear: 
it supports maximum income policies. We distinguish between different maximum 
income proposals, and argue that all three approaches support relative maximum 
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Chapter 2: Defending asymmetries of desert14 
1. Introduction 
Is it defensible to hold that desert should play a very different role in distributive 
justice than it does in retributive justice?15 John Rawls (1999) thought so.16,17 He 
famously argued that desert should play no role in distributive justice, but should play 
central role in retributive justice. Many Rawls commentators have argued that he does 
not succeed in defending the asymmetry of desert in his theory of justice (Honig 1993, 
chap. 5; Matravers 2011a; Moriarty 2003; Scheffler 2000; Smilansky 2006). This has 
caused some to worry that his position on desert is inconsistent: the arguments Rawls 
uses to reject desert as a principle of distributive justice also seem to support rejecting 
desert as a principle of retributive justice (cf. Moriarty 2003). Samuel Scheffler (2000, 
2003a) was the first to propose a defense of the asymmetry of desert in Rawls’s work.  
Although not many philosophers hold explicit views about both distributive 
and retributive justice, it would seem that quite a few are sympathetic to (a version 
of) Rawls’s position on desert. Desert, after all, plays a central role in many 
philosophical accounts of retributive justice,18 whereas it plays no role in the major 
philosophical accounts of distributive justice.19 This is somewhat surprising, because, 
 
14 This chapter is based on my single-authored paper “Defending Asymmetries of Desert”, which is 
currently under review. For helpful comments and conversations on earlier drafts of that paper, I thank 
Constanze Binder, Daphne Brandenburg, Willem van der Deijl, Bart Engelen, Andrea Gammon, Shelly 
Kagan, Sem de Maagt, Thomas Mulligan, Serena Olsaretti, Attilia Ruzzene, Maureen Sie, Jojanneke 
Vanderveen, and Jack Vromen. I am also grateful to audiences in Aix-en-Provence, Amsterdam, Cape 
Town, and Rotterdam for helpful comments and questions.  
15  Saul Smilansky (2006) and Jeffrey Moriarty (2003; 2013; 2018) use retributive justice to refer, 
broadly, to theories of punishment. I follow them in this usage of the term.  
16 Scheffler (2000, 2003a), Matravers (2011a; 2011b), and Moriarty (2003), among others, argue that 
he does. I agree with their interpretation. However, the argument of this chapter does not hinge on 
whether Rawls did or did not endorse the asymmetry of desert.  
17 The passages from which Rawls commentators have concluded that he endorses an asymmetry of 
desert are present in both the original (1971) and the revised edition (1999) of A Theory of Justice.    
18 Anthony Duff (2003), Joel Feinberg (1970), Douglas Husak (1992; 2000), Michael Moore (2010), John 
Rawls (1999), Wojciech Sadurski (1985), and George Sher (1989), among many others, include desert 
as a condition for punishment in their theories. 
19 Moriarty remarks on this that desert “plays an unimportant role in most contemporary theories of 
distributive justice” (Moriarty 2003, 518), and Smilansky remarks that “the notion of desert is … 
neglected in our thinking about distributive justice (2006, 511). This is, of course, not to say that desert 
plays no role in theorizing about distributive justice at all. David Miller (2001), David Schmidtz (2006), 
and Michael Walzer (1983), among others, propose pluralistic theories that include desert as a 
distributive principle. Fred Feldman (2016) and Thomas Mulligan (2018a) have recently proposed 
monistic desert-based theories of distributive justice.   
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as inter alia Moriarty (2013, 537) points out, the arguments used against desert as a 
principle of distributive justice often seem to imply that desert should play the same 
role in both spheres; and the same holds true for the arguments used in favor of desert 
as a principle of retributive justice.  
The question whether asymmetries of desert are defensible has been the 
subject of increasing attention, ever since Scheffler’s (2000) initial defense of the 
asymmetry in Rawls’s work. Besides Scheffler, both Saul Smilansky (2006) and Jeffrey 
Moriarty (2013) have proposed defenses. Scheffler’s and Smilansky’s defenses of 
asymmetries of desert have each been the subject of critiques, and Moriarty notes 
that his defense is only valid for ‘weak’ asymmetries—in which desert plays a 
(somewhat) less central role in distributive justice than it does in retributive justice 
(2013, 537).20 It cannot defend ‘strong’ asymmetries—in which desert plays no role in 
distributive justice and a central role in retributive justice. This raises the question: are 
strong asymmetries of desert defensible at all? 
In this chapter, I argue that strong asymmetries of desert are defensible. More 
specifically, I defend two claims. First, I argue that some recent defenders of desert-
based theories of distributive justice may actually be interested in defending 
asymmetries that go the other way: in which desert plays a more central role in 
distributive justice than in retributive justice. Second, I argue that strong asymmetries 
in both directions can be defended. Throughout this chapter, I will discuss various 
conceptions of desert for which asymmetries of desert are defensible without, at any 
point, endorsing them.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section 2, I examine the notion of 
desert in greater detail, identifying three features of the concept that will play a 
central role in the defenses I develop later in the chapter. I then move on to 
distinguishing twelve ways in which desert could play an asymmetric role between the 
distributive and retributive spheres of justice, and discuss why these asymmetries 
stand in need of defense. In section 3, I briefly discuss the three defenses of the 
 
20 For critiques of Scheffler’s (2000) defense, see Greenblum (2010), Hurka (2003), Husak (2000), Miller 
(2003), Mills (2004), Matravers (2011a), and Moriarty (2003). For a critique of Scheffler’s (2003a) 
amended defense, see Moriarty (2018). For a critique of Smilansky’s (2006) defense, see Moriarty 
(2013). Note that Moriarty (2013) criticizes Smilansky’s (2006) defense and puts forth a defense of his 
own in the same paper.  
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asymmetry of desert that have been proposed so far, and criticize Moriarty’s (2013) 
defense of weak asymmetries of desert. In section 4, I develop two lines of argument, 
which, taken together, can defend the two strongest asymmetries of desert I 
distinguished in section 2. I end this chapter with a conclusion, in which I point out 
that my defenses of strong asymmetries could be developed into defenses of weak 
asymmetries as well (section 5). 
 
2. Identifying asymmetries of desert 
People make desert claims all the time. We say, for instance, that (i) ‘Barack Obama 
deserves to be President of the United States because he received the most Electoral 
College votes during the 2012 Presidential Election’, (ii) ‘Sandy deserves welfare, 
because giving it to her would benefit the worst off’, and (iii) ‘Steve Jobs deserved to 
be wealthy because he made such a large productive contribution to the world 
economy’.21  
In each of these three desert claims, the verb ‘to deserve’ means substantially 
different things. The challenge for political philosophers is to single out those uses of 
the term that could function as a principle of justice. 22  Three pieces of received 
wisdom about desert help in doing so, and play a central role in both understanding 
better what asymmetries of desert are, and how and why they are to be defended. 
The first received wisdom is that desert claims on the currency of justice must 
be “preinstitutional” and “prejusticial” (Scheffler 2000, 978). This requirement 
excludes many common desert claims: in these claims, desert does not do any 
normative work, but is merely a placeholder for some other principle. Desert claim (i), 
for instance, is institutional. The verb ‘to deserve’ here says no more than that Barack 
Obama was, given the rules of the institutions regulating the election of the US 
President, entitled to be the President of the United States. Desert claim (ii) is 
preinstitutional, but not prejusticial. Here, the verb ‘to deserve’ means that Sandy 
 
21 This way of introducing the distinction between preinstitutional and prejusticial desert claims is 
inspired by the first chapter of George Sher’s book on desert (1989, 6–7). 
22 Some of the seminal contributions were made by Feinberg (1970), Feldman (1995; 1996; 2016), 
Kagan (1999; 2012), Miller (2001), Moriarty (2018), Olsaretti (2004), Schmidtz (2006) and Sher (1989); 
as well as by the contributors to Olsaretti (2003a). For overviews of the desert literature, see Pojman 
and McLeod (1998), McLeod (2002), and Feldman and Skow (2016). 
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deserves to receive welfare because another principle of justice, John Rawls’s 
difference principle, says that she should. (Olsaretti calls these “rubberstamp” desert 
claims, (2004, 19)). Desert itself does not do any added normative work.  
 Desert claim (iii), on the other hand, is, arguably, distinctive.23 It neither relies 
entirely on institutions nor entirely on principles of justice other than desert. This 
prejusticial claim holds that the distribution of wealth should be in proportion to an 
attribute of Steve Jobs’, namely his productive contribution. I am solely concerned 
with notions of desert that their defenders take to be preinstitutional and 
prejusticial—as are the other defenders of asymmetries of desert (Scheffler 2000; 
2003a; Smilansky 2006; Moriarty 2013).24,25  
The second received wisdom about desert concerns the form that desert 
claims take. A desert claim is a three-place relation, uniting a subject (S) that is said to 
deserve an object (O) on a certain base (B) (McLeod 2002; Olsaretti 2003b; 2004, chap. 
1). An example would be the claim that Rosemary (S) deserves to win the New York 
weightlifting contest (O) on the basis of having the strongest muscles of all contestants 
(B). There is a great deal of discussion on how the concept of desert should be 
transformed into a conception: 26 What are the appropriate subjects, objects, and 
bases of desert claims in a theory of justice?  
Many different answers have been given to this question. As I will point out in 
section 4, the defenses I develop in this chapter are valid on a number of these 
 
23 Miller’s (2001) theory of social justice includes productive contribution-based desert as a principle. 
Olsaretti (2004, chap. 3) argues that desert based on productive contribution may not be distinctive.  
24 Olsaretti (2003b; 2004, chap. 1) and Scheffler (2003a), among others, discuss in greater detail what 
it means for desert claims to be prejusticial. Some of the desert-based views that I will go on to discuss 
have been criticized as not being prejusticial. An example would be Feldman’s community-essential 
needs-based view—see for instance, Alexander (2017), and Dekker’s (2016) reviews of Feldman’s book. 
Another example would be productive contribution-based conceptions of desert (see previous 
footnote). These are intricate disputes and I cannot settle them within the confines of this chapter.  
25 Note that I here exclude the possibility of wholesale skepticism about the existence of prejusticial 
desert claims in both spheres of justice, because such skeptics would not be interested in endorsing 
asymmetries of desert in the first place. 
26 I am using the Dworkinian concept-conception distinction here, as Rawls (1999, 5) does as well. I 
thank Serena Olsaretti for suggesting to frame the issue in these terms.  
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answers.27,28 The only restriction I make, is about the object of desert claims. I am 
concerned with desert of what is supposed to be the relevant currency of distributive 
and of retributive justice. I do not take a position, however, on what exactly the 
appropriate currency of distributive justice (be it (access to) income, wealth, 
wellbeing, jobs, and/or something else) and retributive justice (be it incarceration, 
suffering, and/or something else) are. My argument is valid on a wide range of 
answers to that question.29 
A final ‘received wisdom’ about desert that is relevant here, is what Feldman 
calls the “aboutness principle” (2016, 42): the principle that the base of desert claims 
should be an action or characteristic of the desert subject.30 This principle rules out 
claims such as ‘Rosemary (S) deserves to win the New York weightlifting contest (O) 
because her parents would cry all night long if she does not (B)’. The crying of 
Rosemary’s parents, after all, is not an action or characteristic of Rosemary’s.31  
Many argue that the aboutness principle should take the form of a 
responsibility condition.32 This condition is typically fleshed out as follows (Feldman 
2016, 64): If S deserves O in virtue of the fact that S did or suffered B, then S is 
responsible for doing or suffering B. In the case of Rosemary, this would imply that if 
Rosemary deserves to win the New York weightlifting contest on the basis of her 
strong muscles, then she is responsible for her strong muscles.33 The responsibility 
 
27 Many philosophers seem to assume that only human beings can be the appropriate subject of desert 
claims. Kagan (2019, chap. 4.1.) has recently argued, however, that other animals could be the subject 
of desert claims as well. McLeod (2002) speculates that even inanimate objects could be the 
appropriate subject of desert claims.  
28 Desert bases that have been defended include (purposeful) effort (cf. Sadurski 1985; Wolff 2003), 
productive contribution (Miller 2001), merit (Mulligan 2018a), virtuousness (Kagan 2012; Kristjánsson 
2003) and (community-essential) need (Feldman 2016). Retributive desert bases that have been 
defended include (culpable) wrongdoing (Duff 2003; 2011; Kershnar 1995), and viciousness (Kagan 
2012).  
29 Note, as, among others, Smilansky (2006) and Moriarty (2013) have stressed, that the distributive 
sphere is not just concerned with the distribution of benefits, but also burdens (such as taxes).  
30 The foundational discussion of this topic is by Feinberg (1970, 72).  
31 It should be noted here that it is not clear where to draw the line—especially when it comes to 
characteristics (as opposed to actions) of the desert subject. Why, for instance, is it not a characteristic 
of Rosemary that she has parents who will cry all night if she does not win? I thank Serena Olsaretti for 
drawing my attention to this issue. It is a relatively neglected point in the desert literature deserves 
more attention than it has received so far.  
32 For discussion, see Feldman (1995; 1996; 2016, chap. 2.3.), Olsaretti (2004, chap. 1), Rachels (1978), 
Sadurski (1985, chap. 5), and Smilansky (1996a; 1996b). 
33 Feldman (1995; 1996; 2016, 42–43) and Kleinig (1971, 74) reject the responsibility condition in this 
form. To see why, consider Feldman’s hamburger case: “Suppose […] that a fast food restaurant is 
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requirement will prove important in the first of the two defenses I develop in section 
4.1: the responsibility defense.   
 Now, philosophers who write about the asymmetry of desert have focused on 
asymmetries in which desert plays a more central role in retributive justice than in 
distributive justice. They commonly distinguish two asymmetries: strong and weak. In 
strong asymmetries, desert plays no role in distributive justice, but a central role in 
retributive justice. In weak asymmetries, desert plays at least some role in each 
sphere—but a more central role in retributive than in distributive justice.34 It seems 
to me that there is reason to draw some further distinctions. It may actually be helpful 
to distinguish twelve, rather than just two asymmetries (listed in Table 1), for two 
reasons.  
First, the distinction between weak and strong asymmetries of desert could be 
made more precise in order to reflect the four different roles desert commonly plays 
in the distribution of currencies of justice. Desert could be no condition, a necessary 
condition, a sufficient condition, and both a necessary and sufficient condition for 
receiving whatever is deserved. All of these positions have been defended recently in 
 
careless with its hamburgers. Many customers become ill with food poisoning. Those customers 
deserve several things: an apology; some compensation for their illness; a refund of the money they 
spent on bad hamburgers. The customers deserve these things in virtue of the fact that they are 
innocent victims of the restaurant’s carelessness. Yet in any typical case the customers bear no 
responsibility for the fact that they were being poisoned” (1995, 68). For discussion, see the exchange 
Feldman (1995; 1996) had with Smilansky (1996a; 1996b) about inter alia the responsibility 
requirement on desert claims. 
34 Scheffler discusses the strong asymmetries of desert. He defines the asymmetry that he finds in 
Rawls’s Theory of Justice as the position that “denies that the principle of distributive justice make 
reference to a prejusticial notion of desert”, but “allows that there may nevertheless be a legitimate 
place for prejusticial desert in our thinking about retributive justice” (2000, 979). Smilansky, on the 
other hand, takes the asymmetry to be the position that “we are morally justified in not assigning the 
same role to desert in distributive justice as it rightly has in retributive justice” (2006, 512)—in which 
desert “remains fundamental” (2006, 511). Moriarty discusses both types of asymmetries, and offers a 
defense of a weaker asymmetry, which he takes to be the position that although desert can still play 
an “important role” in distributive justice, it “cannot be expected to play the same role in distributive 
justice that it can play in retributive justice” (2013, p. 538, his emphasis). 
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the literatures on distributive and retributive justice.35, 36 Second, recent defenders of 
desert-based theories of distributive justice may actually be interested in defending 
asymmetries that run the other way: in which desert plays a more central role in 
distributive than in retributive justice. The explanation for why this type of asymmetry 
has not been considered so far, I think, is how the discussion of asymmetries of desert 
started: as an attempt, by Samuel Scheffler (2000), to defend John Rawls’ seemingly 
inconsistent position on desert.   
The fact that desert could play four different roles, combined with the thought 
that asymmetries could run in both ways, brings the total number of asymmetries of 
desert up to twelve. Table 1 provides an overview.  
 











Symmetry 1 2 3 
Necessary 4 Symmetry 5 6 
Sufficient 7 8 Symmetry 9 
 
35 Fred Feldman, for instance, has recently proposed a theory of distributive justice in which desert is 
the necessary and sufficient condition: He argues that people should only receive the objects of justice 
when they deserve those on the basis of their community-essential needs (2016, chap. 4). Miller (2001) 
defends a theory of distributive justice in which productive contribution-based desert is one of multiple 
sufficient conditions for receiving the objects of distributive justice, alongside equality and need. 
Anthony Duff, thirdly, argues for a theory of retributive justice in which desert is included as a necessary 
condition (2003; 2011). In his theory, desert only justifies the absence of immunity from punishment—
not the actual punishment itself, which is justified by its capacity to effectively communicate censure. 
Elizabeth Anderson (1999), Robert Nozick (1974), John Rawls (1999), Michael Sandel (1998), Thomas 
Scanlon (2018), and Amartya Sen (1995) defend theories of distributive justice in which desert plays no 
role. Matravers (2011a), Russ Shafer-Landau (1996), and Victor Tadros (2011, chap. 4), finally, are 
examples of defenders of desert-less theories of punishment.   
36 Note that I do not claim that this list is exhaustive. Some philosophers, for instance, include desert in 
their theories of justice as a modifier of the claims generated by some other principle—take Richard 
Arneson’s (2007) desert-adjusted prioritarianism. I do not consider such positions here, because (i) no 
philosopher has yet attempted to defend asymmetries in which desert is merely a condition for 
receiving the currency of justice in one sphere, and (ii) I am interested in defending strong asymmetries 
of desert in this chapter.  





10 11 12 Symmetry 
 
Table 1: Twelve asymmetries of desert 
 
My main aim in this chapter is to defend the strongest asymmetries of desert: 
asymmetries 3 and 10. In these asymmetries, desert is no condition at all for receiving 
the currency of justice in one sphere, but a necessary and sufficient condition for 
receiving the currency of justice in the other. Before going on to defend asymmetries 
3 and 10, it is worth asking: why do we need to defend asymmetries of desert in the 
first place? There are, I think, two main reasons, which have both already been 
discussed by others who have written about asymmetries of desert—so I will only 
introduce them briefly here. 
First, as mentioned in the introduction, arguments against desert in the 
distributive sphere often seem to carry over to the retributive sphere.37 Similarly, 
arguments in favor of desert often seem to carry over to the distributive sphere (cf. 
Moriarty 2003, 520). If that is indeed the case, then those who endorse an asymmetry 
of desert may be inconsistent. Smilansky gives voice to this inconsistency concern 
when he remarks that “unless we find some good reason to distinguish between 
distributive and retributive justice when it comes to desert, we need to revise our 
thinking radically, either abandoning desert in retributive justice or making it 
paramount in distributive justice” (2006, 511).  
Second, defending asymmetries of desert can deepen our understanding both 
of the notion of desert and of its plausibility as a principle of distributive and of 
retributive justice (cf. Moriarty 2003, 520–21). I will go on to suggest that distributive 
desert and retributive desert may actually be thought to be different kinds of desert, 
which are not subject to the same objections. I will also argue that even if one thinks 
that distributive and retributive desert are essentially the same kind of desert, the 
 
37 This has been pointed out by, among others, Hurka (2003), Matravers (2011a), Moriarty (2003; 2013; 
2018), and Smilansky (2006).  
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same objection to desert may carry less weight in one sphere of justice than in the 
other sphere.   
Having clarified what notion of desert is at stake at this chapter, distinguished 
twelve asymmetries of desert, and reiterated why these asymmetries stand in need 
of defense, I will now move on to briefly discussing the three existing defenses of 
asymmetries of desert, and, after exposing the already discussed flaws of some of 
them, provide my own criticism of Moriarty’s (2013) defense, which has not been 
criticized yet. 
 
3. Previous defenses 
3.1. Scheffler’s holism defense 
Scheffler (2000) was the first to defend the asymmetry of desert in Rawls’s work. The 
central thought in Scheffler’s defense—which is careful and nuanced, and hence 
difficult to summarize briefly here—is that there is no fact of the matter about what 
an individual’s distributive desert is, whereas there is a fact of the matter about what 
an individual’s retributive desert is.  
An individual’s contribution to the social product, according to Scheffler, is 
inextricably bound up with the contributions of others.38 There is no fact about what 
an individual contributed, and hence no adequate basis for distributing the currency 
of distributive justice between individuals. Scheffler claims that a similar argument 
cannot be made about the retributive sphere. There actually is a fact of the matter 
about an individual’s wrongdoing, and the currency of retributive justice can be 
distributed on that basis.  
If valid, Scheffler’s argument could serve to defend asymmetries 3, 6, and 9.39 
However, there have been many critical responses to Scheffler’s defense and he 
acknowledges its weaknesses in later work (2003a). Some commentators have argued 
 
38 In defense of this claim, Scheffler draws on Anderson (1999, 321) who argues that “from the point of 
view of justice, the attempt, independent of moral principles, to credit specific bits of output to specific 
bits of input by specific individuals represents an arbitrary cut in the causal web that in fact makes 
everyone’s productive contribution depend on what everyone else is doing.” 
39 Which asymmetry it defends, depends on what position one takes on the appropriate role of desert 
in the distribution of punishment. One could, for instance, hold, as Husak (1992) does, that desert is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for punishment, because desert cannot justify the harsh 
treatment involved in punishing.  
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that an individual’s contribution to the social product can, in fact, be identified (Hurka 
2003; Miller 2003; Moriarty 2003, 526–33).40 Others have claimed that Scheffler’s 
argument against distributive desert generalizes to retributive desert: there may be 
no fact of the matter about what an individual’s wrongdoing is either (Husak 2000; 
Matravers 2011a).41 
 
3.2. Smilansky’s control-based defense 
The second philosopher to come up with a defense of asymmetries of desert is 
Smilansky (2006). He argues that more philosophers, not just John Rawls, may be 
inclined to endorse a view of justice in which desert plays a less central role in the 
distributive rather than in the retributive sphere. Smilansky’s aim is to defend ‘weak’ 
asymmetries, in which although desert is a condition for receiving the currency of 
justice in both spheres, it is a more demanding condition in the retributive sphere. 
Because he denies that desert is a necessary condition for receiving the currency of 
distributive justice, I think that Smilanky’s aim is to defend asymmetry 2.  
The central notion in Smilanky’s defense of asymmetry 2 is that of control. He 
argues that both distributive and retributive desert are subject to a responsibility 
requirement in the form of a control condition. People do not, according to Smilansky, 
have a capacity for equal control over their productive contributions, which he 
assumes is the distributive desert basis, whereas they do have a capacity for equal 
control over their law abidance, which is the retributive desert basis. This asymmetry 
in people’s capacity for equal control, he claims, makes it defensible for desert to play 
a less central role in distributive than in retributive justice.  
A puzzling aspect of Smilansky’s defense is that he mentions multiple times 
that he sets out to defend weak asymmetries of desert, but his argument actually 
seems aimed at defending strong asymmetries. After all, if people do not have a 
 
40 Smilansky (2006, 512) mentions that he agrees with Moriarty that people’s distributive deserts can, 
in fact, be established.  
41 Although these are the most common criticisms that have been raised against Scheffler’s (2000) 
argument, there have been others. Greenblum (2010, 176–79), for instance, argues that Rawls’s main 
concern about desert is not so much that there is no fact of the matter about an individual’s productive 
contribution, but that it is impossible to find a distributive desert basis that is independent from 
people’s native endowments and character—a worry that, in his view, generalizes to the retributive 
sphere of justice, and is not addressed by Scheffler’s defense. 
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capacity for equal control over their productive contributions, and such a capacity is 
required for desert to play a role in distributive justice—then his defense, if valid, 
would actually defend asymmetry 3, instead of asymmetry 2.  
Regardless of which asymmetries he intends to defend precisely, it seems that 
Smilansky’s defense does not succeed. Moriarty (2013) has convincingly objected to 
Smilansky’s defense that people do not, in fact, have a capacity for equal control over 
their law abidance. It is much more difficult for some people to abide the law than it 
is for others, because of a host of social and genetic luck factors. Hence, if a capacity 
for equal control is required, then desert should play no role in retributive justice 
either. 42  
 
3.3. Moriarty’s cost-based defense 
After criticizing Smilansky’s defense, Moriarty (2013) goes on to propose his own 
defense, which, if successful, could defend both asymmetries 1 and 5. Moriarty starts 
his defense by assuming that a pro tanto case can be made for the requital of desert 
in both the distributive and retributive spheres of justice (2013, 542). That is, he 
assumes that it would, in principle, be desirable to requite desert in each sphere of 
justice.  
He then goes on to argue that a free market does not reward people according 
to any plausible conception of distributive desert. The reason is that market incomes 
are not corrected for the impact of factors for which people cannot be held 
responsible, such as the number of other suppliers of a good or service.43 In order to 
distribute the currency of distributive justice in accordance with desert, then, a 
planned economy would need to be implemented, in which a central planning agency 
tracks how deserving each member of society is. History has shown, however, that 
 
42 Smilansky (2006, 518–21) also argues that equal control is more important in the retributive sphere 
of justice than in the distributive sphere of justice, and that this provides another reason for desert to 
play a more important role in the former than the latter. I ignore this second part of his argument, 
because I do not think it can defend even weaker asymmetries of desert unless one accepts the claim, 
which Moriarty (2013) and I deny, that people have a capacity for equal control regarding their law 
abidance.    
43 To make his case, Moriarty relies on Arneson’s argument that “the market distribution is set by supply 
and demand conditions, which have no tendency to produce results that are in conformity with any 
reasonable conception of individual desert” (2007, 266; also cited in Moriarty 2013, 541).  
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planned economies are terribly inefficient. Structuring the distributive process around 
desert would, hence, come with costs that are “unacceptably high” (2013, 542). 
According to Moriarty, this cost objection to distributive desert does not apply 
with equal force to retributive desert. Although it is also expensive to establish for 
what part of their wrongdoing people can be held responsible, doing so is (much) 
cheaper in the aggregate, because fewer people break criminal law than make 
productive contributions.  
The upshot is that requiting desert is prohibitively costly in the distributive 
sphere of justice, and would hence, on balance, not be required by justice—except 
perhaps for a few particular distribuenda of distributive justice that cannot be 
distributed by markets, such as “welfare benefits”, “university scholarships”, and 
“compensation for carework” (2013, 544). The same does not go for requiting desert 
in the retributive sphere of justice. The asymmetry in the costs of requiting desert in 
each sphere can, according to Moriarty, justify that desert plays a less central role in 
distributive justice than it does in retributive justice.   
Although I think that Moriarty’s defense is helpful and insightful, it seems to 
me that it is less successful than he makes it out to be, for two reasons. First, there 
are various indirect and less readily quantifiable costs of punishing wrongdoers in 
accordance with their deserts, which Moriarty does not consider.44 A few examples 
would be a reduction in the employment possibilities of those who served their 
sentence, the long-term physical and mental health costs to the incarcerated, and the 
physical and mental health costs to the families and communities of the incarcerated. 
If one takes all of these costs into account, the costs asymmetry on which Moriarty’s 
defense relies becomes less pronounced. 
Secondly, as I mentioned, Moriarty assumes that a pro tanto case can be made 
for the requital of desert in both spheres of justice. This, however, is precisely the 
 
44 Moriarty only mentions the costs of the prison system: “The number of people incarcerated in the 
U.S.—whose incarceration rate and amount exceeds by a wide margin every other country—is 2.3 
million, at a cost of $44 billion” (2013, 543). There are, however, various other costs that can be 
quantified easily, such as that of finding wrongdoers (police) and convicting them (courts, legal aid, 
prosecution). Another point that he does not consider is that the clearance rate for many crimes 
categories is quite low in the United States; increasing that would come at significant additional costs 
(for crime clearance rates, see FBI 2017).  
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assumption that often is at issue in debates about desert and justice:45 It is not the 
case that many philosophers understand both distributive justice and retributive 
justice in terms of desert and grind their teeth at their inability to find ways to requite 
distributive desert in a cheap enough manner. As a result, many philosophers who are 
drawn to endorsing asymmetries 1 or 5 will, I fear, not be able to avail themselves of 
Moriarty’s defense. They would require a more principled defense.46  
Having surveyed previous defenses of asymmetries of desert, criticized 
Moriarty’s defense of asymmetries of desert, and argued that the two strongest 
asymmetries I identified, asymmetries 3 and 10, are currently undefended, I will now 
move on to my defenses of these two asymmetries.  
 
4. Defending stronger asymmetries of desert 
4.1. The responsibility defense (asymmetry 10) 
The first asymmetry of desert that I will defend is asymmetry 10. It holds that desert 
is no condition at all for receiving the currency of retributive justice, but is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for receiving the currency of distributive justice. I 
call this defense the ‘responsibility defense’, because the responsibility requirement 





 Defending asymmetry 10 
 
45 An example would be Rawls’s (1999, secs. 17 and 48) well-known argument against desert. Moriarty 
(2003) provides a helpful classification of various common arguments (including Rawls’s) against desert 
as a principle of distributive justice.  
46 One option, I think, to make Moriarty’s defense more principled is to object to a planned economy 
not on the grounds of the monetary costs of implementing it, but on the grounds of liberty: a planned 
economy would significantly restrict people’s freedom. The cost of restricting people’s freedom 
through a planned economy may be unacceptably high in the distributive sphere of justice. A similar 
freedom-based objection seems much plausible in the retributive sphere of justice, which, at least in 
part, aims at restricting the freedom of wrongdoers. I will not explore this possibility further in this 
chapter, but I think that such a freedom-based argument, could, potentially, be developed into a 
successful defense of strong symmetries of desert.  
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1. Responsibility requirement: Desert claims on the currency of distributive 
justice are not subject to a responsibility requirement, whereas desert 
claims on the currency of retributive sphere are subject to a responsibility 
requirement;  
2. Not satisfied: The responsibility requirement on retributive desert cannot 
be satisfied.  
3. Therefore: Desert can defensibly be no condition for receiving the currency 
of retributive justice and a necessary and sufficient for receiving the 
currency of distributive justice.  
 
4.1.1. An asymmetric responsibility requirement (premise 1) 
As mentioned before, many desert theorists hold that desert claims are subject to a 
responsibility requirement of the following form: If S deserves O in virtue of the fact 
that S did or suffered B, then S is responsible for doing or suffering B. This requirement 
is imposed to prevent unfairness: without it, there would not be an equal opportunity 
to become deserving (cf. Olsaretti 2003b; 2004, chap. 1). In premise 1, this widely 
endorsed claim about desert, justice, and responsibility is limited to the retributive 
sphere and thus rejected for desert claims in the distributive sphere. 
What reason could there be to reject the responsibility requirement on desert 
claims on the currency of distributive justice? Some philosophers have argued that a 
person may deserve things on the basis of, as Matthew Adler has recently put it, “the 
very characteristics that determine her identity” (2018, 197). An example would be 
Fred Feldman (2016)’s view of distributive justice, in which all people deserve to have 
their community-essential needs—such as (access to) education, infrastructure, and 
security—met, simply on the basis of having these needs. According to Feldman, and 
this is crucial, people are not responsible for having community-essential needs: they 
simply have them in virtue of being human and they can only be satisfied with the 
help of others. 47  It would, hence, be inappropriate to impose a responsibility 
requirement on desert claims with community-essential needs as a basis: if we did, no 
 
47 See footnote 33 for references to Feldman’s work on desert and responsibility.  
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one would deserve to have their needs met, because no one is responsible for having 
them.48 
In the retributive sphere of justice, on the other hand, it would be 
inappropriate to choose a desert basis that identifies characteristics of people that 
they cannot be held responsible for. The retributive sphere of justice is, after all, 
concerned with the distribution of deliberately inflicted burdens and harms (such as 
imprisonment). It would be unfair to impose such harms on people on the basis of 
factors they cannot be held responsible for. This defends the second part of premise 
1.   
 
4.1.2. Not satisfied (premise 2) 
Having provided a reason why one might reject the responsibility requirement on 
distributive desert claims but not on retributive desert claims, I will now move on to 
defending the second premise of the responsibility defense: that the responsibility 
requirement on desert claims cannot be satisfied. Quite a number of philosophers 
have objected to desert on the grounds that people cannot be held responsible in the 
way that would be required to be deserving, for instance because “no differences 
between persons can be the basis for different desert claims because all differences 
between people are themselves undeserved” (Matravers 2011a, 142). A version of 
this objection to desert is frequently attributed to Rawls (1999, secs. 17 and 48)49 and 
Scanlon (1998, chap. 6). The details of these objections are not relevant to the 
argument here. What matters is that they only apply to desert claims that are, in fact, 
subject to a responsibility requirement. If one can deserve on the basis of the very 
characteristics that determine one’s identity, as Feldman (2016) and Kagan (2012; 
2019) argue, then this objection to desert does not apply. 
4.2. The shameful revelation defense (asymmetry 3) 
 
48 Another philosopher who has recently denied that distributive desert claims are (always) subject to 
a responsibility requirement is Shelly Kagan. He argues (2019, chap. 4.1.) that human beings might 
deserve to have the same level of wellbeing simply in virtue of having agency and the capacity to 
experience wellbeing (also see his 2012, chap. 4.1.). 
49  For discussion of Rawls’s position on desert, see Olsaretti (2004, chap. 1), Matravers (2011a), 
Moriarty (2003; 2005b), and Sher (1989, chap. 2). 
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I will now move on to defending asymmetry 3: desert is no condition at all for receiving 
the currency of distributive justice, but is both a necessary and sufficient condition for 
receiving the currency of retributive justice. I call this defense the shameful revelation 
defense, because it builds on the notion of shameful revelation that Jonathan Wolff 
introduces in his critique of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism (1998; 2010).  
 The shameful revelation defense holds for a different set of desert-based views 
than the responsibility defense. In particular, the shameful revelation defense 
assumes that desert claims are subject to a responsibility requirement in both spheres 
of justice. Those who, such as Feldman (2016), deny this, would hence not be able to 
avail themselves of this defense. 50  
 The central thought in the responsibility defense is that implementing certain 
desert-based theories of justice would require people to reveal facts about 
themselves that they consider shameful, and that forcing them to do so would, under 
certain conditions, be permissible in the retributive sphere, but not in the distributive 
sphere.   
 The shameful revelation defense consists of two premises: 
 
Defending asymmetry 3 
1. Shameful revelation: Implementing responsibility-sensitive desert-based 
theories of justice requires people to make shameful revelations.  
2. Justified harm: Requiring people to make shameful revelations is 
permissible in the retributive sphere of justice, but not in the distributive 
sphere of justice. 
 
50 The shameful revelation defense may also hold for certain conceptions of desert that are not subject 
to a responsibility requirement. I think, however, that the concern about shameful revelations is most 
pressing for conceptions of desert that are subject to a responsibility requirement, because these 
actually require more detailed investigations into people’s lives. To see this, take productive 
contribution-based views of desert of income. Absent a responsibility requirement, it would be possible 
to establish what income a person deserves by measuring her productive contribution. With a 
responsibility requirement, doing so would not suffice—it would also need to be established what part 
of her productive contribution she can be held responsible for, which may require, among other things, 
correcting for her intelligence. For further discussion on what information would need to be gathered 
to implement responsibility-sensitive views, see Wolff (1998; 2003; 2010) and Roemer (2000).  
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3. Therefore, desert can defensibly be no condition for receiving the currency 
of distributive justice and a necessary and sufficient for receiving the 
currency of retributive justice. 
 
4.2.1. Shameful revelation (premise 1) 
Shameful revelations are the forced revelation of “facts that one finds demeaning or 
shameful, even humiliating” (Wolff 1998, 114). Such forced revelations could involve 
the direct involvement of the person concerned (they themselves are required to 
reveal the relevant facts), or only their indirect involvement (others invade their 
privacy to gather the relevant facts about them). An example of a shameful revelation 
would be a governmental agency forcing individuals who apply for welfare benefits to 
demonstrate that they lack the aptitude for the jobs that are currently available.51  
Applying this to responsibility-sensitive desert-based theories of justice, let us 
take two archetypical responsibility-sensitive desert-based theories justice—one of 
distributive justice and one of retributive justice. The distributive theory holds that 
people deserve the currency of distributive justice on the basis of their productive 
contribution. The retributive theory holds that people deserve the currency of 
retributive justice on the basis of their wrongdoing. In both theories, desert is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for receiving the currency.52 So, for instance, if and 
only if you productively contribute to society, you deserve additional pay. And if and 
only if you have committed a crime, you deserve the appropriate punishment. 
To prevent unfairness, it is necessary to impose a responsibility-requirement 
on the desert basis in each of these two archetypical theories. It would, after all, be 
unfair if people would receive more of the currency of distributive justice because 
they made a larger productive contribution than others, even though they were not 
responsible for making this larger productive contribution (for instance, because they 
have a higher IQ, or were raised in a family that stimulated them to work hard). 
Similarly, it would be unfair if people would receive the currency of retributive justice 
 
51 What counts as a shameful revelation is, at least in part, subjective for Wolff: “to some degree at 
least, what is considered shameful is socially relative and contingent” (1998, 114). It is not necessary, 
however, to assume this in order for the shameful revelation defense to go through.  
52 Note that the defense also holds if desert is a necessary condition. Since I am setting out to defend a 
strong asymmetry, however, I assume here that desert is both a necessary and sufficient condition.   
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(such as a fine, or imprisonment), even though they are not responsible for their 
wrongdoing (for instance, because neuroscientists manipulated their brain to get 
them to commit a crime).53  
Implementing our archetypical desert-based theories requires shameful 
revelations. The reason is that to measure accurately what, if any, part of people’s 
productive contribution and wrongdoing they can be held responsible for, a great deal 
of information needs to be gathered about them. It would be necessary to obtain 
information about how intelligent they are, what family circumstances they grew up 
in, what genetic medical conditions they might suffer from, and so on (cf. Moriarty 
2005b; 2008; Roemer 2000; Wolff 2003). Many people will find it shameful if they are 
forced to reveal such intimate information about themselves to the government 
(and/or if the government gathers these facts about them). This defends premise 1 of 
the shameful revelation defense.  
 
4.2.2. Justified harm (premise 2) 
Shameful revelations are objectionable because they are incompatible with the value 
of respect (Wolff 1998). Requiring people to make such revelations can make it seem 
as if you distrust them. An iconic example here is the social services officer coming 
into one’s house to count the number of toothbrushes in the bathroom in order to 
makes sure that one is not cohabitating without telling them. Such shameful 
revelations may be thought to be a decisive reason to reject responsibility-sensitive 
desert-based theories of distributive justice. The idea of a tax office that gathers 
information about, among other things, their intelligence, family background, genetic 
medical conditions, and cohabitation arrangements is abhorrent to many people. 
Elizabeth Anderson (1999) puts this points forcefully in her critique of luck 
egalitarianism—asking the reader to imagine the demeaning letters that the State 
Equality Board would have to send to people if luck egalitarianism were to be 
implemented.54  
 
53 This alludes to the first of the four Cluedo cases that Pereboom (2005) introduces in support of 
indeterminism.  
54 The message to those who have trouble making productive contributions seems especially relevant 
here: “To the stupid and untalented: Unfortunately, other people don’t value what little you have to 
offer in the system of production. Your talents are too meager to command much market value. 
Chapter 2: Defending asymmetries of desert 
 
 59 
At the same time, however, gathering such information in the context of 
retributive justice seems much less objectionable. It is common practice in the 
criminal justice system in the United States to gather detailed information about the 
accused, with the information about their DNA as perhaps the most extreme example. 
I think this points to an important difference between the two spheres. In the 
retributive sphere, the desert subject stands accused of wrongdoing. There is 
probable cause that she has betrayed the trust that society placed in her. Hence, 
gathering the information required to punish her in accordance with her desert may 
not as morally problematic as it is in case the distributive sphere of justice. This 
defends premise 2 of the shameful revelation defense.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Asymmetries of desert are the subject of increasing attention. Is it defensible to hold 
that desert should play a very different role in distributive justice than in retributive 
justice? In this chapter, I have argued that it is. My argument might seem internally 
inconsistent. I have claimed, using the responsibility defense, that it is consistent to 
hold that desert is both a necessary and sufficient condition for receiving the currency 
of retributive justice, and no condition at all for receiving the currency of distributive 
justice. I have, however, also argued, using the shameful revelation defense, that it is 
consistent to claim that desert is no condition for receiving the currency of distributive 
justice and a necessary and sufficient condition for receiving the currency of 
retributive justice.  
I should stress that, despite appearances, there is no inconsistency. It may be 
thought, as the responsibility defense attempts to show, that distributive desert is a 
different type of desert than retributive desert, and that these different types of 
desert are not subject to the same objections. It may also be thought, as the shameful 
revelation defense aims to show, that although distributive and retributive desert are 
 
Because of the misfortune that you were born so poorly endowed with talents, we productive ones will 
make it up to you: we’ll let you share in the bounty of what we have produced with our vastly superior 




vulnerable to the same objections, these objections may be asymmetrically pressing 
in the different spheres of justice.  
Although my focus in this chapter has been on defending strong asymmetries 
of desert, I think that it is possible to defend weaker asymmetries of desert as well. In 
fact, the two defenses I develop could be turned into defenses of weaker asymmetries 
of desert by weakening the second premise of each defense. Doing so, however, is a 
project for a different occasion.  
For now, I conclude that those who defend desert as a necessary and sufficient 
condition in one sphere of justice, are not committed to also endorsing it as a 
necessary and sufficient condition in the other sphere. Strong asymmetries of desert 
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Chapter 3: When, if ever, is desert forward-looking?55 
1. Introduction 
 
“You still have a choice.” 
 
- Agatha to John, who has seen himself kill Leo Crow on a screen in the 
PreCrime department and is now about to do it.  (Minority Report, 2002) 
 
We sometimes say that what people deserve depends, in part, on what will happen in 
the future: ‘The student deserves the scholarship because she will do well, given the 
chance.’ ‘The professor deserves tenure, because she will continue to make a great 
contribution to the department.’ ‘The child deserves a trip to Disneyland now because 
she will be very ill later.’ ‘The people of Bangladesh deserve compensation for the 
climate change damage they will suffer.’  
Although forward-looking desert claims are sometimes made in everyday 
speech, the received wisdom amongst philosophers is that desert claims are always 
backward-looking. 56  Fred Feldman (1995) was the first to challenge this received 
wisdom: he argues that, sometimes, if at time t, desert subject S deserves object O in 
 
55 This chapter is based on my single-authored paper “When, If Ever, Is Desert Forward-Looking?”, 
which is currently under review. Some modifications to the original article have been made. For helpful 
comments and discussion, I am grateful to Alexander Andersson, Willem van der Deijl, Teun Dekker, 
Yvette Drissen, Bart Engelen, Shelly Kagan, Tim Klaassen, Tom Mulligan, Serena Olsaretti, David 
Schmidtz, Rozemarijn van Spaendonck, Maureen Sie, and audiences at the Ethics seminar of the TiLPS 
(on 21/02/2019) in Tilburg and the 2019 PPE society meeting in New Orleans (on 28/03/2019). 
56  Here are six statements of the received wisdom: First, Wojchiech Sadurski claims that “desert 
considerations are always past oriented. When talking about desert, we are evaluating certain actions 
which have already happened. That is why it is a confusion to base desert upon utilitarian grounds" 
(1985, 117). Second, Brian Barry argues that “[d]esert looks to the past—or at most to the present—
whereas incentive and deterrence are forward-looking notions” (1965, 111). Third, John Kleinig writes 
that “[d]esert can be ascribed to something or someone only on the basis of characteristics possessed 
or things done by that thing or person. That is, desert is never simply forward-looking” (1971, 73). 
Fourth, Joel Feinberg says that “if a person is deserving of some sort of treatment, he must, necessarily, 
be so in virtue of some possessed characteristic or prior activity (1970, 48). Fifth, James Rachels argues 
that “what people deserve always depends on what they have done in the past” (1997, 100). Sixth and 
finally, David Miller claims that “[d]esert judgments are justified on the basis of past and present facts 
about individuals, never on the basis of states of affairs to be created in the future. Desert is a 
'backward-looking’ concept, if we regard the present as the limit of the past” (2001, 93). 
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virtue of the fact that S did or suffered something at t’, then t’ can be later than t. 
Feldman gives the following desert claim as an example: a child (S), may deserve to go 
to Disneyland (O) now (t), in virtue of the fact she is going to be very ill (B) later (t’). 
Feldman suggests that whether desert is forward-looking crucially depends on the 
choice of O, the desert object. The desert of punishment, according to him, is never 
forward-looking—whereas the desert of compensation for harm, such as a severe 
illness, sometimes is. Feldman concludes that “if there is any relation between desert 
and time, it is far more complex” than philosophers commonly assume (1995, 76).  
There are two reasons why it is important to consider whether desert can be 
forward-looking. The first is that forward-looking desert claims are sometimes made 
in everyday life, especially in the context of hiring decisions and compensation. If 
desert really can only be backward-looking, as many philosophers would have it, then 
we may need to revise such everyday moral claims. The second is that, the past few 
decades of inquiry into desert have shown that, as Shelly Kagan put it, the notion of 
desert is “surprisingly complex” (2012, 3). If it is the case that desert claims on some 
objects can sometimes be forward-looking, then this would reveal yet further 
complexities of the notion.  
Feldman’s challenge to the received wisdom that desert is forward-looking has 
been met with two responses. The first is to resist it and argue that desert really is a 
backward-looking concept (Kristjánsson 2005; Celello 2009). The second is to build on 
Feldman’s suggestion that desert may sometimes be forward-looking, and propose a 
more elaborate account of forward-looking desert (Schmidtz 2002; Kagan 2012). The 
question of this chapter is under what conditions, if any, desert may plausibly be 
forward-looking.  
I answer this question in three steps. First, I introduce Feldman’s argument for 
forward-looking desert in greater detail, and defend it against objections by 
Kristjánsson (2005) and Celello (2009) (section 2). It seems to me that although their 
objections are insightful in establishing under what conditions forward-looking desert 
is implausible, they fail to establish that forward-looking desert of all objects is always 
implausible. Secondly, I argue that the desert of chances, compensation, praise, and 
rewards can be forward-looking (section 3). Thirdly, I argue that, all else equal, it is 
better that people get what they deserve at the time they deserve it (section 4).  




2. Resisting challenges to Feldman’s argument for forward-looking desert 
2.1. Feldman’s argument for forward-looking desert 
Feldman sums up the received wisdom that desert is backward-looking in the 
following way:  
 
“D[esert]T[ime]: If at t S deserves x in virtue of the fact that S did or 
suffered something at t’, then t’ cannot be later than t” (1995, 67) 
 
Feldman challenges DT through a series of examples, all of which involve the desert 
of compensation for harms that will occur in future. His first example is of children 
who will suffer from severe illnesses. According to Feldman, these children (S) 
“deserve extraordinary benefits” (O) now (t), such as a visit to Disneyland, because 
they will be very ill (B) later (t’) (1995, 70). His second example is that of soldiers who 
volunteer to go on a suicide mission. According to Feldman, such soldiers (S) are 
“deserving of great honours” (O), such as “medals” and “promotions” (1995, 70–71), 
now (t), on the basis of the mission they will carry out (B) in future (t’).57  
 Feldman anticipates that defenders of the received wisdom that desert is 
backward-looking might respond that, in both cases, the desert object is actually 
deserved on the basis of facts that lie in the past and the present. We could say that 
children who have contracted fatal illnesses deserve a trip to Disneyland on the basis 
of the very fact that they “have contracted fatal diseases”, and/or because they “have 
already suffered” (1995, 71, emphasis his). We could say that soldiers deserve medals 
and promotions because they “volunteered…for their suicidal missions” (1995, 71, 
emphasis his). 
 He responds to this objection with the example of two children who suffer 
from painful diseases. Both have suffered for several months. The first, however, will 
soon make a full recovery—whereas the second will, unfortunately, die. Now suppose 
 
57 Feldman also discusses a third case: that of a custom’s officer who is going to search the bags of a 
traveler, without the traveler having given the officer any reason to do so. According to him, this 
traveler deserves an apology from the custom’s officer, even before her privacy is going to be invaded. 
I ignore this case here, because it is, in structure, quite comparable to the suicide mission case.  
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that we have one trip to Disneyland to divide between these two children. Who of the 
two deserves it the most? The answer seems to be: The child with the fatal disease. If 
that is true, then, Feldman argues, facts that will only obtain in future (t’) do seem to 
determine who is more deserving now (t).  
Besides the desert of compensation for future harms, Feldman also considers 
whether the desert of punishment can be forward-looking. According to him, it cannot 
be, for four reasons. It is worthwhile to discuss these reasons here, because critics of 
Feldman’s argument have argued that these reasons generalize to the forward-
looking desert of compensation (Celello 2009; Kristjánsson 2005).  
The first reason why, according to Feldman, the desert of punishment cannot 
be forward-looking is that epistemological uncertainties are pervasive in the case of 
punishment. We rarely really know for sure what the future will bring—there usually 
is a chance, however small, that a person will not commit the crime we expect her to 
commit. To avoid the injustice of wrongfully punishing a person, we must, therefore, 
wait and see whether she actually commits the crime. 
The second, related but more fundamental reason is that forward-looking 
desert of punishment faces a freedom objection. To deserve punishment for a crime, 
a person must, according to Feldman, have had the freedom to do otherwise than 
commit it. If we really know for sure, however, that a person is going to commit a 
crime, then she cannot do otherwise but commit it, meaning that she cannot deserve 
punishment for it.  
The third reason why, according to Feldman, the desert of punishment cannot 
be forward-looking is that it sometimes faces a desert basis obtainment objection. To 
see this, consider that it would only be justified to punish a person for a crime she will 
commit in future, if we know for sure that she will commit it. But if we punish the 
would-be criminal for committing the crime before she actually commits it, for 
instance by incarcerating her, then she may never commit it—and hence the desert 
basis (committing the crime) will never obtain.  
Feldman points out that the desert basis obtainment objection does not apply 
to all types of punishment. It seems especially pressing in the case of more severe 
punishments, such as incarceration. Less severe punishments, such as fines, may not 
prevent the obtainment of the desert basis. In such cases, a fourth concern arises: 
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punishing people before they commit crimes may be regarded as equivalent to 
granting permission for crimes: If, for example, a person can pay a fine for speeding 
before actually doing it, it would seem as though she could buy permission to speed.  
Taken together, Feldman argues, these four reasons explain why the desert of 
punishment can never be forward-looking. These reasons, he claims, do not apply to 
the desert of compensation for future harms. The position that Feldman defends, 
then, can be summarized as follows:  
 
D[esert] F[orward-looking] 1: If at t, S deserves compensation (O) in virtue of 
the fact that S did or suffered something (B) at t’, then t’ can sometimes be 
later than t. 
 
Critics of Feldman’s argument have focused on the first three objections that 
Feldman raises against the forward-looking desert of punishment, and argued that 
these apply to forward-looking desert of compensation as well. If that is true, then the 
received wisdom that desert is backward-looking would be salvaged. I will push back 
against these attempts at generalization.  
 
2.2. The epistemological objection 
Both Kristjánsson (2005) and Celello (2009) raise an epistemological objection to 
forward-looking desert of compensation. They point out that in the case of the sick 
children, it might be that a cure is miraculously found before the children die 
(Kristjánsson 2005, 152--also see; Celello 2009, 148–49). In the case of the suicide 
mission soldiers, it could be that the soldiers die of a heart attack before being able to 
carry out the mission. Our desert judgments about the deservingness of the children 
and the soldiers, then, are based on reasonable expectations—not on certainty about 
what will happen. Given this, it would be impracticable to implement forward-looking 
desert: we never really know for sure what the future will bring.  
 I agree with Kristjánsson and Celello that we face difficulties, sometimes 
severe ones, in establishing what will happen in future, and, more in particular, what 
a person will do in future. But note that this is not a fundamental objection to the 
claim that desert can be forward-looking. It could be that it is, even though we are, in 
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practice, not able to make forward-looking desert claims because of epistemological 
constraints.  
I do think, however, that we are able to make forward-looking desert claims in 
practice as well. To see this, consider that (1) there are epistemological difficulties 
about establishing what has happened in the past as well, which are not taken to 
undermine backward-looking desert claims; (2) epistemological uncertainties about 
the future come in degrees and (3) different standards of certainty may be required, 
depending on the choice of desert object. Combined, these three considerations 
suggest that uncertainties about what will happen should not always prevent us from 
making forward-looking desert claims.  
Let’s take a closer look at each consideration. First, many defenders of 
backward-looking desert views do not require absolute certainty about what 
happened in the past. Many retributivists, for instance, believe that epistemological 
uncertainties are not a detrimental objection to their view: They believe we are 
justified in assuming that, on balance, people can deserve punishment even though it 
is difficult to establish with certainty whether they have committed a crime and under 
what precise conditions they committed it (for instance: Were they compelled by 
others? Were they under the influence?). In fact, I suspect that many retributivists 
would endorse punishing a person when we are as certain that the person committed 
the crime, as we are that the terminally ill child is going to die from her illness. Many 
retributivists, after all, require that it is beyond reasonable doubt that a person has 
committed a crime—not that it is certain that they did.  
Second, although it will often not be beyond reasonable doubt what will 
happen in future, it sometimes is: Uncertainties about what will happen come in 
degrees. Take Feldman’s case of the sick children again. It is, sadly, quite certain that 
these children are going to die. Of course, there are possible futures in which they do 
not. The children may, as Kristjánsson and Celello point out, be miraculously cured. 
The world may cease to exist before the illnesses have run its course. But it seems, 
nevertheless, beyond reasonable doubt that the children will die.  
Matters are very different in the case of criminal wrongdoing. Someone who 
is planning to commit a crime might, up to the very second before committing it, still 
choose to refrain from carrying it out (remember the ‘you still have a choice’ quote 
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from Minority Report). What this points to, is that the epistemological difficulties we 
face in establishing someone’s future desert may not be as pervasive for all desert 
claims.   
Thirdly, different forward-looking desert claims may require different 
standards of certainty, depending on the object that is distributed. In particular, there 
appears to be a difference in the degree of certainty required for the distribution of 
harms and the distribution of benefits. To see this, consider, again, the difference 
between the desert of punishment and the desert of compensation. Many 
philosophers think that people have a right to immunity from punishment that can 
only be revoked if it is beyond reasonable doubt that a person has committed a crime. 
We might think, however, that a different standard of certainty applies for 
compensatory desert claims: Even if it is not certain that a child will die from an illness 
she has contracted, she may still deserve a trip to Disneyland. The reason, it seems to 
me, is that the trip would benefit the child rather than harm her—and giving the trip 
to the child, if it turns out later that she does not deserve it, would not constitute a 
violation of her rights.  
 
2.3. The freedom objection 
Celello (2009, 149) argues that the freedom objection to the forward-looking desert 
of punishment generalizes to the forward-looking desert of compensation. I agree 
with Celello that it could, indeed, sometimes apply to forward-looking compensatory 
desert claims as well. To see this, consider the case of the suicide mission soldiers: if 
they did not have the freedom to do otherwise than carry out the suicide mission, 
then we might think that they no longer deserve awards and prizes.  
 However, pace Celello, I do not think that the freedom objection applies to all 
forward-looking compensatory desert claims: We often claim that people deserve 
compensation for harms that they do not have control over. Even more strongly, it 
seems that people deserve compensation for such harms precisely because they could 
not have done otherwise than suffer them. Terminally ill children, for instance, 
deserve a trip to Disneyland, especially because they could not have done otherwise 
than become sick.  
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 Also, some desert theorists may want to go further and deny that even the 
desert of punishment requires the freedom to do otherwise. These theorists may be 
drawn to what Parfit has called the “Compatibilist View” about desert (1986, 765). As 
he puts it (without endorsing it himself): “On the Compatibilist View, the kind of free 
will that is required for desert would not be undermined by the truth of Determinism” 
(1986, 765). 58 Other philosophers might be drawn to a view on which, if determinism 
is true, desert can only justify the revocation of people’s right not to be punished—
but not the actual harsh treatment that is involved in punishing (see, for instance, 
Husak 1992).  
 
2.4. The desert basis obtainment objection 
A third concern about forward-looking desert, raised by Kristjánsson (2005, 152) and 
anticipated by Feldman (1995, 75), is that awarding the desert object before the 
desert basis obtains can, sometimes, influence the obtainment of the desert basis 
itself. Punishing someone before she commits the crime for which we punish her may 
prevent her from committing the crime—for instance, because she is in prison whilst 
she would have carried out the crime.  
  A second version of the same objection holds that sometimes, instead of 
preventing the desert basis from obtaining, giving the desert object to someone may 
actually induce her to make the desert basis obtain. David Schmidtz (2002, 783-784) 
pushes this objection against the forward-looking desert of punishment: if we punish 
someone before she commits a crime, that person may actually be induced to commit 
a crime. The person punished, he points out, might reason as follows: “Ok, if they treat 
me like a criminal, I’ll act like one” (2002, 784). If such inducement occurs, then this 
“condemns” the punishment, according to Schmidtz (2002, 784). 
I see the force of the desert basis objection. However, Kristjánsson (2005, 152) 
offers little argument to support his claim that it applies not just to the forward-
looking desert of punishment, but to forward-looking desert claims in general. I think 
that Feldman is right to say that there are cases in which awarding the desert object 
before the desert basis does not affect the obtainment of the desert basis. Think again 
 
58 Robert Adams (1985) defends a view of this kind.  
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of the example of the children who are terminally ill. The trip to Disneyland does not 
change the fact that their lives are going to end soon. The desert basis objection, then, 
does not apply to all forward-looking desert claims.  
 
2.5. The permission objection 
A fourth concern that one might have to forward-looking desert is the permission 
objection. According to this objection, awarding the desert object before the desert 
basis obtains may be regarded by the desert subject as receiving permission. As far as 
I am aware, the only philosopher who has raised this objection is Feldman (1995, 75) 
himself. I think that the permission objection might be especially pressing for the 
forward-looking desert of less severe punishments, such as fines for parking violations 
and speeding. The problem with the permission objection, however, is that it does not 
apply to forward-looking desert claims only. People might, after all, regard paying a 
fine after speeding as retroactively buying permission to speed as well. Because the 
permission objection seems to apply to both backward- and forward-looking desert 
claims, I will ignore it from here onwards.  
 In sum, I have now argued that challenges that have been raised against 
Feldman’s argument for forward-looking desert can be resisted. The desert of 
compensation for future harms can sometimes be forward-looking. I will now go on 
that desert can be forward-looking for more objects than just compensation.  
 
3. Additional objects for which desert is sometimes forward-looking 
3.1. Desert of chances 
David Schmidtz (2002) has argued that, besides compensation, people may sometimes 
forward-lookingly deserve chances as well. This seems to be particularly salient in 
hiring decisions: Jane may deserve a chance at a certain job,59 partly on the basis of 
what she will do after she gets it.60 Jane’s past behavior may be taken as evidence of 
how well she will do if she were given the job, but the facts that really make her 
 
59 For convenience, I’ll simply write ‘job’ from now on, instead of ‘chance at a certain job’. 
60 As Schmidtz puts it: “what she will do if given the chance” (2002, 781). 
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deserving of the chance—her performance on the job—lie in the future at the 
moment of the hiring decision.61,62   
 I agree with Schmidtz that the desert of chances can be forward-looking. 
Hence, I want to defend his account against an objection that has been raised to it by 
Celello (2009). Celello claims that the desert of chances in jobs is not truly forward-
looking: What really drives hiring decisions, he argues, are people’s past performance 
and “desert-making internal features”, such as being “trustworthy, hardworking, and 
so on” at the moment of hiring (p. 154). If that is right, then Schmidtz fails to offer an 
account of desert that is truly forward-looking. This objection, however, can be 
resisted.63  
To see this, suppose that there would not be one, but two Janes: Jane and 
Jane*. 64  Both Janes have exactly the same past performance and desert-making 
internal features. If both would apply for the same job, then it would seem that we 
should simply flip a coin to decide who gets the job. But suppose we now learn more 
about the future of both Janes. Suppose we have very good evidence to believe that 
Jane*, after she is hired, will quickly become dissatisfied with her job and start shirking 
her responsibilities. Jane, on the other hand, will really enjoy the job and carry out her 
responsibilities diligently.  
It seems to me plausible to say that Jane, rather than Jane*, deserves to get 
the job.65 She does so on the basis of future facts: it is neither a present nor a past fact 
 
61 Schmidtz, in later work, points out that we tend not to find forward-looking desert claims in the 
context of jobs paradoxical: “Upon receiving a surprisingly good job offer, a new employee vows to 
work hard to deserve it. No one ever thinks the vow is paradoxical. No one takes the employee aside 
and says, “Relax. There is nothing you can do. Only the past is relevant.” But unless such everyday vows 
are misguided, we can deserve X on the basis of what we do after receiving X” (2006, 98). 
62 Rawls (1999, secs. 17 and 48) offers what is perhaps the most influential critique of desert as a 
principle of distributive justice. Schmidtz suggests that the chance-based account of desert he proposes 
may be immune to Rawls’s criticisms and that “the difference principle, far from competing with 
principles of desert, can support the idea that people deserve a chance” (2002, 787). I think this is an 
intriguing suggestion that warrants further exploration.    
63 I think that this analysis fits with a case Schmidtz introduces in a paper preceding his book on desert: 
“Candidates often see their case as purely backward-looking, but tenure committees do not. Tenure 
committees want to know that a candidate will not become deadwood—that past performance was 
not spurred mainly by a prospect of tenure qua reward” (Schmidtz 2006, 101). 
64 Note that this response mirrors Feldman’s (1995, 71) response to the claim that the forward-looking 
desert of compensation is not genuinely forward-looking (see, also, section 2.1 of this chapter).  
65  Schmidtz suggests that the same is true for the desert of scholarships: “Two students receive 
scholarships. One works hard and gets excellent grades. The other parties her way through the first 
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about her that she will, in fact, carry out her responsibilities much more diligently than 
Jane*. If that is right, then it seems that the desert of jobs can be forward-looking. Of 
course, Celello could resist this response by saying that, in actual hiring decisions, the 
best we can rely on to predict a person’s future performance are that person’s past 
performance and her desert-making internal features. But that is merely an 
epistemological concern, rather than a metaphysical objection to the desert of 
chances. I am inclined to insist, with Schmidtz, that Jane is more deserving of the job 
than Jane*, because of a difference in their future performance.  
 Although many of the examples that Schmidtz provides are about hiring 
decisions, he allows for his account to apply to other opportunities as well, such as the 
chance to study through a scholarship. However, as I pointed out when discussing the 
desert obtainment objection, he thinks that people cannot deserve a chance on 
punishment: “The transformative role of expectations (the fact that we tend to live up 
to them, or down, as the case may be) can justify the faith involved in granting an 
opportunity but cannot justify punishment.” (Schmidtz 2006, 104). Punishment is, 
according to Schmidtz, likely to induce wrongdoing, and this inducement “condemns” 
the punishment (2006, 104). In that way, there is an asymmetry between desert of 
opportunities (chances on study programs, jobs, and so on), which can be forward-
looking, and desert of punishment, which cannot be forward-looking.  
Adding desert of chances to DF1, gives DF2:  
 
DF2: If at t, S can deserve chances and compensation (O) on the basis of the 
fact that S did or suffered something (B) at t’, then t’ can sometimes be later 
than t.   
 
3.2. Desert of blame, praise, and rewards 
Many desert theorists think that besides chances, compensation and punishment, 
people can also deserve rewards (Feldman 2016; Miller 2001; Mulligan 2018; Schmidtz 
2006) and praise and blame (Scanlon 2018). We often make desert claims such as: ‘Bill 
 
year before finally being expelled for cheating. Does their conduct tell us nothing about which of them 
was more deserving of the scholarship?” (2006, 99 his emphasis). 
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Gates deserves to be wealthy because he made a substantial productive contribution.’ 
‘Tracy deserves to be praised for saving Lucy from a burning house.’ ‘The CEO of L-
bank deserves to be blamed for the excessive risks that the bank took in the lead-up 
to the 2008 financial crisis.’  
Could it be that, besides desert of chances and compensation, desert of 
rewards, praise, and/or blame is forward-looking as well? To answer this question, I 
use the same approach as Feldman (1995). I consider examples of forward-looking 
desert claims on these objects and see whether these can plausibly be rewritten as 
backward-looking desert claims, or run into one, or more, of the four objections that 
I discussed in the previous section.  
 Let’s start with desert of rewards. One example of a desert claim for rewards 
that appears to be forward-looking is the following: an author (S) deserves to receive 
an advance (O) now, partly for the future completion of a manuscript she is working 
on (B). The claim, to be sure, is not that the advance is based exclusively on the future 
completion of the manuscript—but only in part. A case in which, I think, this is 
particularly plausible, is the advances that are paid to former US first ladies and 
presidents (Michele and Barack Obama were paid an advance of $65 million dollar by 
Penguin Random House).66 As long as the manuscripts of such biographies are not 
finished, they will be of little value to the publisher. The publisher will, at least usually, 
not be able to sell just a few chapters. Hence, if we were to reward the author purely 
on the basis of the value of the manuscript whilst she is working on it, we would only 
pay her a very minor advance.67 If, however, we take into account that the manuscript 
the author is working on will turn into a marketable book later on, we would, in fact, 
pay her a more substantial advance.    
 The forward-looking desert of advances (and rewards more generally) does 
not seem to run into any of the four objections that could be raised against the 
forward-looking desert of punishment. It does not seem to be the case that there are 
insurmountable epistemological uncertainties, partially because the size of the 
 
66  See: https://www.vox.com/culture/2017/3/2/14779892/barack-michelle-obama-65-million-book-
deal-penguin-random-house.  
67 Desert theorists who defend some version of a willingness to pay metric of productive contribution 
include Miller (2001) and Dekker (2008; 2018). 
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advance can be varied. If there is a great deal of uncertainty about whether the author 
will complete the manuscript, the advance can be reduced. Second, and relatedly, the 
freedom objection does not seem to be detrimental here: even if the author has the 
freedom to do otherwise than complete the manuscript, we may still be certain 
enough that she will do so to justify paying her an advance. In fact, if anything, paying 
out the advance will make it more likely that the author will finish the manuscript. 
Sometimes, at least, without an advance, an author would need to work at some other 
occupation in order to survive—which would slow down the completion of the 
manuscript. Thirdly, the desert obtainment objection does not apply here either: 
again, paying out the advance may actually make it more (rather than less) likely that 
the author will finish the manuscript.  
It seems to me that the desert of praise may at times be forward-looking as 
well. Sometimes, someone who is about to do something courageous should be 
applauded on the basis of what she is going to do. Actually, Feldman’s case of the 
suicide mission soldiers may also be construed as a case of the forward-looking desert 
of praise. Another, and perhaps more precise way of putting the point is that part of 
the compensation that the soldiers deserve consists in praise. My responses to 
objections to the forward-looking desert of compensation apply to the forward-
looking desert of praise as well. In fact, the freedom objection to the forward-looking 
desert of praise may even be weaker than it is for the forward-looking desert of 
compensation. As Tim Scanlon (2017, chap. 7) points out, people may deserve 
expressive attitudes such as praise, even if they are not free in the sense that they 
could have done otherwise. The appropriateness of such attitudes may, instead, be 
grounded in our everyday practices of holding each other responsible.68  
 That leaves the forward-looking desert of blame. Could desert of blame 
sometimes be forward-looking? It seems to me that it cannot. The epistemological 
argument and the desert obtainment objections raised to the forward-looking desert 
of punishment also apply, though less forcefully, to the forward-looking desert of 
blame. Blaming someone is generally thought to constitute harming that person. As a 
 
68 This position was first defended by Peter Strawson in his seminal Freedom and Resentment (2008). 
Strawson, however, does not construe his account in terms of desert.  
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result, the degree to which we need to be certain that the desert basis will actually 
obtain is high. We may rarely, if ever, be so certain that someone is going to commit 
a blameworthy act, that we are justified in actually blaming her before she commits 
it. Second, to blame people before they commit blameworthy acts may make them 
more likely to actually commit such blameworthy acts. If that is so, then this condemns 
the blame.  
 Adding praise and rewards to DF2, gives DF3:  
 
DF3: If, at t, S can deserve chances, compensation, praise, and rewards 
(O) in virtue of the fact that S did or suffered something (B) at t’, then 
t’ can sometimes be later than t.  
 
4. Retaining time-sensitivity 
People can sometimes deserve on the basis of facts occurring in future, or so I have 
argued. But DF3 leaves an important question unanswered: How long after t can the 
future facts that determine the desert basis occur? I will, in this section, sketch the 
beginnings of an answer to this question, using Shelly Kagan’s whole-lives-view of 
desert. According to that view,69 “in deciding how deserving [a] person is, the relevant 
question isn’t so much a matter of how virtuous or vicious they may be at this or that 
particular moment, but rather how virtuous or viscous the person is overall—that is, 
over the course of their entire lifetime” (Kagan 2012, 10–11). This whole-lives-view is 
partially forward-looking, because in establishing how deserving a person is at t, it 
does not just consider past and present facts about them, but also future facts.  
My concern about Kagan’s account is that it is insensitive to the amount of 
time that passes between the moment of awarding of the desert object and the 
obtainment of the future facts that, in part, determine the desert base. To see this 
concern, consider graphs 1 till 3. Graph 1 shows the development of Amos’s 
virtuousness over his lifetime (the x-axis depicts his age, from 18 till 80; the y-axis 
depicts his virtuousness, from very vicious to very virtuous). Graphs 2 and 3 both 
 
69 Kagan notes that he uses these desert bases and objects as placeholders, but that users of the 
framework he sets out are free to insert other desert bases and objects if they want to.  
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depict Amos’s wellbeing: the x-axis, again, shows Amos’s age, from 18 till 80; the y-
axis depicts his wellbeing, from neutral to extreme bliss. It would not matter, on 
Kagan’s view, whether the evolution of Amos’s wellbeing matches (as in graph 2) or 






1. Virtuousness 2. Wellbeing (mismatch) 3. Wellbeing (match) 
 
The only thing that matters in establishing whether Amos received the 
wellbeing he deserved, is that the average level of wellbeing Amos experiences 
matches his overall level of virtuousness. This implication is implausible, because of 
two familiar objections: the epistemological and the desert obtainment objection.   
 First, remember that there are epistemological limitations to how well we can 
predict what will happen in future, and that these limitations can sometimes be a 
legitimate objection to forward-looking desert, such as in the case of the desert of 
punishment. It seems that, frequently, the sooner the future facts that determine the 
desert basis are likely to obtain, the more certain we are that they will, in fact, 
obtain.70 Epistemological limitations, then, provide a prima facie reason for preferring 
the awarding of a desert object closer to the obtainment of the future facts that, in 
part, determine the desert basis. If Amos is going to carry out a praiseworthy action, 
such as helping an old man cross the street, then, all else equal, it is better to praise 
him for his action while he is doing it or right after he has done it. That way, we are 
more certain that Amos is, indeed, praiseworthy. 
Second, and more importantly, awarding the desert object long before 
obtainment of the future facts that determine the desert basis, makes one vulnerable 
to the desert obtainment objection. This objection is, as I argued, particularly forceful 
 
70 There are, of course, a few exceptions to this claim. We can, for instance, predict with absolute 
certainty we will all die.   
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in the case of severe punishment. Punishing a person by incarcerating her, for 
instance, may prevent her from actually committing the crime. But it may also hold 
for positive desert objects such as chances, praise, and rewards. Giving an 18-year old 
an amount of 20 million dollars for an invention she will do thirty years later, may 
actually prevent her from making the invention—for instance, because she would no 
longer have to work.  
This brings me to suggest the following qualifying claim on accounts of 
forward-looking desert: for all desert objects in DF3, it is better if people get the desert 
object closer to the future facts that, in part, determine the desert basis. It is, all else 
equal, better to give someone an award for her heroism right after she has actually 
been heroic. All else equal, it is better to give someone a chance just before she 
deserves it. All else equal, it is better to give someone compensation for the 
earthquake damage to her house, right after the house has been damaged. All else 
equal, it is better to praise someone for helping an elderly person cross the street, 
during or after they have done so. All else equal, it is better to reward someone for 
her productive contribution after she has made it. Adding the thought that time 
matters to DF3, gives DF4:  
 
DF4: If, at t, S can deserve compensation, chances, rewards, and praise (O) in 
virtue of (B), where B can be determined by facts occurring at t’, t’ can 
sometimes be later than t, especially when t and t’ are not far apart.  
 
5. Conclusion 
When, if ever, is desert forward-looking? The received wisdom is that it never is. As 
Feldman (1995), Schmidtz (2002), and Kagan (2012) have argued, however, the 
relationship between desert and time is more complex than this received wisdom 
allows for. Building on their forward-looking accounts of desert, I have attempted to 
be even more careful about the ways in which desert could be forward-looking and 
sketch the outlines of an account that is wider in scope than theirs. The main claim I 
have defended in this chapter is that the desert of chances, compensation, rewards, 
and praise can sometimes be forward-looking. I have also argued that, all else equal, 
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it is better that people get the desert object closer to the obtainment of the future 













Chapter 4: Why not be a desertist? Three arguments for 
desert and against luck egalitarianism71 
1. Introduction  
If we take Aristotle at his word, the distributive justice debate was considered settled 
in the fourth century BC: “All people agree that what is just in distribution must be in 
accord with some sense of desert” (Nicomachean Ethics: 1131a). 
 This consensus has been lost. None of today’s dominant theories of justice 
provides a foundational role to desert—that is, they do not distribute with a view to 
how deserving people are.72 Utilitarians reward the deserving only as an instrument 
for maximizing the general welfare. Egalitarians such as John Rawls (1971) would 
happily enrich the greedy and the indolent—if doing so redounded to the benefit of 
members of the least-advantaged class. And libertarians like Robert Nozick (1974) 
have no interest in establishing any pattern of distribution whatsoever: If free markets 
create an idle rentier class which monopolizes the product produced by diligent 
workers—well, so much the worse for the workers.  
In 1971, John Kleinig wrote that “the notion of desert seems by and large to 
have been consigned to the philosophical scrap heap” (1971, 71). Some might think 
that desert has made a comeback of sorts, in the form of luck egalitarianism. As Shlomi 
Segall points out, “many luck egalitarians invoke desert, whether explicitly or 
implicitly” (2015, 355). These desert-invoking luck egalitarians include G.A. Cohen 
(2011), Eric Rakowski (1991), and Larry Temkin (2017). 
 
71 This chapter is based on a paper I co-authored with Tom Mulligan and that has been accepted for 
publication: Brouwer and Mulligan (2019). Some modifications to the original article have been made. 
For helpful comments on draft versions of this paper, we wish to thank audiences at the Erasmus 
Institute for Philosophy and Economics (EIPE) PhD seminar (February 2017), the EIPE 20th anniversary 
conference (March 2017), the ninth European Conference in Analytic Philosophy (August 2017), the 
fifteenth Pavia Graduate Conference in Political Philosophy (September 2017), the fifth annual 
conference of the Dutch Research School for Philosophy (November 2017), and the second PPE society 
meeting (March 2018); an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies; and Alfred Archer, Rutger 
Claassen, Willem van der Deijl, Teun Dekker, Bart Engelen, Zoé Evrard, Andrea Gammon, Anca Gheaus, 
Jasper van den Herik, Tim Klaassen, Serena Olsaretti, Maureen Sie, and Jojanneke Vanderveen. 
72 There are, of course, exceptions to the utter exclusion of desert from the distributive justice debate; 
these include, among others, the theories of Michael Walzer (1983), Wojciech Sadurski (1985), David 
Miller (2001), David Schmidtz (2002; 2006), Fred Feldman (2016), and Thomas Mulligan (2018a). 
Nevertheless, we think that it is safe to say that the concept “plays an unimportant role in most 
contemporary theories of distributive justice” (Moriarty 2013, 537). 




Our purpose in this chapter is to show that not only has desert not made a 
comeback in the form of luck egalitarianism: the two theories are, in fact, deeply at 
odds. We distinguish three important contexts in which desertism conflicts with luck 
egalitarianism. 73  Moreover, analysis suggests that desert, not luck egalitarianism, 
renders the correct moral verdict in these contexts. 
We proceed as follows: In §2, we provide conceptual outlines of luck 
egalitarianism and desertism and describe the argumentative strategy we employ in 
what follows. §3 is the heart of the chapter: We adduce and analyze three thought 
experiments which demonstrate that luck egalitarianism conflicts with desert-based 
justice, and we show that the latter provides the more plausible analysis. We 
conclude, in §4, by drawing broad lessons for the current dialectic about justice. 
Among these is that luck egalitarians should consider supplementing their theory with 
desert considerations.  
 
2. Luck egalitarianism and desertism: General principles 
Some years after Ronald Dworkin (1981a; 1981b) first inspired luck egalitarianism,74 
G.A. Cohen remarked that “Dworkin has, in effect, performed for egalitarianism the 
considerable service of incorporating within it the most powerful idea in the arsenal 
of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice and responsibility” (1989, 933). 
Desertism also makes use of this idea, but that is perhaps the only commonality 
between the two theories. And even this shared concern for choice and responsibility 
is incorporated into the two theoretical frameworks in different ways.  
 Two preliminary remarks must be made. First, we cannot, within the confines 
of this chapter, provide a complete conceptual mapping of either theory, let alone 
both. Doing so would be especially problematic for desertism: Desert is a wonderfully 
rich concept, but also a maddeningly complex one. For the purposes of our argument, 
we need not consider all the variety in the literature on luck egalitarianism and 
 
73  We use “desertism” and “desert-based (theory of distributive) justice” interchangeably in this 
chapter.  
74 The term “luck egalitarianism” was coined by Anderson (1999, 289) in a critique of the theory. 
Dworkin (2003) resisted the label, and Arneson (2018) argues that, indeed, Dworkin should not be 
regarded as a luck egalitarian. We do not take our argument to apply to Dworkin’s theory of distributive 
justice. 




desertism. Instead, we focus on features of luck egalitarianism which all its major 
construals share, and on one, mainstream, desert-based view of distributive justice. 
Our aim is to show that desert-based justice provides a more plausible moral analysis 
in three important cases than luck egalitarianism, however construed, does.  
 Second, we consider monistic versions of luck egalitarianism and desertism. 
That is, we ignore that, to decide on what is distributively just all things considered, 
luck egalitarians and desertists might supplement their core ideas with independent 
principles, such as benevolence, compassion, freedom, and/or utility (cf. Temkin 2003, 
63; 2017, 46; Voigt 2007, 391). What we are interested in here are the ramifications 
of the core ideas of both theories in the cases that we consider.75  
  
2.1 Luck egalitarianism 
Samuel Scheffler puts the central claim of luck egalitarianism thus:76 
 
“inequalities in the advantages that people enjoy are acceptable if they derive from 
the choices that people have voluntarily made, but […] inequalities deriving from 
unchosen features of people’s circumstances are unjust. Unchosen circumstances are 
taken to include social factors like the class and wealth of the family into which one is 
born. They are also deemed to include natural factors like one’s native abilities and 
intelligence” (2003b, 5). 
 
From this central claim, the two questions that constitute much of the luck egalitarian 
literature arise: (1) What are the instances of bad luck (“unchosen circumstances”) 
that give rise to unacceptable inequalities? And (2) what, exactly, are these 
“advantages that people enjoy” (i.e. what is the appropriate currency of justice)?  
 When it comes to (1), luck egalitarians agree that not all inequalities arising 
from luck are unjust and therefore in need of repair.77 The problematic inequalities 
 
75 We discuss the possibility of pluralism in §3.3. 
76 See Arneson (2011) and Lippert-Rasmussen (2017) for overviews of luck egalitarianism. Prominent 
luck egalitarians include G.A. Cohen (1989), Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2001), John Roemer (2000), and 
Peter Vallentyne (2002). 
77 The exception is what Segall (2010, 46) deems “all-luck egalitarianism”, which maintains that all luck-
derived inequalities are unjust. We suspect that all-luck egalitarianism collapses into a form of outcome 
egalitarianism. 




are those that arise from unequal brute luck. Inequalities that arise from unequal 
option luck need not concern us.  
There are two common views on how to distinguish the two types of luck: the 
choice view and the control view (cf. Lippert-Rasmussen 2018, sec. 4). Proponents of 
the choice view hold that X is brute luck for P iff P did not substantially and voluntarily 
choose X; X is option luck for P iff P did substantially and voluntarily choose X (cf. 
Cohen 2011). Proponents of the control view, on the other hand, say that X is brute 
luck for P iff P does not and did not control X; X is option luck for P iff P does or did 
control X (cf. Zimmerman 1993). 
In some scenarios, the choice view and the control view will agree.  Suppose, 
for example, that Alice steps up to the roulette wheel and bets a large sum of money 
on black. Unlucky for her, it comes up red. As a result of this loss, she is made worse 
off than others. Because Alice voluntarily chose to gamble, and because she controlled 
her decision to participate in the gambling, nearly all (see n. 77) luck egalitarians agree 
that her relative disadvantage is not unjust. To be sure, Alice neither chose nor 
controlled the roulette wheel’s coming up red. But she did choose and control her 
participation in this calculated gamble—and that, for the luck egalitarian, is the 
important thing. 
In other scenarios, choice and control need not coincide. Suppose that Bert 
gets into an accident because he voluntarily chose to drive his motorcycle recklessly 
(and he voluntarily chose his taste for reckless riding).78 On the choice view, Bert (like 
Alice) may justly bear the relative burdens produced by his recklessness (e.g., his 
injuries). The accident is a result of bad option luck. But suppose, further, that Bert’s 
accident was overdetermined; even if he had been careful, the accident would have 
occurred. On the control view, the accident would be a case of bad brute luck—
because Bert had no control over it—and therefore is amenable to compensation by 
the state. 
The second major question, (2), confronting luck egalitarians (and indeed, all 
theorists of justice) is specifying the currency of justice. Some regard resources as the 
currency, where these are akin to and include the standard notion of social goods. 
 
78 This example is adapted from Fleurbaey (1995, 40–41). 




Others, like Arneson (1989; 2000b; 2016), disagree, holding that a person suffers from 
unjust disadvantage when his (access to) welfare is lower than it would have been, 
had the bad brute luck circumstances not obtained.79 And Cohen (1989; 2011) thinks 
that luck egalitarians ought to concern themselves with inequalities in both.80  
Taking these distinctions into account, luck egalitarianism can be partitioned 
into four theoretical approaches: choice-resources, choice-welfare, control-resources, 
and control-welfare. We shall show in §3 that our argument is sound no matter which 
the luck egalitarian elects. 
  
2.2 Desertism 
Serena Olsaretti aptly characterizes the literature on desertism as a “fairly eclectic 
collection of contributions by desert theorists whose views differ widely” (2004, 6). 
But here, too, there is a unifying claim: It is unjust when people do not get the things 
that they deserve. Defenders of desert-based distributive justice agree also on three 
basic features thought central to the concept of desert.81  
First, desert claims minimally consist of (1) a subject (S), that (2) deserves an 
object or mode of treatment (O), given (3) a certain desert base (B). For instance, Mo 
(S) deserves to win the gold medal (O) because he was the fastest runner (B). For 
desert to function as a principle of distribution, it is insufficient to say that Mo 
deserves the medal; there must be a base or bases for awarding it to him (although 
this is often left implicit). It is also insufficient to say that Mo was the fastest runner; 
we must also have an object or mode of treatment in mind that he is morally entitled 
to. 
Desert claims are, second, subject to an ‘aboutness principle’: the bases must 
bear a proper relationship to the desert subject.82 This principle rules out claims like: 
 
79 Note that Arneson (1989) initially defended subjective welfare, but has since abandoned this view. 
He now defends an objective welfare account (see his 2016).  
80 This is not meant to be an exhaustive classification. It excludes, for example, responsibility-sensitive 
capability views (cf. Vallentyne 2005). We focus on resources and welfare because these two currencies 
seem to come apart most often. Our argument, however, also holds for responsibility-sensitive 
capability views.    
81 See Feldman and Skow (2016) and McLeod (2002) for contemporary overviews of desert. Pojman 
and McLeod (1998) provide excerpts from important historical and contemporary texts on desert. The 
seminal conceptual work on desert was done by Feinberg (1970), Kleinig (1971), and Sher (1989).  
82 See Feinberg (1970, 72–73), Feldman (2016, 42), Olsaretti (2003b, 4), and Sadurski (1985, 117). 




‘Mo deserves the medal because his parents will cry if he does not get it’. While the 
distress of Mo’s parents could in theory entitle Mo, morally, to the trophy (on a 
utilitarian account, for example), their distress could not make Mo deserving. 
We shall not give a specification of the aboutness principle here, both because 
we do not wish to make any controversial assumptions and, more importantly, 
because the cases we adduce in §3 are valid on many specifications. We only note that 
it is frequently cashed out in terms of responsibility.83 On this view, it’s not enough 
that the desert basis be about the desert subject; she must also be responsible for that 
basis.84 
Just as there is some necessary relation between the desert subject and the 
desert basis (whether it’s responsibility or something else), there is a necessary 
relation between the desert object and the desert basis. This is generally put in terms 
of ‘fit’: Mo’s athletic performance may make him deserving of a medal, but not of a 
multi-billion-dollar fortune. 
For the purpose of this chapter—comparing luck egalitarianism and 
desertism—we shall assume that people deserve the currency of justice on the basis 
of their social contributions. We do this, because it is a central position among the 
(admittedly small) community of desert theorists. So there will be nothing 
idiosyncratic in the desert-based approach that we commend here. David Miller 
(2001), for example, in his pluralist account of distributive justice, says that people 
deserve on the basis of their contributions, where ‘contribution’ is measured by the 
aggregating the reservation prices of consumers. And one of us (2018a) has advanced 
a monistic theory of desert-based justice in which people deserve income on the basis 
of their contributions, as measured by the amount of additional output they provide 
(and where Shapley value is used to disentangle joint production).85  
 
 
83 A well-known exception is Feldman (1995; 1996; 2016) who holds that we can be deserving without 
being responsible for our performance on a desert base—for instance, we can be deserving on the basis 
of how needy we are. For a careful discussion of Feldman’s arguments, see Smilansky (1996b; 1996b).  
84  There are many ways in which the responsibility requirement can be fleshed out. For helpful 
discussion, see McLeod (1998) and Sie and Pereboom (2016).  
85 There is, indeed, a small but lively discussion among desert theorists about how to measure social 
contribution. In addition to Miller (2001) and Mulligan (2018a), see Dekker (2008; 2010; 2018), Hsieh 
(2000), and Sheffrin (2013). 




3. Three thought experiments, three differences 
Talk about desert is ubiquitous in the luck egalitarian literature.  Indeed, some 
philosophers reckon that the theories themselves are intimately connected; Nicholas 
Barry, for example, says that luck egalitarianism is “both an egalitarian and a desert-
based theory” (2006, 102). 
But the demands of luck egalitarianism and desertism come apart in a number 
of important and frequently occuring instances. We illustrate this phenomenon by 
way of three thought experiments. We shall see that at times the desertist regards the 
luck egalitarian as too stingy (§3.1), and at other times too restrictive (§3.2). And the 
two theories differ in scope: Luck egalitarianism is concerned only with the justness of 
differences in the level that people have of a currency of justice, whereas desertism is 
also concerned with the justness of the level itself (§3.3). 
 
3.1 Too stingy: The burning house86 
 
Tracy lives in a neighborhood with many timber-framed houses. One morning, she 
wakes up to the cries of her neighbor, Shirley. Shirley’s house is on fire and she 
cannot escape. Tracy calls the fire brigade and waits, but when Shirley’s cries stop, 
Tracy decides to try to save Shirley herself. Tracy gets a ladder, climbs into Shirley’s 
house through a window, finds Shirley lying unconscious on the floor, and carries her 
out of the house. Shirley survives. Unfortunately, the rescue leaves Tracy injured 
from burns and smoke inhalation. Tracy requires expensive treatment at the hospital, 
which means that her resource holdings decrease. Her welfare has also dropped 
considerably as a result of her injuries.  
 
Could Tracy, compatibly with justice, receive compensation for the drop in her 
resource holdings (the resources view) and welfare (the welfare view)?  
 
86 The Burning House is similar in structure to examples considered by Dekker (2009), Eyal (2007), 
Moriarty (2018), Olsaretti (2009), Stemplowska (2009), and Temkin (2003; 2017). We raise new 
objections to the solutions that they propose for accommodating rewards for costly, praiseworthy 
actions within luck egalitarian theory. 




The luck egalitarian answer is clear: No (cf. Eyal 2007, 4; Moriarty 2018). Why? 
Because Tracy chose to save Shirley (the choice view) and because she had control 
over her decision to save Shirley (the control view).  
We find this morally implausible. Tracy ought to receive compensation for her 
actions, which should include (the resources required for) medical care for her 
injuries. Luck egalitarianism has no conceptual mechanism for providing such care. It 
is too stingy when it comes to parceling out aid to people like Tracy—sufferers of bad 
option luck who voluntarily made socially valuable choices at high costs to 
themselves. Shirley will live (and may work), social ties are tightened, and the 
community has been strengthened—all because of Tracy’s heroism. 
Objection 1: Shared duties (Stemplowska 2009, 243–45). In response to 
scenarios like this, some luck egalitarians argue that critics interpret their theory too 
narrowly, ignoring the requirement that people face equal options before justice 
requires that they bear a disadvantage. People’s options are equal only if “they make 
it possible to enjoy (face) the same combination of benefits (burdens) at the same 
cost, except where the differences are controlled by the agent whose opportunities 
are being assessed” (Stemplowska 2009, 244).  
In the Burning House case, the equal options constraint could allow luck 
egalitarians to claim that all members of society share a duty to save others in life-
threatening circumstances, and that people should receive compensation if they bear 
a disproportionate share of this duty. If that were true, then perhaps Tracy should 
receive compensation, since she bears more of the physical and psychological costs 
of the duty to save than others do.  
Reply to objection 1: Supererogation. Although stressing that luck 
egalitarianism requires equality of options may sometimes help the luck egalitarian 
evade harshness objections, the strategy is not successful here. Saving people at a 
significant risk to one’s health, which is what Tracy does, goes beyond the call of 
shared duties—especially if one has already tried to carry out one’s duty without 
incurring a serious risk of getting in harm’s way. Observe that we would not blame 
Tracy if she had chosen not to try to save Shirley by entering the burning house. 




Our worry about luck egalitarianism, then, can be rephrased so that it says 
that luck egalitarianism cannot hold that justice requires reimbursing people for 
making costly, praiseworthy, voluntary choices that are supererogatory. This is a 
problem for luck egalitarianism, because there are many cases in which we value it 
when people go beyond the call of duty, and in which we think they ought to be 
compensated for this: Someone voluntarily resigning from his job to care for a sick 
family member; someone risking her life in defense of her country; someone 
donating an organ, putting her own life in danger, to help another who is in urgent 
need. And, we stress, all of these actions make a bona fide social contribution. 
Objection 2: Innocent choice (Eyal 2007). Nir Eyal has responded to scenarios 
such as the Burning House by arguing that luck egalitarianism needs to be replaced 
with ‘modified luck egalitarianism’, defined as follows:  
 
“That someone incurs a disadvantage without having chosen culpably to risk 
incurring it is, in a central respect, unjust. If, however, that disadvantage results from 
that person’s own culpable choice to take that risk, then (barring prioritarian 
considerations) that disadvantage can remain perfectly just. ‘Culpable’ choice is 
understood as a free and at least somewhat morally wrong choice“ (2007, 6). 
 
In other words, on Eyal’s modified version of luck egalitarianism, it is not voluntary 
choice that determines the cut between brute luck and option luck, but culpable 
choice.  
 Reply 1 to objection 2: Neutrality. Many luck egalitarians, and many liberal 
egalitarians generally, will be loath to endorse Eyal’s theory on the grounds that it 
conflicts with the liberal commitment to neutrality in justification—the idea that (on 
one common definition) state action should not be justified by appeals to particular 
conceptions of the good.87 The extent to which it violates neutrality in justification 
will depend on the definition of “somewhat morally wrong”—something Eyal does 
 
87 As Gaus (2005) points out, there is a wealth of different definitions of neutrality in justification. Eyal’s 
modified luck egalitarianism would conflict with neutrality under many of these. Quong (2011, 12–44) 
discusses the importance of neutrality to liberal egalitarians.  




not make precise. But it is very unclear how this moral wrongness could possibly be 
hashed out in value-free terms.88 
Reply 2 to objection 2: Contribution Matters. More importantly, however: 
Luck egalitarians willing to abandon neutrality are better served by simply endorsing 
one of the desert view discussed in §2.2—which, to be clear, also violate the 
commitment to neutrality in justification. This we shall justify at some length in §3.2 
and §3.3; here we point out that Eyal anticipates this reply and offers two rejoinders 
to it. But neither is convincing.  
First, Eyal asks the reader to: 
 
“[i]magine a society in which a principle of desert is being strictly followed. The results 
of all gambles are effectively obliterated. Optional gamblers are granted precisely 
what they deserve. Gamblers’ lots are of course tied to the fact that they gamble, 
which affects their deserts. However, their lots are not tied to the arbitrary outcomes 
of their gambles, namely, to their option luck. Plainly, such a society differs from a 
(standard or modified) luck-egalitarian one. Strict adherence to a desert principle 
obliterates all luck, regardless of whether it is brute luck or option luck, luck following 
innocent choice or culpable choice” (2007, 8). 
 
This is incorrect. “Strict adherence to a desert principle” does not obliterate all luck. 
In fact, if anything, as we will go on to point out in §3.2., desertist theories of 
distributive justice often are more permissive of luck influencing distributive 
outcomes than luck egalitarian ones (cf. Miller 2001, 147–55; Olsaretti 2006, 438–
44).  
The second objection Eyal levels against desertism is that it might not offer a 
large enough reward to compensate for bad option luck: 
 
“[Desert] permits a person who risks having his own house burnt in order to save a 
neighbor’s baby to receive a prize for his praiseworthy act. But that prize need not be 
 
88 A critic might resist this claim by pointing out that culpable choice would be the only choice that 
violates the requirement that free and equal persons cannot reasonably disagree about. This minimal 
definition of culpable choice, however, cannot avoid the harshness objection, as I argue in a draft paper 
with Julien Kloeg (see chapter 7.4. for a summary of the argument). 




nearly as substantial as the loss of his home. A person’s praiseworthy decision to focus 
on the neighbor’s baby need not be praiseworthy enough to call for a substantial 
enough award: one may save the baby when the risk to one’s own house is still low. 
In this instance, the decision will be only somewhat praiseworthy, justifying only a 
small desert-based prize.” (2007, 9) 
 
There is an important problem with this objection. The luck egalitarian idea 
which Eyal applauds is that our hero ought to be ‘made whole’ after saving the baby—
that is, be fully compensated for the loss of her house. But this is implausible in some 
cases. Suppose, for example, that our hero’s home is lavish and expensive (but not 
unjustly owned; i.e., she purchased it with resources gained through good option 
luck). Our hero rushes out of it in the middle of the night and saves the child—but 
then watches as her estate burns to the ground.  
We all agree that she ought to receive many things for her heroic act—
profound thanks, society’s admiration, and, to be sure, some compensation. But does 
justice really require that she be compensated millions upon millions of dollars for 
her loss? (Keep in mind, by design of Eyal’s example, she freely chose not to insure 
against this loss. For some luck egalitarian theories, that would obviate the need for 
compensation—but not for Eyals´s modified luck egalitarianism.) Perhaps intuitions 
differ, but we do not think justice requires that our hero be made whole—and desert-
based theory we assume, which responds to the contribution, not the loss, agrees. 
Objection 3: Incorporating desert (Arneson 2011; Dekker 2009). Finally, some 
luck egalitarians have responded to scenarios such as the Burning House by adjusting 
their theories to incorporate considerations of desert. They argue that desert can 
provide luck egalitarianism with a principle of stakes, which specifies “what 
consequences can justifiably be attached to the features that are the appropriate 
grounds of responsibility” for the luck egalitarian (2009, 167).89 If desert is used as 
 
89 Olsaretti (2009) offers an extensive discussion of formulating principles of stakes. As she points out, 
critics of luck egalitarianism have often assumed that luck egalitarians subscribe to a contextualist 
principle of stakes, according to which people should bear all the consequences of their voluntary 
choices. As she argues, however, it would be perfectly compatible with luck egalitarianism to instead 
adopt a consequentialist principle of stakes, according people should bear only those consequences of 
their voluntary choices that would be optimal for them to bear from a social point of view—or, as we 




principle of stakes, then people should only bear a subset of all the consequences of 
their voluntary choices: namely, the consequences that are deserved. On this, desert-
adjusted variant of luck egalitarianism, Tracy ought to be compensated for her 
medical expenses, since she incurred them while making a sizeable social 
contribution. 
Reply 1 to objection 3: Neutrality (encore).  An obvious worry about using 
desert as a principle of stakes is that this would be subject to a similar concern as 
Eyal’s modified luck egalitarianism. Desert-based theories, such as the one we adopt 
in this chapter, conflict with the liberal commitment to neutrality in justification. By 
holding that certain acts constitute a social contribution which deserves to be 
rewarded, this view privileges conceptions of the good that agree with the definition 
of social contribution.  
As we noted already, not all luck egalitarians are committed to neutrality in 
justification. Those who are, however, will be hesitant to incorporate desert for this 
reason.   
Reply 2 to objection 3: Restrictiveness. Relatedly, adopting desert as a 
principle of stakes only would unduly narrow the category of social contributions that 
should be rewarded. According to the desertist, people may, compatibly with justice, 
deserve rewards for their social contributions even when these contributions are due 
to unequal brute luck circumstances. To see this, consider the case of the Personal 
Computer Revolution.   
 
3.2 Too restrictive: The personal computer revolution  
 
Bill Gates had a vision: to revolutionize the computer industry and put a personal 
computer in every home. Through his native intelligence, the good fortune of being 
born to wealthy parents, and his work ethic, he succeeded. Today, he is a wealthy and 
happy man.  
 
Is it just that Gates is wealthier and happier than others?  
 
will go on to point out, a desertist priniciple, according to which people should only bear those 
consequences of their voluntary choices that they deserve to bear. 




The luck egalitarian thinks not. Gates did not choose his intelligence, diligence, 
or his other natural traits. The same can be said for his social circumstances. Nor did 
he control these. Consequently, Gates’s wealth, so it is claimed, should be taken from 
him and redistributed to those who had worse brute luck. 
For the desertist, that result is wrong—or at least too quick. After all, Gates 
made a bona fide social contribution. Moreover, quite independent of justice we, as a 
society, should like to incentivize the acquisition of skills and the achievements of 
people like Gates. 
The precise size of Gates’s just reward will depend on how the aboutness 
principle is specified. Some desert theorists hold what Olsaretti (2006, 438–41) calls 
the ‘conventional view’ of the principle, on which the only luck that Bill’s income 
should be corrected for is ‘performance luck’—that is, unforeseeable circumstances 
that affect Bill’s success (such as the unexpected death of a major competitor). On this 
view, neither Bill’s “luck in the natural lottery” (e.g. his intelligence) nor his luck in the 
social lottery (his rich parents) undercuts his desert (defenders of this view include: 
Schmidtz 2002; Miller 2001, 147–55).  
Other desertists defend more stringent versions of the aboutness principle,90 
and say that desert is not only undercut by performance luck but also by some forms 
of background luck (cf. Olsaretti 2006, 444–48). On these views, Bill could keep less of 
his wealth than on the conventional view—but more than would be compatible with 
luck egalitarianism.  
Now, the luck egalitarian may at this point lodge an objection; namely, that 
our critique ignores the fact that many luck egalitarians are pluralists who hold that to 
decide whether a distribution is just, luck egalitarian theory must be supplemented 
with other moral principles—such as beneficence, compassion, a communitarian 
principle, and/or freedom. And a pluralist theory which included luck egalitarianism 
might be able to evade criticisms about restrictiveness.  
We acknowledge that pluralism may help the luck egalitarian in this way. But 
it comes at a high cost. We discuss the cost of pluralism in conjunction with a third 
 
90 Here we should note a difference in view: Mulligan (2018a) is drawn to the conventional view of luck 
and desert, Brouwer adheres to what Olsaretti has called the “fair opportunity view” (Olsaretti 2006, 
444). 




difference between luck egalitarianism and desertism, which we turn now to consider. 
This difference, which has received insufficient attention in the literature, provides 
another reason to prefer desert to luck egalitarianism. Here, the problem is that luck 
egalitarianism is only concerned with the justness of differences in the level of a 
currency of justice between people, not with the justness of the level itself. Desert is 
sensitive to both. 
 
3.3 Deserved levels: A Malthusian state91 
 
In the agrarian state of Ludville, the government is wholly committed to justice in 
accordance with luck egalitarian principles. Every year, the government redistributes 
in order to neutralize any and all resource (or welfare) differences that arose out of 
unequal brute luck circumstances. Let us suppose that Ludville’s government has 
perfect information about which inequalities were due to brute luck (and thus in need 
of repair) and which were not (i.e., which were due to option luck). 
Ludville’s government has another odd feature: It burns up—literally—a 
huge share of the social product. As a result, almost all of Ludville’s citizens live, 
unequally, at a near-starvation level. Every couple of years, when the harvest is bad, 
there is famine, and there is death. 
 
Is the distribution in Ludville just? 
According to the luck egalitarian it is, as there are no inequalities in resources 
or welfare that arose from brute luck. While luck egalitarians might viscerally regard 
Ludville as an unjust place, that finding is not yielded by luck egalitarian principles. G. 
A. Cohen says that “there is injustice in distribution when inequality of goods reflects 
not such things as differences in the arduousness of different people’s labors, or 
people's different preferences and choices with respect to income and leisure, but 
myriad forms of lucky and unlucky circumstance” (2000, 130). In Ludville, the 
inequalities that do exist result, ex hypothesi, from legitimate choices to, for example, 
 
91 This example is adapted from Feldman (2016, 138–39). As Brouwer & Van der Deijl (2017) and Dekker 
(2016) argue, the notion of desert that Feldman assumes may not be distinctive. Hence, we are not 
convinced that Feldman succeeds in showing that desertism can avoid this Malthusian objection. We 
argue here that contribution-based desertism does succeed at avoiding it.  




work harder and longer. A conclusion of injustice can only be drawn if the luck 
egalitarian principles are supplemented by other considerations,92 such as a concern 
for the needs of Ludville’s citizens. 
The desertist, on the other hand, holds that everyone who makes a social 
contribution non-comparatively deserves to get a certain amount of social product in 
return (cf. Hurka 2003; Kagan 2012; Miller 2001). That is, a person should get the 
amount of social product he or she deserves, and that is in part determined by the 
size of her inputs. One does not simply assume, as luck egalitarianism implicitly does, 
that the question of the size of the distributive pie is irrelevant.  
Objection: Pluralism. The luck egalitarian again has an objection based in 
pluralism. It goes like this: Of course there is something wrong with the distribution in 
Ludville. But that wrongness is of a kind that luck egalitarianism is not intended to 
diagnose. If luck egalitarianism is really just a theory of comparative fairness, for 
example, then perhaps our criticism of luck egalitarianism is misplaced. This view has 
been best advanced by Temkin (1993; 2011; 2017). As he puts it, 
 
“[o]n close examination, the intimate connection between equality and fairness 
illuminates the ultimate role that luck plays in the egalitarian’s thinking, as well as the 
relevance and limitations of the well-known ‘through no fault or choice of their own’ 
clause. Among equally deserving people, it is bad, because unfair, for some to be 
worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. But among unequally 
deserving people it isn’t bad, because not unfair, for someone less deserving to be 
worse off than someone more deserving, even if the former is worse off through no 
fault or choice of his own” (2017, 45–46, his emphasis) 
 
 One is immediately struck by all this talk about desert by a luck egalitarian. 
And, indeed, the most straightforward reply to Temkin is that he is really a desertist 
and not a luck egalitarian. But we’ll get to that in a moment. 
Reply: The disadvantages of pluralism. We do not dispute that pluralism is 
likely necessary at some level. After all, it may be that the concept of justice itself does 
 
92 Tan (2008) makes some suggestions along these lines. 




not encompass everything that we think morally relevant to economic life.93 If that is 
so, then no theory of justice can fully answer every question about how we ought, 
morally, to arrange our economy. 
 What is important for our purposes in this chapter is that, in the scenarios 
described, desert monistically renders the intuitively correct moral verdict. Luck 
egalitarianism, in contrast, constantly has to be supplemented: by principles of 
beneficence, or efficiency, etc. 
 Occam’s Razor tells us that we should not multiply entities without need, but 
luck egalitarians like Temkin would have us do precisely that in order to account for 
the intuitions that luck egalitarianism misses. But when it comes to justice, just as 
when it comes to the natural world, we should aspire to a theory that “explains various 
large and independent classes of facts” (Darwin 1868, 8) that “bring[s] order to 
phenomena that in its absence would be individually isolated” (Kuhn 1977, 322). 
Desertism has greater explanatory power than luck egalitarianism. 
 More seriously, as we have seen, there are some cases (the Burning House, the 
Personal Computer Revolution) in which luck egalitarianism can render a clear and 
monistic verdict—but it appears to be the wrong one. This casts doubt not on the 
generality of luck egalitarianism, but on its truth. As these cases suggest, the fact that 
someone made a valuable contribution may be of greater fundamental importance, 
from the point of view of distributive justice, than whether that person voluntarily 
chose her actions (or was in control of them).  
 Finally, there is a pragmatic worry. Suppose that Temkin is right and the proper 
domain of application of luck egalitarianism is ‘comparative fairness’. Further suppose 
that we want to pursue justice in our world by applying luck egalitarian theory. We 
face hard questions: How is comparative fairness related to non-comparative 
fairness? Are fairness and justice coextensive, or could some distribution be fair but 
unjust? In such a case, which takes priority? What role is there for rights? For 
 
93 Konow (2001) finds that human beings share three “distributional goals”: “just deserts, need, and 
incentives for productivity [i.e. efficiency]” (p. 139). In other words, (1) giving people what they deserve 
is what we mean by justice, (2) need and efficiency are also morally important (though less important 
than justice/desert), and (3) need and efficiency may conflict with justice (and each other) in some 
cases. 




communal values? When must communal values be ceded to rights, rights ceded to 
fairness, and fairness ceded to communal values?  
 While luck egalitarians are certainly not alone in dodging conceptual 
complexities, if they cannot even tell us what fairness demands, let alone distributive 
justice, then it is hard to see what value the theory has for the real-world pursuit of 
justice. 
As an aside, another pragmatic concern, which again favors desertism over 
luck egalitarianism, is efficiency. A redistributive system that provides resources or 
welfare-enhancements in proportion to laziness or incompetence is driven toward 
zero output. Everyone suffers. Yet a luck egalitarian system might well do this—if 
those traits are had as a matter of luck. In contrast, the plausible desert bases in the 
economic realm, including contribution, 94  are all connected to a person’s 
productivity—the amount of output she can produce per unit time. Put differently, by 
giving people what they deserve we naturally promote the right economic incentives. 
As Paul Krugman reminds us, “productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is 
almost everything. A country’s ability to improve its standard of living over time 
depends almost entirely on its ability to raise its output per worker” (1994, 11). 
 Some luck egalitarians have felt the theoretical allure of desert, as evidenced 
by the extent to which talk about desert suffuses the luck egalitarian literature. These 
luck egalitarians resist the notion that the ubiquity of desert should incline them to 
desert-based justice. We believe that this resistance will ultimately fail. To illustrate, 
let’s consider an example Temkin gives, which is supposed to prove that he is, pace all 
his desert talk, not actually a desertist deep down.  
Example: Having children (Temkin 2017, 58). Bo and Qing begin their adult lives 
with equal talents and equal resources. Both are equally morally deserving. Qing has 
children and Bo does not, leaving Qing with fewer resources to spend on himself. 
Temkin says this is fair. This shows that he is a luck egalitarian, and not a desertist, 
because desert would require that Bo and Qing should actually have equal resources 
to spend on themselves (since they are equally deserving): “Having children and 
 
94 Another possible desert base that is tied to productivity is purposeful effort (cf. Wolff 2003; Sadurski 
1985). 




sacrificing on their behalf wouldn’t make Qing a less virtuous or less morally deserving 
person than Bo. […] it is perfectly plausible to believe that such free and responsible 
choices don’t make Qing less deserving of a good life than Bo” (2017, 58, his 
emphasis).  
 Reply: Mutually beneficial exchanges. Temkin, it seems to us, strawmans 
desert-based justice here. Even if there were a viable theory of virtue-based desert 
that had the implication Temkin suggests, many theories do not have this implication. 
The mainstream desertist theory on which we rely certainly does not. To see this, 
consider Smith, who deserves D dollars on the basis of his social contribution. He 
decides to spend d dollars of it on a book. Now there’s supposed to be injustice, 
because Smith deserves D dollars, but in fact he only has D – d, plus a book?  
No desert-based theory of justice that subscribed to such a view could possibly 
serve as an operative theory of distributive justice, since it rules out the possibility of 
mutually beneficial trades. An economy in which (1) resources are distributed on the 
basis of social contribution and (2) deserved resources may be exchanged between 
citizens for goods and services as they see fit is a perfectly coherent one.  
 So Qing’s choice about whether to raise children or not is irrelevant for 
determining whether her income is deserved. The distributor doesn’t look at Qing’s 
personal life, but at his economic activity: Did Qing make bona fide contributions to 
the economy (in which case his income is deserved), or did he steal it, extract rents 
from his firm, or the like (in which case it is not)? 
  
4. Conclusion 
Our world is one in which nearly all people consider themselves “friends of desert” 
(Kagan 2012, 3). There is, thus, a gap between the centrality of desert-like intuitions 
in people’s reasoning about justice and the presence of desert in political theory.95 
Although some philosophers may think that this gap has already been bridged by luck 
egalitarianism, we have shown in this chapter that that is incorrect. All of the major 
construals of luck egalitarianism conflict with one dominant version of desertism. And 
at these three points of conflict, desertism has the better side of things. Desertism is 
 
95 As noted in Miller (2001), Mulligan (2018a), and Scheffler (2018b). 




more intuitively appealing, more flexible, and does not produce the unsavory 
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Chapter 5: Can desert solve the problem of stakes? A reply to 
Olsaretti96 
1. Introduction 
In “Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice”, Serena Olsaretti (2009) argues 
that luck egalitarianism needs a principle of stakes. Such a principle specifies “what 
consequences can justifiably be attached to the features that are the appropriate 
grounds of responsibility” (2009, 167). Without it, luck egalitarianism is 
indeterminate: the theory cannot tell us what consequences people should bear when 
they are responsible for their acts.  
To illustrate the need for a principle of stakes, Serena Olsaretti uses Marc 
Fleurbaey’s (1995) well-known example of the motorcyclist Bert–who gets into an 
accident because he deliberately and voluntarily chose to drive his motorcycle at high 
speed. Should Bert pay for medical treatment? If so, what price should he be charged? 
And would Bert’s employer be justified in firing him if the accident leaves him less 
productive? Absent a principle of stakes, it is unclear what the answers to these and 
similar questions are.  
Olsaretti considers four possible candidate principles of stakes: (1) the natural 
consequences view (2009, 173–77), (2) the equal shares view (2009, 177–82), (3) the 
consequentialist view (2009, 183–84), and (4) the desert view (2009, 184–85). She 
finds that each of these has serious limitations, raising the question whether luck 
egalitarianism can be made determinate in a plausible way at all.  
In this short chapter, we argue that things are not as dire. It seems to us that 
desert fits naturally within the luck egalitarian idea—luck egalitarianism is sometimes 
even formulated as an account that equalizes “undeserved inequality” (Arneson 
2000a, 345).97 Olsaretti is too pessimistic about the potential for desert as a principle 
of stakes.  
 
 
96 This chapter is based on a paper I co-authored with Willem van der Deijl and that has been published 
as Brouwer and Van der Deijl (2018). Some modifications to the original article have been made. We 
thank Bart Engelen, Serena Olsaretti, Maureen Sie, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments 
on an earlier version of this chapter. 
97 Rakowski (1991) and Temkin (2017) also invoke desert in their formulations of luck egalitarianism. 
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2. What is a desert-based principle of stakes?   
To decide whether desert can be a plausible principle of stakes for luck egalitarianism, 
it first needs to be clear what such a desert-based principle is. There is not one single 
answer to this. Desert is a rich concept. It can be conceptualized multifariously by 
filling out the three placeholders that any desert claim (at least implicitly) has to 
contain, which are a desert subject (S), desert object (O), and desert base (B) (Feinberg 
1970). We focus on the basic, intuitively plausible idea of (one form of) moral desert 
here: the idea that a person (S) deserves wellbeing (O) on the basis of her virtuousness 
(B), which we understand as the moral and prudential nature of her character.98   
If moral desert were the sole distributive principle, then the more virtuous 
would deserve that their lives go better. As a principle of stakes for a responsibility-
sensitive view, moral desert has a more limited role: it only requires that the 
consequences of people’s voluntary choices be constrained by the degree of their 
virtuousness. More precisely, luck egalitarianism with a moral desert principle of 
stakes would take the following form:   
 
Whenever the consequences of choice are the result of brute luck, these 
consequences should be neutralized. The consequences of voluntary choice 
(i.e., option luck) should be no worse and no better than the consequences 
she deserves on the basis of her virtuousness.99 
 
In the case of Bert, this account implies that he should bear only those 
consequences that he deserves to bear on the basis of his virtuousness, but no worse. 
If a person suffers a greater decrease in wellbeing than would be deserved on the 
basis of his virtuousness, his wellbeing would need to be restored to the deserved 
level.  
 
98 Recent defenders of (a form of) moral desert include Arneson (2007), Kagan (1999; 2012; 2019), 
Kristjánsson (2003), and, arguably, Temkin (2017).  
99 The conception of desert that we have in mind here is both preinstitutional and prejusticial. That is, 
it can specify what justice requires without reference to the rules or goals of institutions, and without 
reliance on other principles of justice. This conception can then be used in the design of society’s 
institutions, which will generate institutional desert claims (that is, claims of entitlement) in accordance 
with it. For a discussion of these features of the concept of desert, see Feinberg (1970), Scheffler (2000), 
and Olsaretti (2003a, chap. 1), as well as chapter 1.  
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There are various ways in which this desert-based account of stakes can be 
made precise. One way to flesh it out is to adopt a lifetime, comparative conception 
of desert, according to which people deserve on the basis of the extent to which they 
live virtuously compared to others.100 This specific notion of desert would fit well 
within the luck egalitarian framework, for two reasons. First, luck egalitarians hold 
that people’s past inequality-justifying choices can, compatibly with justice, influence 
the quality of the option set they currently face, a concern that is shared by the 
lifetime focus of this notion of desert. Secondly, many luck egalitarians regard their 
theory as a theory of comparative (not absolute) fairness (cf. Temkin 2017, p. 45, also 
see chapter 4.3.3. of this thesis), and a comparative notion of desert fits well within 
that scope.101  
This moral desert account of stakes rules out the possibility that Bert bear 
certain consequences of his accident, such as losing his job and motorcycle, and having 
to pay all the costs of the unforeseeable medical conditions he develops because of 
the accident, at least as long as he did not behave extremely imprudently (such as by 
deliberately drunk driving). These outcomes would seem disproportionately bad.  
  
3. What should a principle of stakes do?  
Now, on to the two problems Olsaretti raises for desert as a principle of stakes. The 
first is that desert cannot delineate the consequences of voluntary choices in an exact 
enough manner. More precisely, she claims that such a principle of stakes cannot 
specify “what exactly a person deserves” (Olsaretti 2009, 185 her emphasis), but at 
most be a “constraint on the costs people may be held responsible for” (2009, 184). 
Olsaretti seems to suggest the following standard for a principle of stakes here:   
 
 
100 Many defenders of desert as a principle of distributive justice insist that desert must be subject to a 
responsibility requirement of the following form: if S deserves O in virtue of the fact that S did or 
suffered B, then S is responsible for doing or suffering B. Fred Feldman (1995, 64) is a well-known 
exception. We think that many luck egalitarians, because of the importance they attach to voluntary 
choice, would impose a responsibility requirement on desert claims.  
101 A further question is how to transform people’s performance in terms of this desert base into 
amounts of the currency of justice (for instance, a specific amount of resources). Doing so requires the 
specification of a mapping function. As we think that many mapping functions would plausibly fit within 
the luck egalitarian framework, we do not choose and pick one here. Kagan (2012) extensively discusses 
the many different mapping functions that defenders of moral desert have at their disposal.   
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Olsaretti standard: A principle of stakes should specify exactly what 
consequences can justifiably be attached to the features that are the 
appropriate grounds of responsibility.  
 
The way we understand this concern is that, in the case of Bert, a principle of 
stakes that meets this standard would specify by itself what share, if any, of his 
medical expenses Bert should bear exactly, whether—and if so, by how much—Bert’s 
employer would be justified in reducing his pay because of a drop in his productivity, 
and so on.  
If this is indeed Olsaretti’s concern, 102  it is unnecessarily demanding. 
Rendering a theory of justice determinate is not the same as being able to specify 
what exactly the theory requires in cases such as Bert’s. Not many theories of justice 
can do that. John Rawls, for instance, famously suggested that his theory of justice 
does not by itself specify the correct economic organization of society, on grounds 
that the right answer to this question depends on the other factors as well (Rawls 
1971, 280). 103  Other examples include Amartya Sen’s (1995) capability approach, 
which does not identify which capabilities and functionings are valuable, but does 
provide a way to reason about these questions; and Nozick’s (1974) libertarianism, 
which does not specify how precisely to rectify past injustices, but does provide 
principles that can help us reach an answer to this question.  
What is important is that a theory of distributive justice specifies under what 
conditions redistribution is required, and provides a principle that can guide 
calculations of how much redistribution is required. Our desert-based principle of 
stakes does not specify the best way to measure virtuousness and how to transform 
this measure into a precise account of consequences, but this should not be held 
against it.  
 
102 Another way to understand Olsaretti’s concern is that desert cannot settle whether the legitimate 
consequences fall in the health domain and/or the job domain. In other words: Desert does not tell us 
how exactly Bert’s well-being must be diminished. If that is the concern, we think the same response 
that we provide in this section applies. In fact, that problem seems common to theories of justice that 
take well-being as the currency.  
103 In later work, Rawls does take a more specific stance (e.g. 2001). 
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Note that even the very general account of moral desert we have outlined so 
far can achieve important results. Suggesting that there is a maximum level of harm 
that may be justly suffered from voluntary choices depending on the virtuousness of 
the individual may already provide a case, for example, for social health insurance 
policies that provide less compensation for traffic participants that grossly neglected 
the safety of others.104  
Also, we think that a moral desert principle of stakes can go some way in 
helping luck egalitarians answer the critique that their theory requires that people 
bear certain harsh consequences of their actions (Anderson 1999; Scheffler 2003b; 
Temkin 2017). Without this principle of stakes, it is hard for luck egalitarians to 
alleviate these concerns about harshness. With it, however, they can easily avoid 
them. 
Now, on to Olsaretti’s second problem for desert as a principle of stakes, which 
is that a desert-based principle of stakes would need to rely on institutions in order to 
work. More specifically, she argues that:  
 
“[W]hat exactly a person deserves—whether it is money or a round of applause for 
having put in a good musical performance, for example—is settled by the institutional 
context in which desert claims are made, rather than by the notion of desert itself.” 
(2009, 185) 
 
If it is impossible to arrive at a judgment of what reward would be just without 
institutions, then desert is not doing sufficient justificatory work itself.  
This objection, however, does not apply to the account of moral desert we 
introduced. The view we put forward proposes proportionality between wellbeing 
and virtuousness in case of option luck. This does not depend on institutions. In fact, 
a number of philosophers take (a form of) moral desert to be distinctive – including 
Richard Arneson (2007), Shelly Kagan (1999; 2012; 2019), and Kristján Kristjánsson 
(2003).  
 
104 The bonus-malus system that is used inter alia in the car insurance industry could be seen as an 
example. People who drive more prudently (i.e., get into accidents less often) get a discount on their 





4.  Conclusion: Researching plausible principles of stakes 
 As Olsaretti has convincingly shown, luck egalitarianism suffers an important 
indeterminacy. Luck egalitarianism and desert are two separate ways of thinking 
about justice (also see chapter 4 of this thesis). However, desert fits naturally within 
the luck egalitarian spirit. In fact, in light of the various problems raised by Olsaretti 
for other accounts of stakes, desert may well be the only viable account. While going 
beyond the scope of this argument, if our argument is correct, if Olsaretti’s arguments with 
respect to the other possible accounts of stakes succeed, and if there are no further 
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Chapter 6: Earning too much. The case for maximum incomes105 
1. Introduction 
What, if anything, can justify a maximum income? Many people think that there is no 
rationale for such a policy. A common worry about the maximum income is, as Marc 
Fleurbaey puts it, that “imposing a 100 percent marginal tax rate [is] a recipe for 
economic collapse” (2018, 40). Another common objection is that people should, in 
principle, always be allowed to earn more money. Anthony B. Atkinson, for one, 
argues along those lines: 
“Marginal tax rates are not just a matter of incentives: the change in take-home pay 
as a consequence of an increase in earnings is also judged in terms of its intrinsic 
fairness. Fairness involves a perceptible link between effort and reward: people 
deserve to keep at least a reasonable portion of what they earn through increased 
hours or taking increased responsibility or a second job” (2015, 210). 106 
According to authors like Fleurbaey, then, a maximum income has detrimental 
consequences for society. For authors like Atkinson, who take a more deontic 
approach, limits to how much people can earn are intrinsically unfair. According to 
them, free choice of occupation, and the idea that people should always be able to 
earn more money, are part of what we owe to each other in a just society, or part of 
what people can deserve or be entitled to. 
We want to challenge those views. Many countries impose a minimum on how 
much people can earn. Why not impose a maximum as well? We will argue that 
 
105 This chapter is based on the paper “Earning Too Much: The Case for Maximum Incomes”, which I 
co-authored with Dick Timmer and is currently under review. For helpful comments on earlier drafts of 
this chapter, we thank Michael Bennett, Bart Engelen, Collin Hickey, Sem de Maagt, Tim Meijers, Serena 
Olsaretti, Ingrid Robeyns, Hanno Sauer, and Maureen Sie. We also thank the participants in the practical 
philosophy colloquium at Utrecht University (on May 7th, 2019) for helpful discussion. We are 
particularly grateful to Serena Olsaretti, for suggesting to us to explore whether different moral 
theories could convergence on the idea of a maximum income, and to Tim Meijers, for pointing us to 
(Carens 1987) as a source of inspiration for our argumentative strategy. This project has received 
funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research 
and innovation programme (grant agreement 726153) and the Dutch Research Council (NWO, grant 
agreement 36020390). 
106 This intuition seems to be widely shared, see e.g. (Scanlon 2018, 114). For some anecdotal evidence, 
consider the widespread support Astrid Lindgren received in Sweden when she protested against the 
102 percent marginal tax rate she was faced with in 1976. See: 
https://lenbilen.com/2012/01/24/pomperipossa-in-monismania/. 
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Rawlsian egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and desertism—three prominent approaches 
to taxation and justice in contemporary political philosophy—support maximum 
income policies (MIPs).107 There are many formulations and interpretations of these 
three theories. But we will argue that, in general, all three hold that, over and above 
some point, increasing hours, taking more responsibility, taking on a second job, or 
other ways to increase one’s pre-tax income can no longer justify an increase in take-
home pay. Convergence of those very different theories on support for MIPs 
strengthens, in our view, the case for such policies. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section clarifies that our 
argument applies to income from three sources (labor, capital, and inheritance and 
gifts), and distinguishes relative and absolute MIPs, and MIPS in structure and in aim 
(§2). In §3, we argue that Rawlsian egalitarianism is compatible with MIPs, and 
supports two of the four types. In §4, we argue that utilitarianism also supports two 
of the four types of MIPs. In §5, we argue that desertism supports all four types of 
MIPs. The upshot of this chapter is, then, that several well-known and often defended 
moral views on distributive justice and taxation provide support for MIPs—and even 
converge on their support for relative MIPs. 
 
2. The maximum income 
A maximum income policy constrains how much income an individual is allowed to 
earn on an annual basis.108 We take such MIPs to apply to the aggregate total of three 
main sources.109 The first is income from labor and self-employment, which includes 
income in the form of wages, bonuses, and so forth. The second is income from 
capital, which includes, among other things, income in the form of rent, dividends, 
interest, profits, and capital gains. The third source is income in the form of gifts and 
 
107 In this paper we assume a non-libertarian paradigm, and so we will not discuss whether people can 
have an entitlement to large amounts of wealth on grounds other than those provided by Rawlsian 
egalitarianism, utilitarianism and desertism. Perhaps libertarianism provides such an independent 
ground, but we leave that for others to explore. 
108 Alternatives include a maximum lifetime income or a maximum income imposed on segments of a 
life longer than one year. We do not discuss such proposals in this paper, but many of our arguments 
apply to those proposals as well. 
109 A fourth source of income is income from social benefits. We will leave this source aside, since it is 
itself based on principles of reciprocity, fairness and efficiency. 
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inherited wealth. For present purposes, we also include income from gambling and 
lotteries under this third category. 
MIPs can be relative (rMIP) and absolute (aMIP), but all MIPs cap how much 
income people can earn. An rMIP, or ‘pay-ratio’, specifies the maximum income 
someone can earn by multiplying a certain income, such as the minimum, median or 
average wage, by a given factor.110 An aMIP specifies how much income someone can 
maximally earn without direct reference to the incomes of others.111 aMIPs can and 
will, however, refer to other incomes indirectly. They can do so, for instance, by 
making the limit depend on the amount of money required to live a fully flourishing 
live.112 That amount depends, among other things, on how much others have.  
MIPs also differ along a second dimension: There are MIPs in structure and in 
aim. An MIP in structure directly limits the amount of income people receive. An 
example would be a 100% tax on incomes above a certain amount, say $1.000.000. 
Another example would be a maximum pay ratio, of say 1 to 30. An MIP in aim creates 
a set of social structures that aim to cap incomes people can earn without directly 
imposing limits. Examples of such policies include governments giving priority in public 
procurement processes to companies that have a pay ratio below a certain level. 
Another example would be the government forcing companies to disclose the pay 
ratio in their annual reports—if doing so incentivizes companies to reduce their pay 
ratio. 
Hence, we distinguish four types of MIPs: aMIPs in structure and in aim, and 
rMIPs in structure and in aim. We will argue that utilitarianism, desertism, and 
Rawlsian egalitarianism all support rMIPs in aim and in structure. Only desertism also 
supports aMIPs. 
 
110 A relative maximum in a company, for example, specifies that the highest paid worker (often the 
CEO) can maximally earn n-times the income of the lowest, average or median-earning worker of that 
company. For example, the average CEO-to-worker pay ratio for S&P 500 companies in the USA was 
361:1 in 2017, meaning that CEOs earned 361 times as much as the median-earning worker in their 
company (see https://aflcio.org/paywatch/company-pay-ratios). 
111 In the European Union, eleven countries have adopted an absolute maximum of this type on the 
salaries of public officials in the public and/or semi-public sector (Bruni 2017). Those income caps 
illustrate the kind of regulation we have in mind, though they often only apply to the first source of 
income and are, furthermore, not implemented in the private sector. 
112Robeyns (2017) defends an argument along these lines.  
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Our focus is on MIPs that apply nationally in both the private and the public 
sphere. The reason for our focus on the national level is twofold. First, in today’s 
world, national governments have the greatest power to tax. This power is necessary 
for the realization of many MIPs. Second, the broad definition of income we use 
cannot be regulated by companies alone. We do think, however, that, with minor 
modifications, our arguments for MIPs also support organization or sector-based-
MIPs; as well as MIPs at the level of international political unions, such as the 
European Union.113  
We should note that our argument’s scope is limited in three ways. First, none 
of the distributive views we discuss require MIPs only. Income ceilings supplement 
other policies, such as a progressive system of taxation on incomes below the 
maximum. We ignore the need for such other policies here, and focus only on MIPs. 
Second, although Rawlsian egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and desertism in isolation 
support MIPs, pluralistic versions of these theories may support different MIPs than 
their monistic counterparts.114 Although it is worthwhile exploring whether pluralistic 
versions of the distributive views we discuss support MIPs, we focus on the monistic 
versions of those theories. Third, our argument is that Rawlsian egalitarianism, 
utilitarianism, and desertism converge on their support for (certain types of) MIPs. 
Our argument is not that each theory proposes to cap income at the same level. In 
fact, it seems quite plausible that each theory recommends different maximum 
incomes. However, we will argue that for none of the theories the maximum level is 
trivially high, so that it would not really have any significant effect. 
 
3. Rawlsian egalitarianism 
Many people believe that people should be treated as equals. And though few of us 
hold that money is all that matters, some in fact believe that economic equality has 
 
113 We do not make a distinction between incomes in the private sector and the public sector. An 
argument one often hears is that, in the public sphere, more stringent ethical norms about wages apply. 
This only strengthens the case for MIPs in certain sectors. But our argument aims to be broader than 
this, and deals with the private sector as well. 
114 Take desertism combined with a principle of need. Such a pluralistic view would be particularly 
concerned with the position of the needy—and may, as a result, support rMIPs over aMIPs (assuming 
that rMIPS would be fixed with reference to a minimum income). But as we will argue below, desertism 
itself supports aMIPs as well. 
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independent moral significance. And even those who maintain that economic equality 
does not matter, often still say that everyone should be treated as having equal moral 
worth or standing when it comes to the distribution of income (see Frankfurt 1987).  
But either way, equality is the default position, and deviations from that 
position require justification. It seems to us that for current wealth inequalities, no 
such justification can be given. To give one example, in 2017 the richest 0.1% in the 
U.S. took in 188 times as much income as the bottom 90% (Saez 2016). How, if ever, 
can this be justified by referring to equality as a moral ideal? We will argue that this 
cannot be done. In fact, we will argue that a commitment to equality urges us to adopt 
MIPs. 
 There are many ways to conceptualize the ideal of ‘equality’, but we will focus 
on John Rawls’ interpretation of it. According to Rawls, any deviation from equality 
must be justified by showing that the least well-off optimally benefit from such 
inequalities. According to Rawlsian egalitarians, then, inequalities “should make a 
certain functional contribution to the expectations of the least favored” (Rawls 1993, 
283). We will consider two domains in which wealth inequalities may matter according 
to Rawlsians, namely in the sphere of politics, and in the sphere of the economy.  
Let’s consider the political liberties first. 115  Rawls says that a just society 
requires: 
“an ideal form for the basic structure [of society] in the light of which ongoing 
institutional and procedural processes are constrained and adjusted. Among these 
constraints are the limits on the accumulation of property (especially if private 
property in productive assets exists) that derive from the requirements of the fair 
value of political liberty” (Rawls 1993, 284). 
From this passage it becomes clear that Rawlsian egalitarians must oppose 
economic inequalities which undermine the fair value of political liberty. Rawls argues 
that because the political liberties should be distributed equally among all members 
of society, we must avoid economic inequalities which threaten those liberties. 
Without fair rivalry, that is, without institutional measures to, among other things, 
 
115 For an earlier discussion of this democratic case for economic limits, see (Robeyns 2017, 6–10; 
Volacu and Dumitru 2019; Timmer 2018) 
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curb the influence of money on politics, the fair value of political liberty cannot be 
guaranteed.  
Can MIPs draw support from this view? Note first that Rawls is primarily 
concerned with inequality, and so aMIPs, which politically enforce an absolute income 
ceiling above a certain amount, are ruled out. After all, if, by assumption, the relative 
value of people’s political liberty is determined by their relative economic standing, 
why should we support policies which set an absolute rather than relative threshold 
on how much income people can earn? It thus seems that a concern for political liberty 
is neither compatible nor supportive of aMIPs. 
If Rawlsian egalitarians supports MIPs, they must support proposals of the 
relative rather than the absolute kind. Some Rawlsian egalitarians argue that the 
economic sphere and political sphere can be insulated from each other to prevent 
economic power turning into political power; this effectively undermines the validity 
of all MIPs on the grounds of the political liberties.116 For example, one can restrict 
the possibility of corporations to influence political processes. This can be done by 
curtailing the lobbying activities they can engage in, and by increasing the share of 
public funds in election campaigns by giving every citizen a certain amount of money 
to spend supporting their preferred candidate (cf. Williamson 2013, sec. 4). 117 If such 
strategies work, then MIPs would be unnecessary to ensure the fair value of political 
liberties. 
However, others are more pessimistic about such insulation strategies. Ingrid 
Robeyns, for instance, argues that adopting anti-lobbying measures and reforming 
campaign financing do not go far enough in realizing political equality between the 
rich and the poor (2017).118 Rich and influential people socialize with other rich and 
influential people, and thereby have a disproportionate influence over political 
decision-making that is very hard for policy makers to counteract. Such inequalities 
lead to social stratifications that give the rich a disproportionate amount of access to 
 
116 See, for instance, (O’Neill 2009; Sandel 1998; Vallier 2015). 
117 Note that Williamson himself is a supporter of property-owning democracy schemes. The insulation 
strategies he outlines, however, are compatible with the welfare state capitalist system as well.  
118 Robeyns draws on Christiano (2010; 2012) to support her argument.  
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political power. The only way to really do something about it, is to reduce inequality 
in income and wealth. 
The pessimists, then, and we count ourselves among that group, think that to 
secure the fair value of political liberty, at least certain constraints in people’s incomes 
are justified and called for. If the relative economic power of people correlates with 
their relative political power, whatever a fair ‘ratio’ of political inequality is, must serve 
as a guideline in determining what the fair ratio in economic inequality is. Setting such 
a ratio is precisely what rMIPs in structure and in aim do. In other words, if one holds 
that the fair value of political liberties cannot be protected by insulation strategies, 
this provides support for rMIPs. 
Rawlsian theory provides another, independent ground for MIPs: the idea that 
inequalities should favour the least-advantaged in the sphere of the economy. As we 
take it, this difference principle supports rMIPs both in structure and in aim. Saying 
that economic inequalities must benefit the least-advantaged members of society is 
simply a different way of saying that the ratio between those most and least 
advantaged members cannot exceed the point where the least advantaged members 
no longer benefit (if one adopts the strong interpretation of the difference principle) 
or are in fact harmed by larger inequalities (if one favours the weak interpretation of 
the difference principle).119 
However, the difference principle is not concerned about high incomes as 
such, and hence cannot support a policy which levies a 100% tax on all incomes above 
a certain amount. It might very well be, for example, that allowing higher incomes 
benefits the least advantaged members of society (or, if one adopts a weaker version 
of the difference principle, that higher incomes do not harm those least advantaged 
members). Hence, we cannot draw on the difference principle to seek support for an 
aMIP in structure. 
 
119 One might argue that for Rawls inequalities are always subject to a constraint–but that this does not 
place an independent limit to the size of the gap. This is true in the sense that Rawls does not propose 
a specific ratio between the poor and the rich. But of course, that does not mean that there is no limit 
to the size of the gap, because the limit is set at the point where further increases in the size of the gap 
no longer benefit the least well-off. On different interpretations of the difference principle, see Van 
Parijs (2003). 
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What about aMIPs in aim? Here, again, we think that the difference principle 
cannot provide much support. aMIPs in aim try to create social structures that tend to 
cap income at a certain threshold. However, that runs counter to one of the main 
rationales behind the difference principle, namely to harness growth and efficiency 
for the purposes of fairness. Even if they are implemented only indirectly via policies 
that tend to lead to lower high incomes, aMIPs do not always improve the situation of 
the least advantaged members of society. Therefore, the difference principle is 
incompatible with aMIPs both in structure and in aim. 
To conclude, neither concerns for political liberties nor the difference principle 
provide a Rawlsian egalitarian case for aMIPs. However, both the fair value of political 
liberty and the difference principle provide support for rMIPs. The fair value of political 
liberty does so if one is sceptical of other strategies to safeguard people’s political 
liberties. The difference principle provides the clearest support for rMIPs; its 
conceptual structure simply asserts as much. Therefore, those in favour of equality, 
and those adopting Rawlsian egalitarian in particular, should support rMIPs. 
 
4. Utilitarianism 
A popular justification for high incomes is that they leave everyone better off. The 
prospects of becoming extremely rich, the thought goes, encourages people to be 
more creative and work harder. And the rich do good things with their money too. 
They spend their wealth on helping people with unmet urgent needs, on improving 
access to education, and on preserving the environment.120 This justification for high 
incomes has a utilitarian ring to it, because it argues against MIPs on the grounds that 
the possibility to earn high incomes increases utility. 
But is there really a utilitarian case for unlimited incomes? We will argue that 
utilitarianism supports MIPs in aim, and that utilitarianism is, at least, compatible with 
MIPs in structure. We will make our case in very general terms, leaving important 
questions that deeply divide the utilitarian camp unaddressed, such as what utility is, 
 
120 Think, for instance, of the success of the Giving Pledge, an initiative that encourages billionaires to 
pledge half of their wealth to charitable causes (The Giving Pledge, 2019). 
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how it is measured, and whether average utility or total utility should be maximized.121 
Our argument holds regardless of how these questions are answered precisely. 
Here is the basic utilitarian case for MIPs. It is implausible to think that utility 
is maximized when income is concentrated in the hands of a few. The marginal utility 
of income is very low for rich people, whereas it is very high for the poor. We will focus 
on utilitarianism in relation to income from labor. But the same argument applies to 
incomes from capital, gifts, and inheritances—the other income sources to which 
MIPs apply. The marginal utility of income decreases the more one earns. Therefore, 
we can achieve greater average and total utility by redistributing some of the rich’s 
economic resources to those lacking food, medicine, and shelter—and, arguably, to 
people who have a somewhat higher income as well. Hence, in order to maximize 
utility, we should implement policies that cap incomes.122  
To make this basic utilitarian argument more vivid, consider a rich person who 
spends millions on art, a fourth sports car, a yacht, and a sixth house—whereas others 
are starving. She could also spend her wealth on goods and services necessary to 
improve the lot of the starving. That generates an amount of utility easily exceeding 
the utility she derives from additional luxury goods. From the point of view of the 
utilitarian calculus, then, the rich are wasting valuable resources, and much can be 
gained by implementing MIPs. 
There are various subtler utilitarian arguments to be made for MIPs. We will 
consider an important one here: the conspicuous consumption argument. According 
to this argument, a significant part of the current consumption of the rich is wasteful 
in itself. Adam Smith already noticed this when he lamented that “the chief enjoyment 
of riches consists in the parade of riches; which, in their eye, is never so complete as 
when they appear to possess those decisive marks of opulence which nobody can 
possess but themselves” (Smith 1776, I.XI). About a century later, John Stuart Mill, the 
famous utilitarian, argued that wasteful consumption should be taxed: 
 
 
121 On these issues, see Kagan (1997, chaps. 2–5). 
122  Because we are interested in policy proposals rather than individual actions, we adopt a rule 
utilitarian approach here. 
Chapter 6: Earning too much. The case for maximum incomes 
 
 113 
“a great portion of the expenses of the higher and middle classes in most 
countries […] is not incurred for the sake of the pleasure afforded by the 
things on which the money is spent, but from regard to opinion, and an idea 
that certain expenses are expected from them, as an appendage of station; 
and I cannot but think that expenditure of this sort is a most desirable subject 
of taxation. If taxation discourages it, some good is done, and if not, no harm; 
for in so far as taxes are levied on things which are desired and possessed 
from motives of this description, nobody is the worse for them” (Mill 2004, 
bk. V, chap. 6, pt. 7). 
 
Why is such conspicuous consumption, which is aimed at showing off how 
wealthy one is, wasteful? For one thing, the rich spend money on things where the 
utility pay-off is relatively low. But more importantly, conspicuous consumption 
engenders wasteful positional arms races.123 The rich buy certain goods to show off 
their social status, which are then also bought by others for the same purpose. This 
reduces the value of the status good, and induces the rich to buy other goods to show 
off. This is wasteful because it decreases the resources available for valuable non-
positional goods, such as food and healthcare (to the extent that these are non-
positional goods). 
And, to make matters more complicated, income itself can also be a positional 
good. Transparency about executive pay in the US has led to higher, rather than lower 
pay—precisely because people now know whom they are up against.124 Simply by 
inhibiting people from gaining economic benefits over and above the maximum 
income, MIPs take way the incentive to compete for such benefits. Insofar as high 
incomes are conducive to wasteful positional arms races, then, MIPs foster the 
maximization of utility.125 
There are two important objections to the utilitarian case for MIPs: the 
incentive objection and the indeterminacy objection. The incentive objection is an 
 
123 On positional goods, see Hirsch (1977), Schneider (2007), and Frank (2007). 
124 See Scanlon (2018, chap. 9), who bases this claim on Bivens and Mishel (2013).  
125  To illustrate, take a look at the equivalent of eBay for the very wealthy: 
http://www.jamesedition.com. Note that we do not claim that all positional arms races are equally 
wasteful. Positional arms races in education may be less wasteful, for instance, than positional arms 
races in exclusive cars. 
Chapter 6: Earning too much. The case for maximum incomes 
 
 114 
amended version of the claim we started out with. It goes like this: ‘We should reduce 
the gap between the rich and poor, but we should allow some individuals to earn 
(very) high incomes, because doing so will leave everyone better off’. This amended 
claim acknowledges that, from a utilitarian perspective, the gap between the rich and 
poor must be reduced. But it also holds that eliminating high incomes altogether 
hampers the maximization of utility.126  
To illustrate the pull of this argument, consider the fact that some jobs are 
socially valuable, but, at the same time, not intrinsically rewarding. Take the job of 
crane operators, who spend most of their time at great heights with little contact with 
other people. Because of this, the salary of crane operators is quite high. In New York, 
for instance, salaries of $500.000 per year are not unheard of. If such salaries cannot 
be paid, the incentive objection goes, no-one is willing to be crane operator. So crane 
operators’ salaries pay off in utilitarian terms. Similarly, without even the possibility 
of earning a very high income, potential entrepreneurs may not invest large amounts 
of money and time in possible innovations (cf. Vallier 2015). If very high incomes are 
impermissible, Bill Gates may not have taken the risk of founding Microsoft if he knew 
in advance it would never make him very wealthy. 
There are three ways to rescue MIPs from the incentive objection. Before 
moving on to these three responses, however, it is important to note that the force of 
the incentive objection really depends on the level of the MIP or the size of the pay-
ratio. All else equal, the lower the income limit, the more bite the incentive objection 
will have. It is quite plausible that there is a valid incentive objection to be made to a 
policy that ensures that everyone is paid the same. The aim of our argument, however, 
is to show that the incentive objection can be met for maximum income proposals 
that are not strictly egalitarian in this sense, but that do allow for income inequality. 
 
126 For this objection in the context of limitarianism, see Volacu and Dimitru (2019). Edward Prescott 
(2004; however, see Rogerson 2007) has argued along those lines that that differences in marginal 
income tax rates alone account for most of the differences in labor supply between Americans and 
Europeans. 
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Now, on to our three responses to the incentive objection. First, the objection 
may be a transitional one. 127 People need time to get used to maximum incomes. But 
as the economist and philosopher John Maynard Keynes put the point:  
 
“There are valuable human activities which require the motive of money-making and 
the environment of private wealth-ownership for their full fruition. […] But it is not 
necessary for the stimulation of these activities […] that the game should be played 
for such high stakes as at present. Much lower stakes will serve the purpose equally 
well, as soon as the players are accustomed to them” (Keynes 1936, 374).  
 
Given the positional nature of income, the relative comparison is largely what is doing 
the motivating and this can and will still happen when it is topped off in relative or 
absolute terms. Even if top incomes are capped, there will still be differences and 
these will continue to work as incentives. It will simply be less wasteful. 
This observation finds support in research about human motivation. In a large 
survey of the literature on reward and motivation, Alfie Kohn points out that “[a] 
number of studies […] have examined whether or not pay, especially at the executive 
level, is related to corporate profitability and other measures of organizational 
performance. Often they have found slight or even negative correlations between pay 
and performance” (1993, emphasis his). He notes that “perhaps what these studies 
reveal is that higher pay does not produce better performance […] the very idea of 
trying to reward quality may be a fool’s errand” (1993). 
Furthermore, Keynes’ observation resonates with research on the relation 
between income inequality and economic growth. According to a 2014 study by the 
OECD, income inequality has a “negative and statistically significant effect on medium-
term growth” and “in countries like the US, the UK and Italy, overall economic growth 
would have been six to nine percentage points higher in the past two decades had 
income inequality not risen” (OECD 2014). Regardless of the exact factors at play in 
 
127 This touches on a big debate on the utilitarian literature, namely: Which consequences should be 
taken into account when evaluating the moral quality of a rule (on this, see Kagan 1997, chaps. 2.4. and 
5.1.)? Should we consider both direct and indirect consequences? And should we take both foreseeable 
and unforeseeable consequences into account? Depending on one’s commitments, the importance of 
the incentive objection being transitional is strengthened. 
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this complex relation, these data show that reducing economic inequality, which is 
what MIPS do, is not at odds with productivity and may well promote it. 
Second, capping top incomes makes low-paid, but highly utility-promoting jobs 
(such as care work) relatively more attractive. This may incentivize some people to 
choose for these jobs rather than what are currently the highest paid jobs. So even if 
maximum salaries reduce incentives to take up some jobs that greatly contribute to 
utility, this does not mean that people always switch to less utility-generating jobs. 
Whether they do is an empirical question, which depends, among other things, on 
what their motivation was for taking up the initial job. To turn the objection upside 
down: some utility-promoting activities may not be performed currently precisely 
because they are not lucrative compared to other activities. An example of this is care 
work, which is often unpaid or underpaid, but certainly utility promoting. 
Third, the incentive objection assumes that the most effective way of 
stimulating innovation and capital investment is through market incentives. This is not 
self-evidently true. For example, we can imagine publicly funded innovation schemes 
in which innovations are not patented. That makes it much easier for companies to 
build on previous innovations.128 There are strong utilitarian arguments in favour of 
such systems. Additionally, there could be democratic control over which innovations 
are funded, which potentially benefit those who are worse off. An example of this is 
the Health Impact Fund. This is a government-funded scheme that aims to incentivize 
pharmaceutical companies to develop medicines specifically for the global poor.129 
Let us turn to the second objection to the utilitarian case for MIPs: the 
indeterminacy objection. According to that objection, all we have shown is that the 
utilitarian approach is compatible with MIPs. But it may also be compatible with a 
progressive tax system that has no strict cut-off point. So why prefer MIPs over such 
policies? First, under plausible assumptions about incentive effects from income 
distribution and consumption, MIPs deserve more credit than they currently receive. 
As we have argued, it is difficult to see how very high incomes can maximize utility. 
 
128 For a defense of the view that the USA’s economic success is a result of public and state funded 
investments in innovation and technology rather than private investments, see Mazzucato (2014). 
129 See: https://healthimpactfund.org. 
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But ultimately, questions about incentives and alternative policy proposals should be 
settled by experimentation and observation, and not by philosophical debate alone. 
Second, and more importantly, although the indeterminacy objection plausibly 
holds for absolute MIPs, it does not for relative MIPs. We will argue utilitarianism is 
compatible with aMIPs, but supports rMIPS. Let’s start with aMIPs in structure. Such 
policies, as we have pointed out, cap incomes at a level that is not determined directly 
by the incomes that other people receive. The utilitarian compatibility with aMIPs 
hinges on what the effects the policy will have below the threshold. If it would lead to 
many people receiving an income just below the threshold, then utilitarianism would 
not be compatible with aMIPs in structure: further utility gains could be realized by 
taking from the rich (those receiving incomes just below the threshold) and giving to 
the poor. Now, of course, how high the incomes below the maximum income will be, 
depends, crucially, on what types of tax policies are adopted below the threshold. In 
light of the responses we have provided to the incentive objection, however, we 
expect that utilitarianism will, at a certain level of income and combined with a highly 
progressive system of taxation below the limit, at the very least be compatible with 
aMIPs in structure.  
It is even more likely that utilitarianism is compatible with aMIPs in aim. The 
reason is that a progressive system of taxation could also turn out to cap incomes at 
a certain level. To see this, imagine that if a progressive system of taxation would tax 
incomes above a certain level at a very high rate (say, 90%), then there is an incentive 
to reduce one’s income in order not to fall in the 90% bracket. If everyone does so, no 
one will earn an income above the amount at which the 90% bracket begins. In that 
case, the indeterminacy objection does not hold, because the system of taxation is, 
actually, an aMIP in aim.   
Now, on to relative MIPs: policies that specify the maximum income someone 
can earn by multiplying a certain income, such as the minimum, median or average 
wage, by a given factor. It is likely, we think, that utilitarianism supports rMIPs in 
structure and in aim, because these policies only allow the rich to increase their wealth 
by letting some of it trickle down to the poor. Similar to the discussion about aMIPs, 
we think that utilitarian case for rMIPs in aim is even stronger than the utilitarian case 
for rMIPS in structure. The utilitarian support for rMIPs, of course, will depend on both 
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the income that the maximum income is tied to, and the factor that income is 
multiplied with. These questions are beyond the scope of this chapter. All we aim to 
do here, is to suggest that there are some rMIPs, both in structure and in aim, that are 
supported by utilitarianism.  
To conclude, the utilitarian case for limitless incomes fails. Because the 
marginal utility of income decreases, utilitarianism tends towards more egalitarian 
distributions. It should, consequently, support policies that reduce the gap between 
the rich and poor. MIPs are such policies. And hence utilitarianism is compatible with 




Another popular justification for high incomes is that people deserve them. Some 
people work much harder and make a much larger productive contribution than 
others do—and they deserve to be rewarded accordingly. Of the three views we 
discuss, desert appears to be the most inegalitarian, and hence the least likely to be 
compatible with MIPs. But is there really a desert-based argument to be made for very 
high incomes?  
Some desert theorists have argued that there is. N. Gregory Mankiw, for 
instance, has proposed a desert-based defense of the 1 percent. On his ‘just deserts 
view’, “people should receive compensation congruent with their contributions,” 
where ‘contribution’ refers to the marginal product of individuals in a “classical 
competitive equilibrium without any externalities or public goods” (Mankiw 2013, 
32).130 The marginal product of a worker is the increase in output that results from 
adding this worker to the production process, holding other factors of production 
constant. Because many members of the 1 percent make very large marginal 
contributions, Mankiw argues, their incomes are deserved. On closer examination, 
however, desertism cannot support this view, or so we will argue. 
 
130 Note that Mankiw stresses, rightly so, that these conditions are very demanding and unlikely to 
obtain in any markets in the real world. 
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 To illustrate the intuitive appeal of the just desert view, Mankiw points out 
that many people do not object to the high incomes of all members of the 1 percent. 
They only take issue with the incomes of some of its members. In particular, people 
object to the incomes of those who (mainly) collect economic rents. For example, 
bankers, whose salaries are so high because banking licenses restrict entry to and exit 
from the banking market. And CEOs in certain sectors, who can pressure their boards 
into giving higher compensation by exploiting information asymmetries. 131  Those 
collectors of economic rents are not making genuine contributions. In other words, 
they do not increase the total amount of utility to be distributed. They only change its 
internal distribution. But people respond differently to the high incomes of members 
of the 1 percent who do make a genuine contribution to society, such as Steve Jobs, 
J.K. Rowling, and Steven Spielberg (Mankiw 2013, 21). They do, in fact, deserve their 
very high incomes, because they significantly increase the size of the pie. 
Consequently, MIPs constitute an injustice towards them. 
We admit that there is some intuitive appeal to the examples Mankiw gives in 
defense of his view. However, upon further reflection, there are many problems with 
it.132 We will focus on the problem that directly bears on whether those sympathetic 
to desert can support MIPs. The problem is that marginal productivity is not a good 
measure of productivity, and hence, not a good basis for desert (see, for example, 
Heath 2018).133 A person’s marginal product depends not only on how hard they work 
and whether they create something that people deem of value, but also, and 
importantly so, on many factors that are entirely unrelated to their performance. 
Examples abound here: People’s marginal product depends, among other things, on 
unexpected fluctuations in the price of inputs (such as the oil price), on geopolitical 
developments (such as Brexit or a tariff war), and on the success of other companies 
in the same sector.134 
 
131 For more on economic rents and desert, see Mulligan (2018b). 
132 See, also, Baumann (2014), Heath (2018), Herzog (2018), Lister (2018), and Solow et al. (2014).  
133 For further discussion, see Miller (2001), Dekker (2008; 2010), and Hsieh (2000). 
134 To illustrate, Bivens and Mishel (2013) argue that CEO salaries in the United States fluctuate not 
with the success of a company relative to its competitors, but with the average share prices of all 
companies in the sector. For discussion, see Scanlon (2018, chap. 9). 
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Because of the implausibility of marginal productivity as the sole basis for 
desert claims on income, many desertists endorse the ‘conventional view’.135 The 
conventional view holds that desert bases, that is, facts about someone which make 
her deserve something in the morally relevant sense, must be facts about her that she 
can claim credit for. On the conventional view, performance luck, which is luck that 
disrupts performances, undermines desert. So if high incomes arise from performance 
luck, desertists cannot support such incomes (at least not on the basis of desert). They 
hold that we should evaluate who is the most deserving by correcting for the impact 
of performance disrupting luck. 
The conventional view of desert rejects marginal productivity as a plausible 
desert base. This is because, as we have argued, this measure is significantly affected 
by performance luck. Proponents of desert have therefore proposed other desert 
bases for income which are compatible with the conventional view. Some argue that 
people deserve income on the basis of measures of productive contribution other 
than marginal productivity (such as generated consumer surplus) (Feinberg 1970; 
Miller 2001), others that they deserve income on the basis of merit (Mulligan 
2018a),136 (purposeful)137 effort (Sadurski 1985; Wolff 2003), the amount of skill and 
training required for the job in question (Nagel 1979), and/or the onerousness of their 
job (Sher 1989). Some desertists are monists when it comes to the desert of income, 
thinking that people deserve income on the grounds of one of these bases (Miller 
2001; Feldman 2016, 109–17). Others are pluralists who hold that people deserve 
income on a combination of these bases (McLeod 1996).138 
What matters for present purposes is that desert, fundamentally, requires that 
the income a person receives is proportional to their performance on the desert basis. 
If we take productivity as desert base, and if Steve Jobs is twenty times as productive 
 
135 As Olsaretti calls it, see her (2006, 438). 
136 On the distinction between desert and merit, see Moriarty (2009). 
137 Those defending effort as a desert base often stipulate that effort must be exerted in the pursuit of 
worthwhile aims. If Luke stands on one leg with a teapot on his head for a full day he exerts effort—
but not effort in the pursuit of worthwhile aims, or so we think. In establishing what qualifies as 
purposeful effort, however, similar issues arise as when discussing what counts as a productive 
contribution. 
138 On the various positions on the desert of wages, see Moriarty (2005a, 262) and Feldman (2016, 109–
17). 
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as Bill Gates, then Steve should earn twenty times as much as Bill.139 Therefore, the 
question for those defending high incomes on desertist grounds is the following: How 
many times can a person outperform another on any of the desert bases for income, 
subject to the conventional view that we must correct for performance disrupting 
luck?  
In some companies in the United States, the ratio between the median earning 
employee and the highest earning employee is well over 1 to 5,000.140 For this to be 
justified on the conventional view, one employee needs to score 5000 times as high 
on a specific desert basis measure and thus needs to be 5000 times as productive, 
hardworking, meritorious, and/or trained as others.141 But there seem to be physical 
and psychological limitations to how many times a person can outperform another on 
any of the desert bases for income that have been suggested, subject to the 
conventional view: Would A still do 5,000 times worse than B if A was in the exact 
same position as B (say, if A was the CEO rather than a factory worker)? This, it seems, 
is highly implausible. 
If it is better if people get what they deserve, it is better that they do not get more 
than a certain amount of income. Desertism, it seems, supports MIPs. The maximum 
income threshold depends on one’s choice of desert basis and one’s estimation of the 
relative differences on how people score on that, and on what view one takes on the 
compatibility between luck and desert. But the resulting differences between people 
will not be limitless, which they should be if desertism is to justify limitless top 
incomes. 
 
139 See Moriarty (2009). The endorsement of a proportionality requirement is one crucial respect in 
which desert-based views differ from luck egalitarian views. For more discussion of this difference 
between the two theories, see Olsaretti (2009) and Brouwer and Van der Deijl (2018).   
140 In 2017, CEO Mindy Grossman from Weight Watchers International earned a total of $33,372,283, 
which is 5,908 times as much as the median worker (which earned $6,013) in that company in that year. 
See https://aflcio.org/paywatch/company-pay-ratios. 
141 One might object that the conventional view is not committed to the idea that the relation between 
desert and reward is linear, and instead argue that it is exponential, meaning that someone who 
deserves 6.000 times as much income as someone else does not have to perform 6.000 times better 
on any of those desert bases. How a person’s performance on a desert base should be transformed into 
a certain amount of income is decided by the ‘desert function’. The conventional view does not say 
what the desert function should be, and so in that sense the objector is right. However, no proponent 
of desert we know of defends such an exponential desert function, and for obvious reasons. It allows 
enormous inequalities in outcomes that run counter to many intuitions people have about desert. For 
more discussion on desert functions and CEO compensation, see Moriarty (2009). 
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Defenders of the conventional view arguably support a relatively high MIP, 
because they do not think that background luck undercuts desert.142 Background luck 
is luck that “affects the conditions in which people undertake their performances 
(rather than disrupting those performances), and includes both the luck of being born 
with certain talents and traits […] and the luck of being faced with certain situations 
or being placed in certain circumstances” (Olsaretti 2006, 440).  
Various desertists of a more egalitarian persuasion, however, argue that not 
only performance luck, but also certain types of background luck undercut desert 
claims, and, consequently, should endorse lower MIPs. 143  Olsaretti, for instance, 
argues that for desert claims on incomes require a fair equality of opportunity to 
deserve. She claims that “the defensible principle of desert is one which does not 
make the magnitude of people’s unequal deserts depend on unchosen, and unequally 
distributed, factors. People may then deserve more or less than others on the basis of 
the choices they make or the effort they exert, given certain fair background 
conditions that enable them to make free or voluntary choices, including the choice 
to exert more or less effort than others” (Olsaretti 2004, 28). Under this conception 
of fair equality of opportunity, entitlements on the basis of desert cannot rely on 
background luck such as a person’s IQ. The MIP supported by such a qualified stance 
on desert and luck sets a lower threshold than the conventional view. The larger the 
degree to which one thinks luck undercuts desert, the fewer inequalities in income 
desert can justify. So, this argument actually favors relatively small income ratios.144 
We have, so far, focussed on desert in relation to income from labor. But 
roughly the same arguments against the claim that people can deserve very high 
incomes from labor also applies to the claim that people can deserve very high 
incomes from capital, gifts, and inheritances—the other income sources to which 
MIPs apply. For example, people cannot personally take credit for the value of their 
 
142 We think that this is a position that, among others, Mulligan (2018a) is committed to.  
143 For a helpful overview of the debate, see Olsaretti (2006). Examples of philosophers who endorse 
views that are more demanding than the conventional view include Arneson (2007), Dekker (2008), 
Olsaretti (2004, chap. 1; 2008), and Sher (1989).  
144 A more radical view on the compatibility between desert and luck is the sceptical view. On this view, 
luck undercuts all desert claims on income. This sceptical view is defended by diametrically opposed 
thinkers, such as Milton Friedman (1962, 165–66) and John Rawls (1999, 89). For discussion of this and 
other objections Rawls raises against desert as a principle of justice, see Sher (Sher 1989, chap. 2), 
Moriarty (2005a), Matravers (2011a), and Mulligan (2018a, chap. 7). 
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stocks, global economic development, and so forth. In fact, in the case of inheritance, 
an even stronger desert-based argument is possible. There is simply no plausible basis 
on which people can deserve to inherit any wealth from their parents. Inheritances 
are not a reward for a productive contribution they made, or effort they exerted, or 
for a performance on any of the other desert bases of income that have been 
defended (cf. Dworkin 2000, 347; Rakowski 1991, 159).145  
The desert-based argument for maximum incomes can support all four types 
of MIPs. Desertism supports MIPs in structure, such as a 100 percent tax on all incomes 
above a certain amount. The same holds for the broader category of MIPs in aim. As 
for the distinction between absolute and relative MIPs: we think that desertism can 
support both. The desertist argument we provided for maximum incomes here was a 
comparative one and hence fits best with rMIPs: We asked how many times one 
human being can outperform another on the desert bases we mentioned. We think, 
however, that it would be possible to make a comparable argument based on how 
well any human can perform on the desert bases for income—which would be an 
argument in support of aMIPs.  
To conclude, there is a desert-based justification for limits to income. On the 
conventional view, which holds that people need to be able to take credit for their 
performance on the basis on which income is distributed, very high incomes are not 
‘deserved’. Given that there are limits to how much income people can deserve, limits 
on income simply follow, and desertism supports MIPs.146  
 
6. Conclusion 
No country currently has the nation-wide types of MIPs we have explored. Some might 
say that this fact alone is enough reason to reject them. But rather than seeing the 
absence of MIPs as an objection, this chapter urges us to view their absence in a 
different light. Rawlsian egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and desertism all support 
 
145 For a helpful discussion on this topic, see Mulligan (2018a, chap. 8). On luck and inheritance more 
generally, see Haliday (2018, chap. 4). 
146 One may doubt whether any combination of tax bases can isolate justified from unjustified desert 
claims, see, for instance, Fried (2000). Our claim is not that the maximum income tracks desert claims 
perfectly. Rather, the point is that, as a heuristic, the maximum income tracks desert claims better than 
other proposals, more specifically those regarding top incomes. 
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certain types of MIPs. Given the widespread support for such views, the absence of 
MIPs requires an explanation—not one drawing on politics but on normative political 
theory. And so, the burden of proof is with those who deny that income ceilings must 
be implemented. More specifically, the challenge is to show why a system without 
MIPs would be more just than a system having them. The idea of a minimum wage 
has been resisted for decades in many countries. But nowadays, many countries do 
have minimum wage policies in place. If there are minima to how much individuals 
can earn, why not maxima as well? 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion – open questions 
When asked whether some people deserve to be paid more than others, Milton 
Friedman answered: “I don’t think desert has anything to do with it. Who deserves 
what? Nobody deserves anything! Thank god that we don’t get what we deserve.”147 
John Rawls (1971, secs. 17 and 48) argued, quite influentially, that the parties 
negotiating the social contract in the original position would reject desert as a 
principle of distributive justice. And, finally, G.A. Cohen once remarked about desert 
that it “is a messy complex thing. We should not want it to form the basis of any social 
practice.”148  
 Despite these influential arguments to the opposite effect, it seems to me that 
generalized skepticism about desert as a principle of distributive justice is 
unwarranted. Desert can plausibly play a role within egalitarian theories of distributive 
justice. What unifies the papers in this PhD is that they contribute to showing that 
some of the objections that are commonly raised against desert do not apply to all 
conceptualizations of it. In addition, I have shown that desert can, in fact, plausibly 
play a limited role within luck egalitarianism and in discussions about just wages.149  
 Of course, there are many additional questions that need to be addressed to 
evaluate more fully what role desert can plausibly play within theorizing about 
distributive justice. My aim, in this conclusion, is to briefly discuss four important 
questions for future research on which I have started working already—and I expect 
to have made further progress on by the time of the PhD defense. The first two are 
about desert specifically, the next two about desert and luck egalitarianism.  
 
7.1. A compensatory desert argument for unequal pay150 
Can desert ever justify that some people should be paid more than others? Milton 
Friedman and John Rawls, in many ways diametrically opposed thinkers, both answer 
 
147 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hsIpQ7YguGE, at 2:35. 
148 Unpublished typescript, available on request.  
149 During my PhD, I co-edited a special issue of the Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics on 
desert and just wages. The contributions by Dekker (2018), Heath (2018), Herzog (2018), Lister (2018), 
Mulligan (2018b), and Sheffrin (2018) reflect explicitly on the question whether wages can, sometimes, 
be deserved.  
150 I am co-authoring this paper with Willem van der Deijl.  
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this question with a resounding ‘no’—for the same reason, in fact. They think that luck 
is so pervasive that it undercuts all differential desert claims on incomes.  
 As Friedman puts it: “most differences in status or position can be regarded as 
the product of chance at a far enough remove. The man who is hard working and 
thrifty is to be regarded as ‘deserving’; yet these qualities owe much to the genes he 
was fortunate (or unfortunate?) enough to inherit” (1962, 165–66). And Rawls says, 
as I pointed out in chapter 1, that: “We do not deserve our place in the distribution of 
native endowments, any more than we deserve our initial starting place in society. 
That we deserve the superior character that enables us to make the effort to cultivate 
our abilities is also problematic; for such character depends in good part upon 
fortunate family and social circumstances in early life for which we can claim no 
credit” (1999, 89).151 
  In this paper, Willem van der Deijl and I will argue that Friedman and Rawls’s 
luck challenge to desert can be resisted. In particular, it seems to us that 
compensatory desert can justify unequal pay. We defend this main claim in three 
steps. First, we point out that some jobs are more demanding and onerous than 
others. We then argue that people can deserve income on the basis of how demanding 
an onerous their jobs are. And, thirdly, we point out that our notion of compensatory 
desert is not vulnerable to Friedman’s and Rawls’s luck challenge. We defend the 
notion of compensatory desert we use against a challenge that has been raised against 
it by Olsaretti (2004, chap. 2). 
 
7.2. Property-owning democracy and desert 
Can very large inequalities in the ownership of property be distributively just? The 
pertinence of this question has grown, following increased awareness of the negative 
repercussions of growing wealth inequality in many developed economies (Atkinson 
2015; Piketty 2014): wealth inequality may undermine procedural fairness (Scanlon 
2018, chap. 4) and substantive equality of opportunity (Mulligan 2018b; Scanlon 2018, 
chap. 5; Thomas 2017), contribute to the furthering of objectionable status hierarchies 
 
151 Note that this is only one of the objections that Rawls raises against desert as a principle of justice. 
For helpful discussion of Rawls’s argument against desert, see Sher (1989, chap. 2), Moriarty (2005b), 
Matravers (2007), and Mulligan (2018a, chap. 7). 
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(Rawls 2001; Scanlon 2018, chap. 3), and even threaten the legitimacy of democratic 
government (Christiano 2010; Rawls 2001)—among many other concerns. This has 
induced some to ask whether it is time for a fundamental rethink of the welfare state 
capitalist system (Edmundson 2017; Thomas 2017). 
 One idea that is gaining traction in philosophical debates about justice is that 
of a property-owning democracy—an economic system in which, contrary to the 
welfare state capitalist system, the ownership of wealth would be widely dispersed 
(Rawls 2001; also see O’Neill 2009; O’Neill and Williamson 2012; Cheneval and Laszlo 
2016). An important concern in these debates is that Rawls’s own principles of justice 
may not, contrary to what Rawls himself argues, provide reason to support property-
owning democracy over welfare state capitalism (cf. Vallier 2015). This has led 
philosophers to search for alternative normative underpinnings for property-owning 
democracy schemes.  
 In the first monograph on property-owning democracy, Alan Thomas (2017) 
argues that a combination of Rawls’s principles and Roman republicanism would 
provide a better normative foundation than just Rawls’s principles alone. In that book, 
he also briefly (2017, 5) remarks that there are parallels between the concerns that 
motivate defenders of desert and defenders of certain versions of property-owning 
democracy. In this paper, I argue that desert could provide an alternative normative 
underpinning for property-owning democracy schemes. 
 
7.3. Human intuition about justice: Desertist or luck egalitarian?152  
Philosophers who defend desert often mention that the concept seems to play a 
central role in people’s reasoning about morality. Shelly Kagan, for instance, starts his 
book on the geometry of desert by pointing out that many people consider themselves 
to be friends of desert: They think that some people are more deserving than others, 
and that it is a good thing if people get what they deserve.  
 The question Thomas Mulligan and I ask in this paper is whether people are 
indeed as good friends with desert as is commonly believed. More specifically, we are 
interested in people’s pre-theoretical intuitions about distributive justice. The 
 
152 I am co-authoring this paper with Thomas Mulligan. 
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question we take up is: Which distributive theory best fits the empirical evidence on 
what people believe about justice? 
 There is a growing interest amongst economists and psychologists in this 
question. The consensus judgment about justice that emerges from these studies goes 
something like this: Unequal outcomes are justified when they reflect unequal 
economic contributions rather than lucky breaks; effort should be rewarded; a safety 
net should protect the deserving poor but not the imprudent; our economy ought to 
be responsive to merit.153  
The reader may recognize that this story, which has some prima facie 
coherence, in fact contains conceptual unclarities (mightn’t one’s economic 
contributions be a matter of luck, at least in part?), and involves different underlying 
normative principles (reward on the basis of effort and reward on the basis of merit 
are not coextensive).  
In this paper, we probe these matters. In particular, we examine, using recent, 
empirical research,154 how well luck egalitarianism and desertism—the two normative 
approaches that do seem to cohere with the coarse-grained story—are supported by 
the empirical literature. The result is surprising. In three quite different contexts in 
which the demands of luck egalitarianism and desertism diverge, the latter coheres 
with the empirical evidence and the former does not.  
That is, the evidence suggests that human beings across demographic lines 
may be desertists deep down—not luck egalitarians. While it is certainly true that luck 
egalitarianism coheres with pre-theoretical intuitions about justice more closely than 
egalitarianism or libertarianism, it does not seem to do as well as desert.  
We believe this project should be of broad interest, for two reasons. First, 
following Nelson Goodman (1995) and John Rawls (1971), most philosophers—even 
those who are not pure intuitionists—do believe that intuition matters when it comes 
to our theorizing, via the process of reflective equilibrium. Second, in recent years, 
 
153 Economists and philosophers who have pointed out this folk consensus about justice, and how 
different it is from the main theories of justice on offer in the philosophical literature, include Janmaat 
(2013), Konow and Schwettmann (2016), Miller (2001), Mulligan (2018a), and Sheffrin (2013).  
154 These recent studies include Tinghög, Andersson, and Västfjäll (2017); Mollerstrom, Reme, and 
Sørensen (2015); Konow (2000); Goya-Tocchetto, Echols, and Wright (2016); Freiman and Nichols 
(2011); Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2010); Almås et al. (2010). Older studies we use include 
are: Schokkaert and Capeau (1991), and Schokkaert and Overlaet (1989).  
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many philosophers involved in the “ideal v. non-ideal” debate (which, again, 
originated in Rawls (1971)) have begun to fret about a gap between (1) our abstract 
theories (and especially those that have dominated the philosophical debate—viz. 
(Rawlsian) egalitarianism and libertarianism) and (2) public sentiment toward relevant 
policy (like income/wealth redistribution). For some non-ideal theorists, if this gap is 
too large (if, e.g., the theory calls for a form of redistribution that is widely resisted) 
then the theory will not—perhaps cannot—be implemented. And this may, indeed, be 
a defect in the theory itself (see, for instance, Farrelly 2007; Wiens 2015a; 2015b; 
2016). 
 
7.4. Desert, luck, and liberal neutrality155  
G.A. Cohen once wrote that “[Ronald] Dworkin has, in effect, performed for 
egalitarianism the considerable service of incorporating within it the most powerful 
idea in the arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice and responsibility” 
(1989, 933). A common critique of luck egalitarianism, the theory inspired by 
Dworkin’s work, is that it takes too much from the anti-egalitarian right. Luck 
egalitarianism is too harsh on those who are responsible for being badly off. More 
specifically, it is thought to be too harsh, because it does not provide distributive 
justice reasons for (i) satisfying basic needs, and (ii) compensating those who 
voluntarily make costly, praiseworthy choices.  
 In response, some luck egalitarians have argued that critics wrongfully assume 
that they subscribe to a contextualist principle of stakes to identify the consequences 
of voluntary choices. On this principle, people would have to bear all the 
consequences of those choices. However, the luck egalitarian has various alternatives 
to the contextualist principle of stakes at her disposal, which require people to bear 
only a subset of those consequences. For instance, only those that people deserve, or 
only those that would be optimal for people to bear on consequentialist grounds.  
 As Serena Olsaretti points out, principles of stakes are committed to theories 
of value: They “presuppose a view of what individuals owe to one another in order to 
determine the legitimate consequences of choices” (2009, 186). In this paper, Julien 
 




Kloeg and I ask to what extent a commitment to theories of value for identifying the 
consequences of people’s voluntary choices can be reconciled with the liberal 
commitment to neutrality in justification. Our answer and the main claim of this paper 
is that luck egalitarianism seems to be faced with a neutrality dilemma: It cannot 
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Chapter 2: Defending asymmetries of desert?  
Is it defensible to hold that desert should play a (very) different role in distributive and 
in retributive justice? Samuel Scheffler, Saul Smilansky, and Jeffrey Moriarty have all 
argued that it is. Their defenses, however, have either been criticized, or only hold for 
weak asymmetries of desert—in which desert plays some role in both distributive 
justice and in retributive justice, but a more central role in the latter. These defenses 
do not support strong asymmetries, in which desert plays no role in distributive 
justice, but a central role in retributive justice. In this chapter, I defend two main 
claims about asymmetries of desert. First, I argue that some recent defenders of 
desert-based theories of distributive justice may actually be interested in defending 
asymmetries that go the other way: in which desert plays a more central role in 
distributive justice rather than in retributive justice. Second, I argue that strong 
asymmetries in both directions can be defended. Those who are sympathetic to strong 
asymmetries of desert have no reasons to revise their thinking radically, as Smilansky 
feared there might be.  
 
Chapter 3: When, if ever, is desert forward-looking? 
The received wisdom about desert is that desert claims are, always, backward-looking. 
Fred Feldman (1995) was the first to challenge this received wisdom. He argues that 
people can deserve compensation on the basis of their future acts and suffering. There 
have been two main responses to Feldman’s challenge. The first is to resist it, and 
argue that desert really is a backward-looking notion (Kristjánsson 2005; Celello 2009). 
The second is to build on Feldman’s suggestion that desert may sometimes be 
forward-looking, and propose a more elaborate account of forward-looking desert 
(Kristjánsson 2005; Celello 2009). In this chapter, I argue that desert is forward-looking 
for a wider range of objects and bases than has been considered so far. To make this 
claim, I proceed in three steps. First, I introduce Feldman’s argument for the forward-
looking desert of compensation and argue that criticisms that have been raised 
against it can be resisted. Secondly, I argue that the not just the desert of 




looking. I, thirdly, argue that, all else equal, it is better that people get what they 
deserve when they deserve it.  
 
Chapter 4: Why not be a desertist? Three arguments for desert and against luck 
egalitarianism 
Many philosophers believe that luck egalitarianism captures “desert-like” intuitions 
about justice. Some even think that luck egalitarianism distributes goods in 
accordance with desert. In this chapter, we argue that this is wrong. Desertism 
conflicts with luck egalitarianism in three important contexts, and, in these contexts, 
desertism renders the proper moral judgment. First, compared to desertism, luck 
egalitarianism is sometimes too stingy: It fails to justly compensate people for their 
socially valuable contributions—when those contributions arose from “option luck”. 
Second, luck egalitarianism is sometimes too restrictive: It fails to justly compensate 
people who make a social contribution when that contribution arose from “brute 
luck”. Third, luck egalitarianism is too limited in scope: It cannot diagnose economic 
injustice arising independently of comparative levels of justice. The lesson of this 
chapter is that luck egalitarians should consider supplementing their theory with 
desert considerations.  
 
Chapter 5: Can desert solve the problem of stakes? A reply to Olsaretti. 
Serena Olsaretti argues that desert cannot serve as a plausible principle of stakes for 
luck egalitarianism. In this short chapter, we defend the claim that she is too 
pessimistic about this by introducing a simple, but plausible, desert-based account of 
stakes that is immune to her argument. 
 
Chapter 6: Earning too much: The case for maximum incomes 
What, if anything, can justify a maximum income? Despite some common objections 
against maximum income policies, we will argue that Rawlsian egalitarianism, 
utilitarianism, and desertism—three prominent approaches to taxation and justice in 
contemporary political philosophy—support them. We argue that all three 
approaches support relative maximum income policies, whereas desertism also 




theories on support for maximum income policies strengthens, in our view, the case 
for such policies. And given this support for such policies, their absence in discussions 
in contemporary political philosophy requires an explanation—not one drawing on 
politics but on normative political theory. The burden of proof is with those who deny 














In filosofische discussies over de rechtvaardige verdeling van inkomen en vermogen 
speelt verdienste nauwelijks meer een rol. Dat is opvallend. Uit onderzoek blijkt 
namelijk dat verdienste wel een centrale rol speelt in hoe de spreekwoordelijke 
‘persoon op straat’ daarover denkt. Verdienste is overal: op de werkvloer, op het 
voetbalveld en in de rechtszaal. Let er maar eens op: Het is moeilijk om een dag door 
het leven te gaan en het werkwoord ‘verdienen’ niet te gebruiken.  
We zeggen, bijvoorbeeld, dat Willem een mooi salaris verdient omdat hij zo 
hard werkt. Dat Rozemarijn erkenning verdient omdat ze de buurvrouw uit haar 
brandende huis heeft gered. Dat Dick straf verdient omdat hij een winkeldiefstal heeft 
gepleegd. En dat Lydia een doctorstitel verdient omdat ze haar proefschrift uitstekend 
verdedigd heeft. Mensen zijn, zoals Shelly Kagan het mooi omschrijft, ‘vrienden van 
verdienste’: ze denken dat sommige mensen meer verdienen dan anderen, en dat het 
goed is als mensen krijgen wat ze verdienen. 
 
Verdienste nader bekeken 
Maar wat bedoelen we nu eigenlijk als we zeggen dat iemand iets verdient? Om beter 
grip op die vraag te krijgen is het volgende voorbeeld, van de al eerdergenoemde 
Shelly Kagan, behulpzaam. Stel er is een explosie geweest in een fabriek. Twee 
fabrieksmedewerkers, Amos en Boris, zijn gewond geraakt. Je kunt maar één van hen 
helpen, bijvoorbeeld omdat je maar één pijnstiller hebt. Wie kies je? Zonder enige 
andere informatie lijkt het antwoord eenvoudig: gooi een munt op. Amos en Boris 
lijken het allebei immers evenzeer te verdienen dat ze geholpen worden.  
Maar stel nu dat we wat meer informatie krijgen. Boris heeft de explosie 
veroorzaakt. En niet alleen dat: hij heeft dat ook nog eens expres gedaan—
bijvoorbeeld omdat hij nog steeds gefrustreerd is over een ruzie die hij de avond 
daarvoor had met zijn man. Wie moet je, gegeven deze nieuwe informatie, helpen? 
Het antwoord lijkt nu: Amos moet nu als eerste geholpen worden, omdat Boris het 
ongeluk expres heeft veroorzaakt. Boris verdient het niet langer om als eerste 





Hier stuiten we op een belangrijk eigenschap van het begrip verdienste: De 
bewering dat iemand iets verdient, komt erop neer dat er een morele balans 
verstoord zou zijn als iemand niet krijgt wat hij of zij verdient. Door het ongeluk in de 
fabriek te veroorzaken, heeft Boris een morele balans verstoord. Door hem niet als 
eerste te helpen, zetten we een stap in het herstellen van die balans. Maar dit alles 
leidt weer tot een boel nieuwe vragen: Wanneer weten we precies dat een morele 
balans verstoord is? Wat zijn goede manieren om de balans te herstellen? Om een 
antwoord op die vragen te vinden, is het behulpzaam om nog iets preciezer te worden 
over wat het nu betekent om te beweren dat iemand iets verdient. 
De bewering dat iemand iets verdient bestaat altijd, in ieder geval impliciet, uit 
drie onderdelen. We zeggen dat iemand (het verdienste onderwerp) een reactie, 
behandeling, of goed verdient (het verdienste object) omwille van een bepaalde reden 
(de verdienste grond). Dit helpt om te zien hoe dat idee van morele balans precies 
werkt: om te bepalen of er morele balans is, dient de relatie tussen het verdienste 
object en de verdienste grond passend te zijn. Als we Boris (het verdienste onderwerp) 
als eerste helpen (het verdienste object) omdat hij expres het ongeluk in de fabriek 
heeft veroorzaakt (de verdienste grond), dan is die relatie niet passend. Als we Amos 
(het verdienste onderwerp) als eerste helpen (het verdienste object) omdat hij, in 
tegenstelling tot Boris, het ongeluk in de fabriek niet heeft veroorzaakt (de verdienste 
grond), dan is die relatie wel passend. 
 
Twee verdienste dogma’s 
Een groot deel van de filosofische literatuur gaat over de vraag wanneer het 
verdienste object en de verdienste grond wél bij elkaar passen. Wat voor en hoeveel 
beloning zou Willem precies moeten krijgen voor zijn harde werk? Wat voor en 
hoeveel beloning zou Rozemarijn moeten krijgen voor haar heldhaftige reddingsactie? 
En wat voor en hoeveel straf zou Dick moeten krijgen voor zijn winkeldiefstal? Veel 
filosofen nemen, in het beantwoorden van deze vragen, twee dingen aan die ik in mijn 
proefschrift betwist: (1) dat verdienste en verantwoordelijkheid altijd zeer nauw met 
elkaar verweven zijn en dat (2) je uitsluitend kunt verdienen op basis van je 
eigenschappen en/of handelen in het verleden en het heden—nooit op basis van je 




Er is goede reden om te denken dat verdienste en verantwoordelijkheid soms 
met elkaar verbonden zijn. Neem onze hardwerkende Willem: stel nu dat hij alleen 
maar zo hard werkt omdat hij doping gebruikt. Zou hij dan nog steeds een mooi salaris 
verdienen voor zijn harde werk? Dat lijkt niet zo te zijn. Willem is immers niet helemaal 
verantwoordelijk te houden voor zijn harde werk. Om een hoger salaris te verdienen 
dan anderen op basis van het feit dat je beter presteert, dien je er verantwoordelijk 
voor te zijn dat je beter presteert. Dit is nog duidelijker in het geval van straf: stel dat 
Dick geestesziek is en uitsluitend daardoor de winkeldiefstal heeft gepleegd. Dan 
verdient hij geen straf, hij is immers ontoerekeningsvatbaar. Het kan natuurlijk nog 
steeds beter zijn voor Dick en de samenleving om hem bijvoorbeeld zijn vrijheid te 
ontnemen, maar een straf verdienen doet hij niet. Verdienste vereist in deze gevallen 
verantwoordelijkheid.  
Maar er zijn ook gevallen waarin het juist niet zo aannemelijk is om te denken 
dat verdienste verantwoordelijkheid vereist. Neem het volgende, licht aangepaste 
voorbeeld van filosoof Fred Feldman: de kok van vegetarisch restaurant Burgertrut 
heeft zijn groenteburgers niet in de koelkast gedaan toen hij het restaurant verliet. De 
burgers bederven die nacht, maar de souschef die de volgende dag voor hem invalt 
heeft niets door. Hij bakt de burgers iets te licht en serveert ze uit. Veel mensen die 
bij Burgertrut eten die avond lopen een voedselvergiftiging op. Het lijkt erop dat de 
mensen die een voedselvergiftiging hebben opgelopen op zijn minst excuses 
verdienen van Burgertrut en misschien zelfs compensatie. En dat terwijl ze niet 
verantwoordelijk zijn voor het feit dat ze een voedselvergiftiging hebben opgelopen. 
Verdienste vereist soms juist geen verantwoordelijkheid.   
Ik beargumenteer in mijn proefschrift dat wanneer verdienste precies 
verantwoordelijkheid vereist afhangt van twee dingen: de vraag of het verdienste 
object ongelijk verdeeld wordt en de keuze van de verdienstegrond. Als het verdienste 
object gelijk verdeeld wordt—dus, als niemand meer krijgt dan een ander—dan maakt 
het niet zoveel uit of mensen nu verantwoordelijk zijn voor de verdienstegrond of niet. 
Als iedereen bijvoorbeeld een AOW-uitkering verdient op basis van het feit dat ze 
ouder zijn dan 66 jaar en 4 maanden—dan is het zinloos om te vragen of ze daarvoor 
verantwoordelijk zijn. Je hebt geen controle over je leeftijd. Datzelfde geldt, zoals Fred 




die erg ziek zijn, kunnen het verdienen om een door hen diepgekoesterde wens 
vervuld te krijgen door de Make-a-Wish foundation. Maar die kinderen zijn met geen 
mogelijkheid verantwoordelijk te houden voor het feit dat ze ziek worden! Verdienste 
en verantwoordelijkheid zijn niet altijd nauw met elkaar verweven.  
Dat brengt me bij het tweede verdienste dogma: het idee dat je uitsluitend 
kunt verdienen op basis van je eigenschappen en/of handelen in het verleden en het 
heden—nooit op basis van je eigenschappen en/of handelingen in de toekomst. 
Verdienste kijkt, volgens dit dogma, achteruit, niet vooruit. Dit is voor sommige 
verdienste objecten zeer aannemelijk: neem het verdienen van straf. Als verdienste 
vooruit zou kijken, dan zouden we Dick, onze winkeldief, nu al mogen straffen voor 
het feit dat hij in de toekomst een misdaad gaat plegen. Dat is problematisch: Dick zou 
immers op het (aller)laatste moment kunnen besluiten om alsnog de misdaad niet te 
plegen. Als dat zo is, zouden we hem onterecht straffen! Dat is erg, vooral omdat 
straffen bestaat uit het bewust toebrengen van lijden in anderen. Alleen al om deze 
reden is het waarschijnlijk dat we mensen nooit mogen straffen op basis van dingen 
die ze in de toekomst gaan doen.    
Maar verdienste kijkt soms wél vooruit. Stel je voor dat je niet één, maar twee 
zieke kinderen hebt: Charlie en Susanne. Hoewel ze nu even ziek zijn, is er een enorm 
verschil in de vooruitzichten voor beide kinderen. Charlie zal volledig herstellen, 
terwijl Susanne helaas zal komen te overlijden. Tragisch genoeg zit de Make-a-Wish 
foundation wat krap bij de kas: het is onmogelijk om de wensen van Charlie en 
Susanne allebei te vervullen. De wens van slechts één van de twee kinderen kan 
worden vervuld. Wie moeten we kiezen? Het antwoord lijkt duidelijk: Susanne, omdat 
zij, naar alle waarschijnlijkheid, uiteindelijk zal komen te overlijden en Charlie niet. Er 
is een minieme kans dat we ernaast zullen zitten. Misschien overleeft Susanne haar 
ziekte wel, net als Charlie. Maar ten onterechte de wensen van iemand vervullen is 
een stuk minder problematisch dan iemand onterecht lijden toebrengen. Hoe zeker 
we moeten zijn van onze zaak hangt af van wat we aan het verdelen zijn. Soms hangt 
wat mensen verdienen daarom niet uitsluitend af van hun eigenschappen en/of 
handelen in het verleden en het heden, maar ook van hun eigenschappen en/of 




Als verdienste soms vooruitkijkt, kunnen we het concept gebruiken voor 
allerlei discussies waar het nog niet in gebruikt wordt. Neem discussies over 
orgaandonatie. Zou iemand die voor haar dood besluit om haar organen te doneren 
daarvoor nu al compensatie kunnen verdienen, bijvoorbeeld door haar voorrang te 
geven als ze zelf organen nodig heeft? Zouden toekomstige generaties compensatie 
kunnen verdienen voor de immense schade die wij het klimaat aan het toebrengen 
zijn? Ik zou vooral die tweede vraag met een voorzichtig ja willen beantwoorden, maar 
dat is een onderwerp voor meer toekomstig onderzoek.  
 
De bijdrage van dit proefschrift 
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit vijf artikelen. De rode draad door die artikelen is dat ik 
probeer om te laten zien dat (i) verdienste een complexer begrip is dan vaak gedacht 
wordt, (ii) niet alle bezwaren die filosofen hebben tegen verdienste gelden voor alle 
concepties van verdienste, en dat (iii) verdienste een belangrijke groep theorieën in 
het filosofische debat over rechtvaardigheid, het ‘toevalsegalitarisme’, kan helpen om 
bezwaren tegen hun theorieën te accommoderen. In dat project speelt het ontkennen 
van de twee dogma’s die ik hierboven beschreven heb een belangrijke rol. Mijn hoop 
is dat ik met dit proefschrift kan bijdragen aan een rehabilitatie van het concept 
verdienste in discussies over een rechtvaardige verdeling van inkomen en welvaart. 
Het is opmerkelijk dat een concept dat zo’n centrale rol speelt in de 
rechtvaardigheidsintuïties van mensen, maar zo’n beperkte rol speelt in filosofische 
discussies over rechtvaardigheid. Ik denk dat, in dit geval, de ‘persoon op straat’ 
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